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Abstract 
 
This paper considers the protection of universal service in the network industries, with a focus on 
the postal service and telecommunications sectors. We define the concept of universal service 
and explain how it was seen as a necessary quid pro quo for securing the liberalisation agenda in 
the EU. We go on to explain and analyse the two competing means of protecting and 
compensating universal service, either under the State aid regime or the relevant sectoral 
legislation. In order to gain a better understanding of how these competing mechanisms operate 
in practice, we look in detail at two areas where liberalisation and universal service are in 
particular tension: (i) high-speed broadband and (ii) letter collection and delivery. We conclude 
by discussing some of the problems of using State aid rules as a substitute for a sectoral 
framework and contemplate the future of universal service.  
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A. Introduction 
 
Over the last three decades, the EU has been pursuing a liberalisation agenda across all of the 
network industries – telecommunications, postal services, energy, water and railways. A concern 
to arise from this is that when traditionally monopolised markets are opened to competition, new 
entrants may be able to enter and target the most profitable consumers, leaving the incumbent 
with a disproportionate number of consumers who provide insufficient revenue to cover their 
costs. This is a particular problem where there have historically been extensive cross-subsidies in 
favour of groups of consumers who are viewed as vulnerable, deserving or politically sensitive 
(for example, those living in rural areas). As a consequence, it is often politically difficult or 
socially undesirable to achieve cost-reflective pricing through tariff rebalancing.  
 
The response in the EU has been to formalise the protection of certain classes of customers 
through the imposition of universal service obligations (USOs). In the early days of 
liberalisation, such obligations were normally imposed on the incumbent without it being 
compensated; its size and the advantages it had derived as the historic monopolist meant that it 
could afford to absorb these additional costs without being placed at a significant competitive 
disadvantage. The effectiveness of this approach to universal service begins to unravel where the 
market share of the incumbent is significantly eroded by new entry, or where new investment is 
needed in network infrastructure. In the long-run, a sustainable approach to funding universal 
service has to be found.  
 
In this paper, we consider the legal responses to the protection of the universal service in the EU. 
In section B, we define what is meant by USOs, and explain some of the potential market 
distortions that can occur in pursuing them, including how entrants and incumbents may be 
placed at a competitive (dis)advantage. While there are inherent tensions in attempting to secure 
universal service alongside liberalisation, a number of EU Member States would never have 
accepted the latter goal without some formal protection for the former. However, in more recent 
years, the policy emphasis has shifted towards the introduction of contestability into the 
provision of universal service with an attempt to reverse the de facto presumption of the 
incumbent’s continuation of the role. In section C, we explain and compare the legal frameworks 
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for universal service provision. In the network industries, the relevant EU secondary legislation 
often prescribes both the requirements of USOs and the means by which compensation may be 
made to those entrusted with its provision. Alternatively, as a subset of Services of General 
Interest (SGEIs), Member States may instead choose to make compensation payments to 
universal service providers (USPs) under the State aid regime, as reformed by the 2012 SGEI 
package. As we explain, in recent years, under both the sectoral and State aid regimes, increased 
emphasis has been placed upon contestability in the provision of universal service. In section D, 
we have selected two contrasting areas to investigate further. The first relates to the provision of 
high-speed broadband, the expansion of which requires substantial investment in infrastructure, 
both public and private. What is particularly striking here is that Member States have eschewed 
the secondary legislation, and the sectoral rules on compensation which it contains, in favour of 
making use of the State aid regime. The second area is postal services, in particular the collection 
and delivery of letters. The provision of universal service has come under particular strain in 
recent years due to increased liberalisation and dramatic falls in demand. Nevertheless, we see 
here very little use of compensation mechanisms, either under the sectoral or State aid regimes, 
with a focus instead on incumbents achieving efficiency gains. In section E, we conclude, 
contemplating the future of universal service, its sustainability, and the extent to which it is 
subordinated to pro-competition goals.  
 
B. Universal service obligations and liberalisation 
 
In this section, we first define what is meant by universal service, before proceeding to explain 
some of the tensions that exist between its protection and the promotion of liberalisation and 
competition in the network industries. We discuss how the protection of universal service in the 
EU was essentially a political compromise by Member States in accepting the EU’s liberalisation 
agenda for the network industries. We then explain how universal service can be secured, 
particularly by utilising the various options that exist in the design of compensation mechanisms.  
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The nature and extent of USOs differ significantly between sectors and countries.1 In some 
sectors, such as telecommunication and postal services, USOs tend to be highly specified, 
whereas in others, EU law lays down requirements which are fairly open textured, leaving 
Member States with a broad degree of discretion. While there is no universal definition of what 
is meant by the term, it is normally taken to mean a requirement which maximises the ubiquity of 
a service in terms of coverage and accessibility.2 First, there may be an obligation to provide a 
prescribed level of geographical coverage for a particular type of service. To achieve 
geographical ubiquity, it may be necessary to use cross-subsidies (for example, from customers 
in urban areas to those in rural areas). Second, such obligations may require that services are 
offered at a price which is “affordable”. Again, this may involve cross-subsidies between 
different types of users (for example, between business and domestic customers). Uniform 
pricing may be used to achieve this goal or a more targeted approach may be used in the form of 
special tariffs in favour of particular types of disadvantaged consumers (“social tariffs”). What 
unifies all of these different requirements is the notion that the market would not otherwise serve 
these areas and/or consumers, or if it did, prices would be charged which would place services 
beyond the reach of a significant number of consumers.3  
 
The imposition of USOs may lead to a number of market distortions. Restrictions on pricing, in 
particular uniform pricing mechanisms, can create strategic links between market participants 
which have complex effects;4 for instance, the possibility of higher prices for all consumers, 
                                                          
1 For a comprehensive review of the literature see M Harker, A Kreutzmann and C Waddams, “Public service 
obligations and competition”, (2013) CERRE, Final Report, 23-46, 
http://www.cerre.eu/sites/cerre/files/130318_CERRE_PSOCompetition_Final_0.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. 
2 Colin R Blackman, “Universal service: obligation or opportunity?” (1995) 19 Telecommunications Policy 171, 
172. 
3 On social exclusion, see E Szyszczak, The regulation of the state in competitive markets in the EU (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2007) 243. 
4 F Mirabel, JC Poudou and M Roland, “Universal service obligations: The role of subsidization schemes” (2009) 21 
Information Economics and Policy 1, 7. 
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including the intended beneficiaries of the policy.5 The imposition of USOs may also reduce 
entry, especially if the obligations are imposed on entrants.6  
 
One particular problem with USOs is “cherry-picking”, i.e., where new entrants target the most 
profitable consumers, leaving the incumbent with those consumers who provide insufficient 
revenue to cover their costs.7 While this may be sustainable in the short term, as new entrants 
establish their position on the market, in the long run the incumbent’s costs will be forced 
upwards, meaning it will either be required to increase its prices, or some form of compensation 
mechanism will have to be employed (for example, an industry compensation scheme). Such 
mechanisms are not without their own problems and may lead to the over-compensation of the 
incumbent.8 It may also mean that certain classes of customers are left with the incumbent 
provider, who is perhaps offering an inferior level of service to that which would be available to 
them in a competitive environment.9 This tends to emphasise the importance of analysing the 
counterfactual, i.e., the market conditions which would prevail absent the USO. Indeed, it may 
even be the case that the imposition of USOs on the incumbent provider may actually place it at 
a competitive advantage vis-à-vis new entrants, especially where it is over-compensated for the 
cost of providing the USO.  
 
From a political perspective, it is often difficult to withdraw USOs, especially where doing so 
may lead to the erosion of cross-subsidies leading to adverse distributional consequences.10 
                                                          
5 Calzada demonstrates that uniform pricing will affect the development of competition enabling the entrant to enter 
in a limited way, increasing both the incumbent’s prices and the profitability of both players, J Calzada “Universal 
service obligations in the postal sector: The relationship between quality and coverage” (2009) 21 Information 
Economics and Policy 10, 18;  Hviid and Waddams Price show how non-discrimination clauses imposed in the UK 
energy markets result in higher prices for all consumers, M Hviid and C Waddams Price, “Non-Discrimination 
Clauses in the Retail Energy Sector” (2012) 122 The Economic Journal, F236.  
6 S Hoernig and TE Pinto, “Universal Service Obligations: Should they be imposed on entrants?” (2001) 
ftp://193.196.11.222/pub/zew-docs/div/IKT/hoernig.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. 
7 L Rapp, “Public service or universal service?” (1996) 20 Telecommunications Policy 391, 394; G Simmonds, 
“Consumer Representation in Europe Policy and Practice for Utilities and Network Industries, Universal and Public 
Service Obligations in Europe” (2003) CRI Research Report 15/2003, 8. 
http://www.bath.ac.uk/management/cri/pubpdf/Research_Reports/15_Simmonds.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. 
8 A Gautier and X Wauthy, “Competitively neutral universal service obligations” (2012) 24 Information Economics 
and Policy 254, 259-60. 
9 JC Panzar, “A methodology for measuring the costs of universal service obligations” (2000) 12 Information 
Economics and Policy 211. 
10 See OECD, “Rethinking Universal Service for a Next Generation Network Environment” (2006) OECD Digital 
Economy Papers 113, 22-23, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/231528858833 accessed 3 August 2016. 
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Tariff rebalancing may be perceived as inequitable where it leads to higher prices for lower 
income and rural consumers, and may even result in some consumers disconnecting from the 
network altogether.11 The political sensitivity of tariff rebalancing may be employed by 
incumbents to resist liberalisation, or to slow its pace, and there is certainly evidence from the 
past that incumbents have used its spectre as a means of resisting liberalisation.12  
 
While there are obvious tensions between liberalisation and USOs, it may be that there is a more 
nuanced relationship between the two. First, the formal recognition of USOs was seen as a quid 
pro quo for further liberalisation, especially for Member States like France that have a strong 
tradition of public service in utilities.13 In this context then, USOs may be characterised as a 
“means to protect the weakest citizens from market liberalization”.14 So without the 
strengthening of USOs in law, the achievement of liberalisation policies at the EU level would 
have been more difficult. Second, liberalisation and USOs may serve the same ends. Increased 
competition may lead to lower prices, greater efficiency and increased affordability. 
Furthermore, the formal legal status and specification given to USOs, while differing 
significantly between sectors, may lead to more meaningful (and enforceable) rights for 
consumers.15 The clearer specification of USOs also increases certainty for market players, 
including new entrants.  
 
                                                          
11 Ibid. 
12 The UK gas incumbent, British Gas, provided an early example of such lobbying in its evidence to the 1993 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission Inquiry into opening the market. They predicted huge increases in fixed 
charges, less than a decade before they themselves abolished them in the competitive market, see M Bennett, D 
Cooke and C Waddams Price, “Left out in the cold? New energy tariffs, low-income households and the fuel poor” 
(2005) 23 Fiscal Studies 167. 
13 T Prosser, The limits of competition law: Markets and public services (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005), 
106-13. For a comparative discussion, see KA Eliassen and J From, “Deregulation, privatisation and public service 
delivery: Universal service in telecommunications in Europe” (2009) 27 Policy and Society 239. 
14 M Finger and D Finon, “From “service public” to universal service: the case of the European Union” in M Finger 
and RW Künneke (eds), International handbook of network industries: The liberalization of infrastructure 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2011), 55.  
15 W Sauter, “Services of general economic interest and universal service in EU law” (2008) 33 European Law 
Review 167, 178. 
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There are potential downsides to greater specification of USOs.16 The concept of universal 
service is a dynamic one, which needs to adapt to changing societal and technological needs.17 
Issues of particular concern include affordability in the light of changing living standards, 
changing perceptions of what is an essential service (for example, access to the internet is 
increasingly perceived as a basic need), and the danger of locking in services which are no 
longer used extensively nor judged as essential. So where USOs remain static and highly 
specified, they may become outmoded or irrelevant.18  
 
While some form of compensation may be necessary in order to achieve USOs, there are a 
number of different models which can be chosen, and the incumbent firm is not necessarily the 
best candidate for discharging the USO. One option is to remove the subsidies from the 
competitive retail supply market and deliver them through other means, for example, via a 
monopoly distribution network (where one exists). This occurs in many distribution networks 
where rural consumers are subsidised by urban consumers by the charging of uniform 
distribution prices. A second option is to grant special or exclusive rights over certain markets to 
the universal service provider, preserving its ability to cross-subsidise between profitable and 
non-profitable customers. This was the model used until recently in postal services. A third 
option, which tends to be the default regulatory choice, is to allow the incumbent to carry the 
costs without compensation because it enjoys other advantages. In the long run, as liberalisation 
gathers pace, it is unlikely that failing to compensate the incumbent will be sustainable. This then 
raises the vexed question of how to calculate the net costs and benefits for the purpose of 
                                                          
16 The actual level of specification differs significantly between sectors. For post and telecommunications, there is 
more detailed specification of the universal service requirements in EU law than is the case for the other network 
industries, in particular, transport, water and electricity. This can, in part, be attributed to the structural 
characteristics of the different network industries (for example, the amount of cross-border trade); and in part to the 
historical traditions in the Member States with regard to the definition and implementation of universal and public 
service provisions in these sectors. See Simmonds, supra n 7, 61; Prosser supra n 13, 174-206; and for a full survey, 
see Harker et al., supra n 1, 65-73.  
17 J Alleman, P Rappoport and A Banerjee, “Universal service: A new definition?” (2010) 34 Telecommunications 
Policy 86, 90; J Davies and E Szyszczak, “Universal Service Obligations: Fulfilling New Generations of Services of 
Economic Interest”, in E Szyszczak (ed), Developments in Services of General Interest (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser 
Press, 2011) 162-71; A Kreutzmann-Gallasch et al, “Criteria to define essential telecoms services” (2013) A Report 
for Ofcom by the ESRC Centre for Competition Policy, 9-16.  
18 Kreutzmann-Gallasch et al, supra n 17; Harker et al, “Competition for UK postal sector and the universal service 
obligation” (2014) BIS Consultation response from the ESRC Centre for Competition Policy,  
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/8158338/8261737/CCP+Response+-+BIS+-
+Competition+for+UK+Postal+Sector.pdf/364e21b3-6296-4ee9-8e4d-945b696e8235 accessed 3 August 2016. 
 8 
 
compensating the universal service provider.19 There are two possible sources of compensation. 
One is an industry compensation scheme whereby entrants compensate the incumbent for 
fulfilling the relevant USO. Another is compensation directly from public funds. In either case, 
there is the problem that the incumbent will be over-compensated because, as with regulation 
more generally, it enjoys an informational advantage over, and an incentive to exaggerate, its 
costs. In addition, the incumbent may enjoy certain other intangible benefits in being appointed 
as universal service provider, for example, brand ubiquity.  
 
There is no reason, however, why the incumbent should be the universal service provider. An 
auction could be held for supplying consumers who require enhanced services or who are loss-
making, inviting bids to supply them with a subsidy. This is similar to the franchising 
arrangements for loss making transport routes, and has the obvious advantage of potentially 
revealing the most efficient provider. Another option is to require all suppliers to either ‘pay or 
play’, so that either they supply a particular portion of the loss making consumers, or pay a 
contribution (in proportion to their market share) into a central fund which is then distributed to 
those who do.20 As we discuss in the remainder of this paper, substantial efforts have been made 
in recent years to expand the provision of universal service beyond the historic incumbents, 
albeit with varying degrees of success.  
 
C. The funding of universal service in a changing environment 
 
In this section we explain the legal frameworks which govern the compensation of universal 
service. First, since USOs are generally accommodated within the Treaty – as a subset of SGEI – 
                                                          
19 A paper by Rodriguez and Storer pays considerable attention to the calculation of USOs. Two main approaches 
are suggested: the net avoided cost and the entry pricing approach, but both have their difficulties. F Rodriguez and 
D Storer, “Alternative approaches to estimating the cost of the USO in posts” (2000) Information Economics and 
Policy 285. In a later report on telecoms, the OECD reports on the difficulties in estimating the net cost of providing 
universal service, including identification of the intangible benefits which might accrue to the universal service 
provider, and the adverse effect such uncertainty might have on investment in the sector: OECD, supra n 10, 18.  
20 For a discussion see P Choné, L Flochel and A Perrot, “Universal service obligations and competition” (2000) 12 
Information Economics and Policy 249. The OECD is of the view that such processes can “generate incentives to 
contain costs, innovate, and reveal the true cost of delivering universal service thus minimising the subsidy 
required” (OECD, supra n 10, 5). It points to some success in competitive tendering in Chile and Peru, although less 
success in Australia and Switzerland (where trials resulted in no competitive entry) (OECD, supra n 10, 18). 
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compensation for the costs generated by them may be justified, even if this requires a derogation 
from the EU competition rules, including the State aid rules.21 We therefore sketch briefly the 
main principles and requirements for compliance with the State aid rules. Second, the general 
rules on State aids and SGEIs have, to a certain extent, been displaced by the rules contained in 
the EU secondary legislation which both define universal service goals and lay down the 
procedural and substantive provisions for compensation. While these sectoral rules have been in 
place for a number of years, they have been left largely inactive by Member States due to the 
incumbents’ ability to maintain cross-subsidies without explicit compensation. Indeed, as we 
explain, the compensation provisions are only triggered if and when the USP can demonstrate 
that the USO imposes upon it an ‘unfair burden’, which is by no means straightforward. In recent 
years the Commission has used its enforcement powers in numerous instances, especially where 
compensation mechanisms appear to be over-compensating the incumbent, or are designed in 
such a way as to exclude entrants from being designated as a USP.  
 
1. State aid, universal service, and Services of General Economic Interest 
 
While no explicit mention is afforded to universal service in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU),22 the concept is generally considered to fall within the scope of SGEI, 
which are given specific protection under the TFEU, primarily under Article 106(2).23 
                                                          
21 Indeed, in theory, where compensation exists which does not exceed the net cost of providing the USOs, 
undertaking(s) charged with their fulfilment are not placed at a competitive advantage, and so the State aid rules are 
not engaged at all.  
22 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47. Unless 
indicated otherwise, all further references are made to the TFEU.  
23 SGEIs are also given protection under Article 14 TFEU, Protocol 26 to the TFEU and Article 36 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. On the effects of Article 14, Protocol 26, and Art 36 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: 
Sauter argues that these provisions add substantively little to Article 106(2), see W Sauter, supra  n 15, 174; W 
Sauter, Public services in EU law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015) 12. For a general discussion see 
N Fiedziuk, “Services of general economic interest and the Treaty of Lisbon: opening doors to a whole new 
approach or maintaining the “status quo”” (2011) 37 European Law Review 226. On the other hand, von Danwitz 
argues that their adoption is “the culmination point in the fight for a specific legal status for public services” (T von 
Danwitz, “The Concept of State Aid in Liberalised Sectors”, (2008) EUI Working Papers LAW 2008/28, 1 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/9588/LAW_2008_28.pdf?sequence=1 accessed 3 August 2016). 
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Notwithstanding the various attempts by the Commission to define SGEI24 (and USOs),25 
Member States have a measure of discretion in defining a service as a SGEI.26 This approach 
allows Member States to establish, extend and adjust the provision of particular services to 
specific national needs, subject to certain limiting principles developed by the EU courts. That 
said, in recent years the Court has held that services can only be categorised as a SGEI if it can 
be demonstrated that the service would not otherwise be provided through the market – the 
‘market failure’ requirement – which significantly limits the apparently broad discretion of 
Member States.27 For example, in a recent case concerning high-speed broadband, the General 
Court confirmed that the presence of market failure is a necessary condition for a SGEI.28  
 
Although external financing may be necessary to secure the provision of USOs, it can also distort 
competition. Article 106(2) contains a derogation from the application of the competition rules, 
including the general prohibition on State aids. However, where the payment made to a universal 
service provider goes no further than merely compensating the undertaking for the net costs of 
fulfilling the USO, there is in principle no market distortion, since it is not placed at a 
competitive advantage vis-à-vis its competitors.  
 
In the past there was no clear understanding of whether payments for the provision of SGEIs 
were to be regarded merely as compensation for discharging those services (the “compensation 
                                                          
24 The term ‘SGEI’ also lacks a clear definition. However, the European Commission has sought to clarify and 
define the concept of SGEI in several of its policy documents, for example, as “economic activities which deliver 
outcomes in the overall public good that would not be supplied (or would be supplied under different conditions in 
terms of quality, safety, affordability, equal treatment or universal access) by the market without public 
intervention”. European Commission, “A Quality Framework for Services of General Interest in Europe”, 
(Communication) COM (2011) 900 final, 5.  
25 In the 2011 Communication, the Commission referred to USOs as: “requirements designed to ensure that certain 
services are made available to all consumers and users in a Member State, regardless of their geographical location, 
at a specified quality and, taking account of specific national circumstances, at an affordable price”. Ibid, 4. This 
definition is in line with Article 3(1) of Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service Directive) [2002] OJ L108.   
26 The Treaty allows Member States and their local, regional and national public authorities broad discretion to 
define a service as being SGEI (and USO). Case T-17/02 Olsen v Commission [2005] ECR II-2031, para 216 
(confirmed by order of the Case C-320/05P Olsen v Commission [2007] I-131 ECR).  
27 Whether or not a service is provided through the market is then addressed by the test for “manifest error of 
assessment”, Olsen v Commission, supra n 26, para 166. For a defence of this position see Sauter, supra n 15, 178.  
28 In the Colt case, the existence of market failure was assumed when the Member State can demonstrate that the 
service will not be provided by the market within the near future, Case T-79/10 Colt Télécommunications France v 
European Commission ECLI:EU:T:2013:463, para 153. Earlier, the General Court ruled in BUPA that in order to 
pass this test, a SGEI must have a “universal and compulsory nature” and the Member State is obliged to explain 
why a particular service is to be regarded as SGEI, Case T-289/03 BUPA [2008] II-81 ECR, para 172. 
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approach”), or as State aid (the “State aid approach”). Under the State aid approach, each 
payment to an entrusted undertaking was considered as State aid within the meaning of Article 
107(1) and, therefore, incompatible with the internal market unless they satisfied one of the 
public interest exceptions contained in Article 107(2-3). However, even if the compensation in 
question did not satisfy the State aid exceptions, it could still be justified under Article 106(2). 
Even though the payment may ultimately be compatible with the internal market, the 
Commission must be notified of it in advance and the Member State is required to wait for the 
Commission’s approval before making the payment (the standstill obligation).29 In contrast, 
under the compensation approach, payment for the pure recovery of the undertaking’s net costs 
(including a reasonable profit) for the delivery of a SGEI is to be regarded as merely 
compensatory and not as State aid. Such a payment would be compatible with the internal market 
without recourse to the public interest exceptions nor the derogation under Article 106(2). 
Further, as it is not regarded as State aid, a prior assessment by the Commission is not 
necessary.30 In practice, therefore, the main difference between the two approaches is the 
notification requirement and standstill obligation under the State aid approach, which obviously 
gives the Commission more control over Member States’ autonomy.  
 
In terms of the jurisprudence, it is fair to say that, while the EU courts have not been entirely 
consistent, the compensation approach dominates.31 The issue was apparently settled in the 
Altmark case,32 where the Court confirmed that the compensation approach was the correct one 
to be followed, confirming as a point of principle that provided the undertaking does not receive 
over-compensation for the fulfilling its public service mission, such payments do not put it at a 
competitive advantage within the meaning of Article 107(1).33 The Court went further, however, 
                                                          
29 Art 108(3). 
30 L Hancher and P Larouche, “The Coming Age of EU Regulation of Network Industries and Services of General 
Economic Interest” in PP Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The evolution of EU law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2nd edn, 2011) 759; A Jones and B Sufrin, EU competition law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 5th edn, 2014),  
chapter State aid,  67-8; For a detailed discussion of the compensation approach and the state aid approach, see 
Szyszczak, supra n 3, 222–28.  
31 For examples of the compensation approach, see: Case C-240/83 Procureur de la République v ADBHU [1985] 
ECR 531, para 18; Case C-53/00 Ferring [2001] ECR I-9067, para 27. For examples of the State aid approach, see: 
Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de Espana SA v Ayuntamiento de Valencia [1994] ECR I-877, paras 20-22.; Case T-
106/95 FFSA and Others v Commission [1997] ECR II-229, para 172; Case T-46/97 SIC v Commission [2000] ECR 
II-2125, para 84. 
32 Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans [2003] ECR I-7747. 
33 Ibid, para 92. 
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by developing four cumulative criteria which have to be met for a payment to fall outside of the 
scope of Article 107(1) (“the Altmark criteria”).34 Despite the apparent clarity of the Court’s 
criteria, their application has not been unproblematic. The fourth criterion – requiring that the 
undertaking is either selected by a public procurement process or that compensation should 
reflect the costs of a “typical, well-run undertaking” (hereafter “the efficiency benchmark”) – has 
been very difficult to apply in practice.35 However, in BUPA, this requirement was relaxed by the 
General Court. Depending on the established compensation scheme in place, an efficiency 
benchmark may not be needed, even in cases in which the undertaking was not entrusted by an 
act of public procurement.36 Furthermore, in the Deutsche Post case,37 the General Court set 
aside the Commission’s State aid decision principally on the ground that it had failed to assess 
sufficiently whether the payments received by Deutsche Post amounted to over-compensation (as 
it was required to do in applying the third Altmark criteria).38 The decision of the General Court 
was upheld by the Court,39 and the case is seen as an important confirmation of the Altmark 
criteria and the “compensatory approach” which underpins it.40  
 
                                                          
34 The criteria can be summarised as follows: First, the recipient undertaking must actually have “public service 
obligations” to discharge, and the obligations must be clearly defined. Second, the method by which the 
compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner. Third, the 
compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to recover costs incurred. Fourth, the undertaking discharging the 
public service must either be chosen by a public procurement procedure or the level of compensation should reflect 
the cost of a “typical, well-run undertaking”, ibid, paras 88-94.  
35 Hancher and Larouche, supra n 30, 761 - 2; See also M Klasse, “The Impact of Altmark: The European 
Commission Case Law Responses” in E Szyszczak and JW van de Gronden (eds), Financing Services of General 
Economic Interest (The Hague, T. M. C. Asser Press, 2013) 36–7; EAGCP, “Services of General Economic 
Interest” (2006) Opinion prepared by the State aid Group of EAGCP, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/sgei.pdf  accessed 3 August 2016.  
36 BUPA, supra n 28, paras 245-8. However, the Commission is still required to examine whether the compensation 
does not result from any inefficiencies of the service provider (ibid, para 249.). See NA Matos, “The Role of the 
BUPA Judgement in the Legal Framework for Services of General Economic Interest” (2011) 16 Tilburg Law 
Review 83, 86–9. In the Chronopost judgment, three weeks prior to Altmark, the ECJ decided that in markets where 
there is no undertaking to compare the incumbent’s costs with, compensation cannot be based on market conditions 
but rather must “be assessed by reference to the objective and verifiable elements which are available” (Joined Cases 
C-83/01P, C-93/01P; C-94/01P Chronopost [2003] ECR I-6993, paras 38-40). 
37 Case T-266/02 European Commission v Deutsche Post AG and others ECLI:EU:T:2008:235. 
38 In particular, the Commission had failed to assess whether or not the total costs of delivering the door-to-door 
parcel service at a uniform tariff exceeded the level of subsidy it received.   
39 C-399/08 European Commission v Deutsche Post AG and others ECLI:EU:C:2010:481. See DC Bauer and G 
Muntean, “Case Note on European Commission v Deutsche Post AG et al.” (2011) 4 European State Aid Law 
Quarterly 655; A Bartosch, “Clarification or Confusion? How to Reconcile the ECJ”s Rulings in Altmark and 
Chronopost”, (2003) European State Aid Law Quarterly 375.  
40 Bauer and Muntean, ibid, 669.   
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In terms of the decisional practice of the Commission, the Altmark criteria has been applied 
strictly and in the majority of cases the fourth criterion is not met.41 The consequence, therefore, 
is that most payments are considered as State aid (within the scope of Article 107(1)), subject to 
the Commission’s control, the prior notification requirement and the standstill obligation.42 
However, even where compensation cannot be justified under Article 107(2) or (3), it may still 
be subject to the derogation under Article 106(2). According to the Court, Article 106(2) has 
three requirements: the SGEI must be clearly-defined; it must be provided by an “explicitly 
entrusted” undertaking; 43 and “the exemption… must not affect the development of trade to an 
extent that would be contrary to the interests of the Community”.44 In contrast with Altmark, 
neither a tendering procedure nor the application of an efficiency benchmark is required.45  
 
Following the Altmark judgment, in 2005 the Commission issued guidelines on granting State 
aids in the form of public service compensation.46 These were replaced by a new SGEI Package 
in 2012, consisting of revised Decision and Framework documents, in addition to a new 
Communication document.47 The objective of the 2012 package is to provide guidance and 
                                                          
41 See Matos, supra n 36. 
42 Klasse, supra n 35, 50. 
43 An entrusted undertaking is any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the 
way in which the entity is financed (see e.g. Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser v Macrotron [1991] ECR I-1979, para 
21 and Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavlov and Others [2000] ECR I-6451, para 74. Entrustment requires 
that the undertaking must discharge a public service assigned by an act of a public authority. See Case C-127/73 
BRT v SABAM [1974] ECR-313, para 20. 
44 Case T-442/03 SIC v Commission [2008] ECR II-1161, para 144; Joined Cases T-204/97 and T-270/97 EPAC v 
Commission [2000] ECR II-2267, paras 125-6; Case C-179/00 Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova [1991] ECR-
5889, para 26. 
45 SIC v Commission, supra n 44, para 145; Olsen v Commission, supra n 26, para 239. In the CBI case, the General 
Court confirmed that Article 106(2) TFEU does not require an efficiency test such as that which is laid down in the 
fourth Altmark criteria; Case T-137/10 CBI v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2012:584, paras 295-300. 
46 The 2005 SGEI Package – or so-called “Monti/Kroes Package” – consisted of a Decision and a Framework 
document. Both documents contained conditions under which compensation payments granted to entrusted 
undertakings with the provision of SGEI are compatible with the internal market “Community framework for State 
aid in the form of public service compensation” [2005] OJ C 297/4; “Commission Decision of 28 November 2005 
on the application of Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted 
to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of series of general economic interest” [2005] OJ L 312/67). 
47 Commission, “Communication from the Commission on the application of the European Union State aid rules to 
compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest” [2012] OJ C8/4; Commission 
Decision (2012/21/EU) of 20 December 2011 on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings 
entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest [2011] OJ L7/3; Commission, “European 
Union framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation (2011)” (2012/C 8/03) [2012] OJ C8/15 
(2012 SGEI Framework). 
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clarification to the Member States for the assessment of public financing of SGEI.48 The 
Decision is a de facto block exemption for State aids below certain thresholds. Where the 
requirements of the Decision are satisfied, the public service compensation constitutes State aid 
but is considered to be compatible with the internal market and therefore no notification is 
required.49 For cases that fall outside the scope of the SGEI Decision, the compatibility of the 
payment must be assessed under the SGEI Framework.50 Where its criteria are satisfied, the 
payment still constitutes State aid but it is justified under Article 106(2).51  
 
The requirements of the SGEI Framework only partially correspond with Article 106(2) 
jurisprudence. In line with recent case law, the Commission emphasises the market failure 
requirement in order to establish a genuine SGEI.52 The 2012 Framework also prescribes that the 
entrustment period is limited to the time necessary to recover the most significant assets,53 and 
prescribes methodologies for calculating the compensation payment.54 However, the Framework 
                                                          
48 European Commission, “State aid: Commission adopts new rules on services of general economic interest 
(SGEI)” (2011), Press Release, IP/11/1579. 
49 For SGEIs in postal services and telecommunications, the compensation threshold was lowered from EUR 30 
million to EUR 15 million per annum (Article 2(1)(a) of the Decision (2012/21/EU)). Undertakings providing SGEI 
have to be entrusted with the provision of the service by the Member State (Article 4). The scope of the Decision is 
then further limited by a 10 year entrustment period (under certain circumstances, where a longer period is required 
for the amortisation of the investment cost, this period can be extended) to reduce the negative impact on 
competition as the entrustment act can create a barrier to entry (Recital 12 and Article 2(2) of the Decision); see A 
Sinnaeve, “What’s New in SGEI in 2012? - An Overview of the Commission’s SGEI Package” (2012) 2 European 
State Aid Law Quarterly 347, 357. To avoid overcompensation of the entrusted service provider, the Decision limits 
the amount of compensation to the net costs, including a reasonable profit (Article 5(1)), in line with the third 
Altmark requirement.  
50 Note also the de minimis rules: Commission Regulation (EU) 360/2012 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services 
of general economic interest [2012] OJ L114/8.   
51 2012 SGEI Framework, Recital 7. The 2012 SGEI Framework does not apply to SGEI in the land transport or 
public service broadcasting sectors, nor to providers of SGEI in difficulty; 2012 SGEI Framework, Recital 8 and 9. 
52 With regard to the Member States’ discretion to actually judge whether the service is not provided through the 
market, the Commission’s control is limited to the manifest error of assessment, 2012 SGEI Framework, Recital 13.  
53 2012 SGEI Framework, Recital 17. This limitation is new compared to the 2005 SGEI Framework.  
54 The first and preferred method is the so-called “net cost avoided methodology”. The second possible method is 
the “cost allocation methodology”. Under the first methodology, the necessary net costs – or the net costs expected 
to be necessary – shall not exceed the difference between the net costs for discharging the services and the net cost 
or profits for the same provider without the obligation to provide such services (2012 SGEI Framework, Recital 25). 
For further guidance, the 2012 SGEI Framework refers in Recital 26 to the Annex IV of the Universal Service 
Directive (Directive 2002/22/EC) and to Annex I of the First Postal Directive (Directive 97/67/EC). The “cost 
allocation methodology” uses the difference between the costs and revenues for the calculation of the net costs 
necessary to provide the obligations (2012 SGEI Framework, Recital 28). For a discussion see D Geradin, “The 
New SGEI Package” (2012) 3 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 1. See generally Rodriguez and 
Storer, supra n 19. 
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further mandates compliance with the EU Public Procurement rules,55 and also requires Member 
States to “introduce incentives for the efficient provision of SGEI of a high standard, unless they 
can duly justify that it is not feasible or appropriate to do so”.56 These two new requirements 
potentially reduce the compatibility of State aid measures under Article 106(2).57 However, the 
threshold of these two requirements must be lower than the criteria enumerated by the Court in 
Altmark, otherwise Article 106(2) would be rendered largely redundant.58 Nonetheless, it should 
be noted that both the requirements of a public procurement procedure and the efficiency test is 
contrary to established case law on Article 106(2).59  
 
2.  The Directives and compensation principles: postal services and telecommunications  
 
In this section, we turn to the alternative route open to Member States in compensating for the 
provision of universal service, with a focus on postal services and telecommunications. In these 
two sectors, relative to the other network industries,60 a stronger emphasis was put on the formal 
protection of universal service in the EU secondary legislation, and the principles and procedures 
governing compensation are the most developed.61 For postal services and telecommunications 
                                                          
55 2012 SGEI Framework, Recital 18-19. 
56 2012 SGEI Framework, Recital 39. For example, Member States can incorporate productive efficiency targets in 
the entrustment act and the level of compensation then depends on the extent to which the targets have been met, 
2012 SGEI Framework, Recital 40 and 41.   
57 One should bear in mind that where an undertaking is entrusted with the provision of SGEI through a procurement 
procedure or where the level of compensation is based on the costs of a comparable efficient undertaking, the 
Altmark criteria will be satisfied and the payment will constitute a pure compensation payment and not State aid. In 
such a case, it would not be necessary to rely on the SGEI Framework. 
58 Rather than being based on a “typical and well-run undertaking” (as in the Altmark test), they must be based on 
objective and measurable criteria (2012 SGEI Framework, Recital 42). See Sinnaeve (n 49) 360. The General Court 
confirmed that Article 106(2) TFEU does not require an efficiency test such as laid down in the fourth Altmark 
criteria in CBI v Commission, supra n 45, paras 295-300. 
59 In comparison with Altmark, a tendering procedure is not required by established European case law SIC v 
Commission, supra n 44, para 145; Olsen v Commission, supra n 26, para 239. See also Geradin, supra n 54, 6–7; 
EM Mestmäcker and H Schweitzer, Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht (München, C.H. Beck, 3rd edn, 2014), 8.  
60 The different structure of the electricity sector in Member States as well as the different stages of liberalisation 
may have contributed to the fact that universal service is less defined in electricity, see Prosser, supra n 13, 186, 
197, 205. 
61 In contrast, the Directive for electricity (Directive 2009/72/EC) contains more limited provisions on both 
universal service obligations and on compensation mechanisms. With respect to the former, the Directive requires 
that Member States ensure that all household customers and – at the discretion of Member States – SMEs shall enjoy 
universal service, defined as the “right to be supplied with electricity of a specified quality within their territory at 
reasonable, easily and clearly comparable, transparent and non-discriminatory prices” (Article 3(3)). On financial 
compensation, the Directive merely states that “financial compensation, other forms of compensation and exclusive 
rights which a Member State grants for the fulfilment” of any obligations “shall be done in a non-discriminatory and 
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the relevant rules are contained in the Postal Services Directive (PSD)62 and Universal Service 
Directive (USD) respectively.63  
 
2.1. The scope of universal service in postal services and telecommunications 
 
As was discussed above, Member States enjoy a measure of discretion when defining SGEI 
(including USOs). This discretion can be reduced or displaced where USOs are specified by 
European secondary legislation.64 The degree to which discretion can be displaced depends on 
how precisely services are specified in secondary EU legislation. While Member States may 
impose USOs which go beyond those specified in the Directives,65 they may not use the 
compensation mechanisms contained within them to compensate service providers for these 
additional obligations.66 If Member States go further and expand the scope of USOs, they are 
subject to the State aid rules.67 
 
For telecommunications, the USD requires that Member States ensure that services included in 
the scope of universal service are made available to all end-users irrespective of their 
geographical location at an “affordable price”.68 In addition, with respect to ensuring the 
affordability of access, Member States may impose on operators to offer tariffs which depart 
                                                          
transparent way” (Article 3(6)). The 2003 Directive [Directive 2003/54/EC (repealed)] was identical. For a wider 
discussion see Harker, supra n 1, 52 – 64.  
62 Directive 97/67/EC of 15 December 1997 on common rules for the development of the internal market of 
Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service [1998] OJ L15/14, as amended by Directive 
2002/39/EC [2002] OJ L176/21, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC [2008] OJ/L52/3. 
63 Directive 2002/22/EC of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic 
communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive) [2002] OJ L108/51, as amended by Directive 
2009/136/EC [2009] OJ L337/11. 
64 Case C-206/98 Commission v Belgium [2000] ECR I-3509 para 45. 
65 The USOs are defined in the Postal Service Directive, Article 3 Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 
2002/39/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC and in the Universal Service Directive, Articles 3 – 9 Directive 
2002/22/EC, as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC.  
66 Directive 2002/22/EC, art 32; Directive 2008/6/EC, Recital 30. 
67 Directive 2008/6/EC, Recital 30. In doing so, Member States’ discretion under the State aid regime is subject to a 
stricter proportionality standard (Sauter, supra n 15, 186-88); see also M Ross, “A healthy approach to services of 
general economic interest? The BUPA judgment of the Court of First Instance” (2009) 34 European Law Review 
127, 136-8; Fiedziuk, supra n 23, 228; Klasse, supra n 35, 50-51.   
68 Directive 2002/22/EC, art 3(1). The relevant services are: access to a publicly available telephone network at a 
fixed location to a public communications network (Directive 2002/22/EC, as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC, 
art 4), a directory of users and a directory enquiry service (Directive 2002/22/EC, as amended by Directive 
2009/136/EC, art 5), the provision of public pay telephones (Directive 2002/22/EC, as amended by Directive 
2009/136/EC, art 6), and special measures for disabled end-users (Directive 2002/22/EC, as amended by Directive 
2009/136/EC, art 7).  
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from “normal commercial conditions”, such as “social tariffs” for those on low-incomes or with 
“special social needs”.69 They may also require operators to offer tariffs which include 
geographical averaging.70 In postal services, the universal service obligations include the 
provision of a sufficient density of post offices and post boxes, the daily delivery and collection 
of specified mail items, at prices affordable for all users.71  
 
2.2. Securing contestability in the provision of USOs 
 
In order for firms to be compensated for fulfilling universal service, they must first be designated 
by the Member State.72 While Member States have some discretion when it comes to 
designation, it is circumscribed by a number of principles, including least market distortion.73 
The USD and PSD make clear that Member States may designate different undertakings to 
deliver different elements of universal service and/or to cover different parts of the national 
territory.74 In so doing, Member States are, in both cases, required to abide by the principle of 
non-discrimination,75 and the USD further stipulates that the designation mechanism must not 
result in any undertaking being “a priori excluded from being designated”,76 ensuring that new 
entrant firms are not excluded in practical terms from providing USOs. A specific issue was 
identified in 2005, which appeared to limit designation to the French telecommunications 
                                                          
69 Directive 2002/22/EC, as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC, art 9(2).  
70 Directive 2002/22/EC, art 9(4).  
71 This includes letters up to 2 kilograms, packages up to 10 kilograms but may be increased up to 20 kilograms, and 
20 kilograms for inbound parcels from other Member States and services for registered and insured items at a 
minimum of five working days per week, Directive 1997/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, art 3. 
72 Directive 1997/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, art 4; Directive 2002/22/EC, as amended by Directive 
2009/136/EC, art 8. The historical position in postal services is different, as the postal incumbents in Member States 
retained exclusive rights over reserved services in order to facilitate the cross-subsidisation of universal service (this 
is explained in more detail in section D.2. below). However, the Third Postal Services Directive required the 
abolition of these exclusive rights, while at the same time putting in place new requirements for designation 
(modelled on those contained in the USD).  
73 For telecommunications, the Directive requires that Member States must “determine the most efficient and 
appropriate approach” which respects the principles of “objectivity, transparency, non-discrimination and 
proportionality”, and “seek to minimise market distortions… whilst safeguarding the public interest”, Directive 
2002/22/EC, art 3(2). The PSD similarly refers to the requirements of “transparency, non-discrimination, 
proportionality, transparency and least market distortion”, Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 
2008/136/EC, art 4(2). 
74 Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, art 4; Directive 2008/6/EC, Recital 23; Directive 
2002/22/EC, as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC, art 8; Directive 2002/22/EC, Recital 14.  
75 Directive 2002/22/EC, art 8(2); Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, art 4(2). 
76 Directive 2002/22/EC, art 8(2). 
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incumbent.77 This was because designation was limited to undertakings that were able to cover 
all of the national territory. An infringement procedure was launched, and the Court found that 
the provision in question, to the extent that it excluded operators who were unable to serve the 
whole of France, breached the principles contained in the USD.78 There are obvious tensions 
between the objective of cost effectiveness and the no a priori exclusion rule, especially in 
relation to economies of scale and scope.79 It is clear from the approach of the Commission and 
the Court, however, that the no a priori exclusion rule takes precedence.80  
 
Various problems have been identified concerning designation, especially in 
telecommunications. A number of countries have been slow to put in place legislation for the 
designation of USPs, much to the chagrin of the Commission.81 Despite the principles outlined 
above, and the increased formalisation by Member States of the designation process in domestic 
legislation, in practice the incumbents are appointed as USPs in the vast majority of cases in both 
                                                          
77 Commission, “European Electronic Communications Regulation and Markets 2005 (11th Report)”, (Staff 
Working Document) Volume I, SEC(2006) 193, 143. Infringement proceedings were also launched against Finland 
in 2005. In that case, the relevant legislation appeared to specify that the operator designated as USP would be the 
company either with significant market power or having the largest market share in the region. The case did not 
come before the Court (ibid, 269).  
78 Case C-220/07 Commission v France [2008] ECR I-95, paras 32 - 33.  
79 BEREC, “Report on Universal Service – reflections for the future” (2010), 17 
http://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/reports/187-berec-report-on-universal-service-
reflections-for-the-future accessed 3 August 2016. 
80 In another case, which resulted in infringement proceedings against Spain, one firm expressed an interest in 
providing a directory enquiries service. The Spanish rules excluded from consideration firms who were only 
interested in offering one unique element of the USOs, and hence the firm was not considered. Despite attempting to 
justify its approach on the ground of cost-effectiveness, the Commission held that the rules for designation were in 
breach of the principles of the USD. Letter of formal notice from the European Commission to Spain (27.06.2007), 
“Designation and financing of universal service”; European Commission, “New round of infringement proceedings 
under the EU telecom rules: What are the issues?”, (2007) MEMO/07/2005; The Commission closed the case after 
Spain had changed its national legislation, European Commission, “Telecoms: Commission requests information 
from Spain on new charge on operators; closes infringement case on universal service”, Press Release, IP/10/322, 
18 March 2010.  
81 Commission, “Progress Report on the Single European Electronic Communications Market (15th Report)”, (Staff 
Working Document) Volume I, SEC(2010) 630 final, 57-58.  
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telecommunications82 and postal services.83 This may be the result of a lack of incentives for new 
entrants to apply for designation, even if the process is open to them, a point made by BEREC: 
 
“…[I]t appears that the number of competitors having the technical and financial standing 
required for an USP designation is very limited, which adds to what can be described as 
an inherent reluctance of market players to compete for being designated as bearers of 
obligations… under the regulatory framework”.84  
 
For postal services, a recent survey of the USP designation points to a failure of most Member 
States to consider introducing some element of contestability in universal service provision, 
using instead “universal service designation to continue some remnant of the former legal 
privileges of the public postal operators”.85 
 
2.3. Deciding whether to compensate – “net costs” and “unfair burden” 
 
The relevant legislation on telecommunications and postal services contain broadly similar 
principles on the implementation and design of compensation mechanisms.86 Before such 
arrangements may be made, the relevant regulator must be satisfied that the provision of 
universal service represents an “unfair burden” on the designated undertaking(s) based on a “net 
                                                          
82 At that time, in 2005, it was only in Estonia that a tender process resulted in the designation of a new entrant as 
USP; in Belgium and the Czech Republic, elements of the service were provided by entrants alongside the 
incumbent, Commission, “European Electronic Communications Regulation and Markets 2006 (12th Report)”, 
COM(2007), 155 final, 17. According to a 2010 Report, published by the Body of European Regulators for 
Electronic Communications (BEREC), eight out of 27 BEREC countries used the tender process to designate the 
universal service provider, BEREC, supra n 79, 30-33. 
83 AK Dieke et al., “Main Developments in the Postal Sector (2010-2013)” (Study for the European Commission, 
Directorate General for Internal Market and Services) (2013), 137, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/post/doc/studies/20130821_wik_md2013-final-report_en.pdf accessed 3 August 
2016. 
84 BEREC, supra n 79, 31–32.  
85 Dieke et al., supra n 83, 137. Malta, Sweden and Germany are exceptions. The latter has not designated any 
operator at all since 2008, Harker et al., supra n 1, 37. In Estonia, Luxemburg, Poland, Romania and Sweden 
universal service is also provided without relying on a designated USP,  European Commission, “Implementation of 
the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications – 2014” (Commission Staff Working Document) 
SWD(2014) 249 final, 17.  
86 For postal services, alongside the abolition of the “reserved market”, new rules on the compensation mechanism 
were promulgated in 2008 (Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, art 7(1)), which largely reflect 
those already in existence for telecommunications that are contained in the Universal Service Directive (Directive 
2002/22/EC). 
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cost” calculation of the provision.87 The meaning of “unfair burden” is not elaborated upon in 
either the USD or PSD.  
 
The calculation of net cost, upon which an assessment of unfair burden depends, is by no means 
straightforward.88 When assessing net costs, account should be had to any “market benefit” or 
“intangible benefits” which accrue to the USP.89  The calculation of attributable costs includes 
identified services or users which can only be provided or served at a loss or under cost 
conditions falling outside normal commercial standards. A calculation of the net costs of each 
aspect of universal service is to made separately in order to avoid any “double counting” of any 
direct or indirect benefits and costs. Notwithstanding the principles above, both the USD and 
PSD do not define what is meant by “unfair”, and several alternative approaches have been 
suggested, including: whether the net costs of the USO exceed those costs which would be 
involved in setting-up a compensation mechanism, the inability of the USP to make a normal 
economic profit (the requirement for a “reasonable profit” is recognised in the PSD),90 or where 
the profitability of the USP differs significantly from its competitors.91  
 
Neither the USD nor the PSD specify or give examples of what is an intangible benefit. Recital 
20 of the USD merely states that such benefits should be an “estimate in monetary terms, of the 
indirect benefits that an undertaking derives by virtue of its position as [a] provider of universal 
service”. In a survey of BEREC members, a number of examples of intangible benefits were 
                                                          
87 Directive 2002/22/EC, art 12(1) in accordance with Annex IV, Part A; Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by 
Directive 2008/6/EC, art 7(3) in accordance with Annex I, Part B. 
88 Net costs are defined as the difference between the USP’s net costs operating with the universal service 
obligations and operating without them, Directive 2002/22/EC, Annex IV, Part A; Directive 97/67/EC, as amended 
by Directive 2008/6/EC, Annex I, Part B. 
89 Directive 2002/22/EC, art 12(1) in accordance with Annex IV, Part A; Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by 
Directive 2008/6/EC, art 7(3) in accordance with Annex I, Part B.See also Commission, “Assessment Criteria for 
National Schemes for the Costing and Financing of Universal Service in telecommunications and Guidelines for the 
member States on Operation of such Schemes”, COM(96) 608 final. For a discussion of different methodologies 
used in postal services to determine whether or not a financial burden is “unfair”, see Frontier Economics, “Study on 
the principles used to calculate the net costs of the postal USO: A Report prepared for the European Commission” 
(2013), 123-36 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/post/doc/studies/2012-net-costs-uso-postal_en.pdf accessed 3 
August 2016.  
90 Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, Annex I, Part B. For a discussion see F Boldron et al., 
“A Dynamic and Endogenous Approach to Financing the USO in a Liberalized Environment”, in MA Crew and PR 
Kleindorfer (eds), Progress in the competitive agenda in the postal and delivery sector (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 
2009).   
91 Frontier Economics, supra n 89, 123–36. 
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gathered from national regulatory authorities (NRAs). These included: the benefits of 
geographical ubiquity, which arises where a customer moves from an area served only by the 
USP to another area where there are new entrants; the “life-cycle effect” benefit, relating to a 
customer who it is currently unprofitable to serve who might become profitable in the future; and 
benefits resulting from brand enhancement and corporate reputation.92 As BEREC observes, 
estimating and quantifying the intangible benefits is likely to “prove extremely difficult” in 
practice.93  
 
Once the net costs have been calculated, and these are judged to be an “unfair burden”, the 
Member States must then decide, upon the request of the designated undertaking(s), how to 
compensate. This compensation can be drawn directly from public funding, or by sharing the net 
costs between market participants.94 Such a sharing mechanism must be administered by a body 
independent of the beneficiaries of the scheme,95 respecting the principles of transparency, non-
discrimination, and proportionality.96 For telecommunications, Member States must also respect 
the principle of “least market distortion”,97 and have the discretion to exempt new entrants 
“which have not yet achieved any significant market presence”.98  
 
The net cost calculation and establishment of an unfair burden appears to be a complicated and 
time-consuming process in telecommunications. Due to various administrative delays, court 
proceedings, delays in contributions, or updates of net cost calculation methodologies, 
compensation schemes have not been widely employed by Member States.99  
 
                                                          
92 BEREC, supra n 79, 35–36. For a similar study in respect of postal services, see Frontier Economics, supra n 89, 
109–22. 
93 For some examples of methodologies used by the national regulatory authorities, see BEREC, supra n 79, 36–38. 
94 Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, art 7(3); Directive 2002/22/EC, art 13(1).  
95 Directive 2002/22/EC, art 13(2), which goes on to specify this should be either the NRA or a body supervised by 
it; Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, art 7(4). The PSD also refers to the requirement of 
supervision by the NRA in the calculation of net costs, Directive 2008/6/EC, Recital 29.  
96 Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, art 7(5); Directive 2002/22/EC, art 13(3).  
97 Directive 2002/22/EC, Recital 23. 
98 Directive 2002/22/EC, Recital 21. 
99 In 2009, compensation mechanisms were only in place and activated in France, Czech Republic, Italy, Spain, 
Romania, Latvia and in Belgium for social tariffs only, Commission, supra n 81, 58. As is discussed below, the 
Belgian compensation mechanism for social tariffs was later challenged by the European Commission.  
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The most important case on the principles which must be followed by Member States in 
compensating USPs is Commission v Belgium.100 The USO in question related to “social tariffs”, 
i.e., discounts which were available to consumers on low incomes and with special needs. All 
operators, the incumbent and entrants alike, were required to offer these tariffs to such 
customers. A compensation scheme was set up whereby payments were made to any operator 
which carried a disproportionate number of social tariff consumers relative to its market share. 
Compensation was calculated at a flat-rate for all operators and was automatic – there was no 
additional need to demonstrate that the number of social tariffs carried by an individual operator 
imposed an “unfair burden”, and the net cost of serving a social tariff customer was assumed to 
be the same for all operators.  
 
The Court found that the automatic nature of the scheme breached the Directive’s requirement 
that an undertaking had to be found to bear an unfair burden before compensation mechanisms 
could be put in place.101 The Court held that a net cost is not per se an unfair burden: 
 
“…[T]he unfair burden which must be found to exist by the national regulatory authority 
before any compensation is paid is a burden which, for each undertaking concerned, is 
excessive in view of the undertaking’s ability to bear it, account being taken of all the 
undertaking’s own characteristics, in particular the quality of its equipment, its economic 
and financial situation and its market share”.102 
 
For the purposes of this assessment, the NRA had to lay down “general and objective criteria” 
taking into account the undertaking’s characteristics, and must carry out “an individual 
assessment of the situation of each undertaking concerned”.103 The Court also held that the 
assessment of the net cost for the undertaking must also include intangible benefits, in line with 
                                                          
100 Case C-222/08 Commission v Belgium [2010] ECR I-9017. See also Case C-389/08 Base and Others [2010] ECR 
I-9073, a preliminary reference procedure covering the same ground. See also Case C-384/99 Commission v 
Belgium [2000] ECR I-633. 
101 Commission v Belgium, ibid, para 58. In Commission v France, a compensation scheme set up to compensate the 
incumbent was unnecessary given that the incumbent held a near monopoly over the market (Case C-146/00 
Commission v France [2001] ECR I-9767, paras 25-30).  
102 Commission v Belgium, ibid, para 49. Emphasis added. 
103 Ibid, para 50.  
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the requirements of the Directive.104 It rejected the Belgium Government’s argument that where 
USOs applied to all operators, the benefits would be the same for all of them.105  
 
3. Conclusions 
 
As we have demonstrated, the provisions which exist for compensating undertakings for the 
costs of universal service are complex and cumbersome. This would appear to explain their 
limited take-up by Member States. This may further explain why, in telecommunications, the ex 
ante system of compensation has been usurped by the State aid regime, especially in relation to 
the provision of universal service in broadband services. However, the State aid regime has been 
significantly reconfigured in recent years to promote contestability in the assignment of public 
service obligations.   
 
D. Balancing universal access and liberalisation: case studies in broadband and postal 
services  
 
In this section, we analyse recent developments in securing universal service in broadband and 
the letter collection and delivery markets. It is in these two sectors where we see the most 
pronounced tensions between the achievement of USOs and liberalisation, albeit for different 
reasons. In telecommunications we witness the most technological change, and liberalisation is 
the most advanced. However, for broadband, the regime for securing universal access under the 
USD has largely been usurped by the use of State aid, with important consequences in terms of 
the Commission’s supervisory powers and the formal protection of USOs. Furthermore, while 
state support for the rolling-out of significant broadband infrastructure investment may be seen 
as necessary to secure universal access to vital communications services, this objective is subject 
to a number of limiting principles which give precedence to securing and maintaining effective 
competition. For postal services, the model of achieving universal service, as originally 
envisaged under the EU legislation, was one where the incumbent could sustain cross-subsidies 
                                                          
104 Ibid, para 84.  
105 Ibid, para 69.  
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because it had exclusive rights over certain market sectors. These rights were gradually 
withdrawn, with full competition being introduced across the EU between 2010 and 2012. 
Alongside this, the rules on compensation were also reformed to the extent that Member States 
were encouraged to ensure that there was a level of contestability in universal service provision. 
In the collection and delivery of letters, our focus here, demand has been declining for a number 
of years, while at the same time incumbents have seen a gradual reduction in their ability to 
subsidise USOs. In this sector, there is little use of compensation mechanisms, despite the claims 
that universal service is being placed in jeopardy by new entrants and their so-called ‘cherry-
picking’ of the most profitable consumers. The emphasis thus far has been on the incumbents 
achieving efficiency gains.106 
 
1. Broadband and its inclusion within the USOs 
 
There is no doubt that, in a sector such as communications where technological progress and 
demand conditions evolve rapidly, services which might have been seen as essential until only 
recently can become obsolete. There is no better example than the provision of public payphones 
which are only used by a very small percentage of end-users, yet are very expensive to 
maintain.107 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that bringing new services within an EU-wide 
definition of universal service has be approached with considerable caution by both Member 
States and the Commission. In some cases, such as mobile services, the answer is 
straightforward; the market is the best route to maximising both ubiquity and affordability, 
without the need for any form of state intervention.108  
 
The position within broadband is quite different, where it is clear that neither national 
governments nor the Commission believe that universal broadband coverage will be achieved by 
                                                          
106 See, for example, Dieke, supra n 83, 220-22.  
107 Some Member States have already withdrawn the obligation to provide public payphones as part of the USO 
(Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, Latvia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania 
and Slovakia), European Commission, “Implementation of the EU regulatory framework for electronic 
communication – 2015” (Commission Staff Working Document) SWD(2015) 126 final, 22. 
108 European Commission, “Universal service in e-communications: report on the outcome of the public consultation 
and the third periodic review of the scope in accordance with Article 15 of Directive 2002/22/EC”, 
(Communication) COM(2011) 795 final, 8-9, 12. 
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the market alone.109 This is particularly the case when it comes super-fast broadband – so-called 
“next generation access” (NGA) – the rolling-out of which requires substantial upgrading and 
replacement of existing telecommunications infrastructure.110 An obvious solution to this 
problem would be to use the existing sectoral regime by including a minimum level of 
broadband services within the definition of USOs, triggering – where appropriate – the use of 
compensation mechanisms for the investment necessary to secure coverage in areas that would 
otherwise be unprofitable to serve.  
 
Since the original USD, Member States have been required to ensure that all users connected at a 
fixed location have access to data communications “at data rates that are sufficient to permit 
functional internet access, taking into account prevailing technologies used by the majority of 
subscribers and technological feasibility”.111 In contrast to the original Directive which specified, 
for the purposes of imposing a USO, functional internet access as a single narrowband 
connection at a maximum data rate,112 the 2009 amending Directive removed any reference to a 
defined data rate,113 making clear that Member States were to have flexibility in defining a 
minimum level of internet access, “taking due account of specific circumstances in national 
markets, for instance the prevailing bandwidth used by the majority of subscribers in that 
Member State, and technological feasibility, provided that these measures seek to minimise 
market distortion”.114 This was a significant change since Member States, while always being 
free to impose more onerous universal service obligations than those specified in the USD, were 
not permitted to include these within any compensation mechanism involving specific 
undertakings.115 The situation now allows Member States to include broadband access within the 
                                                          
109 F Chirico and N Gaál, “A Decade of State Aid Control in the Field of Broadband” (2014) 13 European State Aid 
Law Quarterly 28, 28–29. 
110 For an overview see A Kliemann and O Stehmann, “EU State Aid Control in the Broadband Sector - The 2013 
Broadband Guidelines and Recent Case Practice” (2013) 12 European State Aid Law Quarterly 493, 495-7.  
111 Directive 2002/22/EC, art 4(2).  
112 Ibid, Recital 8. A single narrowband network connection referred to a data rate of 56 kbit/s. Member States were 
allowed to deviate and lower the data rate where necessary. 
113 Directive 2009/136/EC. 
114 Ibid, Recital 5. 
115 Directive 2002/22/EC, art 32. The wording of this provision was unchanged by the 2009 amending Directive. 
However, Directive 2009/136/EC, Recital 5 makes clear that where an expansion of minimum internet access 
covered by USO within a Member State results “in an unfair burden on a designated undertaking, taking due account 
of the costs and revenues as well as the intangible benefits resulting from the provision of the services concerned, 
this may be included in any net cost calculation of universal obligations”.  
 26 
 
scope of USO, with the potential to activate any of the compensation mechanisms specified 
therein, rather than notifying measures under the State aid framework.116 The interesting fact is 
that they so rarely do so.117  
 
1.1. Compensating investment for universal broadband coverage – USD v State aids 
regime 
 
Despite the permissive approach created by the 2009 amending Directive, in its review of 
universal service in 2011, the Commission encouraged Member States not to include broadband 
access within their USOs, fearing that doing so could lead to higher prices for consumers, and 
“could distort markets and put an unreasonable burden on the sector”.118 This message has been 
largely followed by Member States.119  
 
In parallel, however, the EU has developed a proactive policy in favour of encouraging public 
support and subsidies in favour of increasing both the coverage and quality of broadband access. 
A key plank of the Europe 2020 strategy, the “Digital Agenda for Europe” (DAE) adopted in 
2010, is aimed at accelerating the role-out of high-speed broadband across the EU.120  
 
                                                          
116 Directive 2009/136/EC, Recital 5 makes clear that alternative financing methods may also be enacted. The 
Commission confirmed that compensation for the infrastructure and wholesale provision of basic broadband in the 
form of State aid did not breach the original USD, Decision N381/2004 Haut débit en Pyrénées-Atlantiques [2004] 
Press Release IP/04/1371; Decision N382/2004 Haut débit en Limousin - DORSAL [2005] Press Release IP/05/530. 
117 Belgium, Spain, Finland, Croatia, Malta, Sweden and Latvia (only for disabled end-users) have included 
broadband at different broadband speeds within the scope of universal service. Latvia, Slovenia and the United 
Kingdom are discussing whether or not to extend the scope of USO by including broadband, European Commission, 
supra n 107, 22. However, there are reports the European Commission is now proposing to include broadband 
access in the scope of universal service, C Stupp, “Broadband internet access will become a legal right under new 
EU telecoms rules”, EurActiv.com, 29 July 2016, http://www.euractiv.com/section/innovation-
industry/news/broadband-internet-access-will-become-a-legal-right-under-new-eu-telecoms-rules/?nl_ref=17987440 
accessed 3 August 2016. 
118 European Commission, “Universal service in e-communications: report on the outcome of the public consultation 
and the third periodic review of the scope in accordance with Article 15 of Directive 2002/22/EC”, 
(Communication) COM(2011) 795 final, 12. 
119 Subject to some limited exceptions, it appears that the majority of Member States are pursuing increasing 
broadband access outside of the sectoral rules, see BEREC, supra n 79, 59. 
120 European Commission, “A Digital Agenda for Europe” (Communication) COM(2010) 245 final.  
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The DAE contains a number of ambitious broadband targets,121 the achievement of which will 
involve considerable investment in infrastructure, both private and public. The key danger of 
leaving infrastructure investment merely to private firms is that high-speed broadband access 
will be “concentrated in a few high-density zones with significant entry costs and high prices”.122 
Furthermore, relying only upon the private sector will result in under-investment since the 
positive externalities resulting from network expansion will not be captured, particularly the 
economic growth which it can facilitate. Such “market failures” can be corrected somewhat by 
public sector investment and, for this reason, the DAE seeks to impose on Member States an 
obligation to draw-up national broadband plans which should include the use of “public 
financing in line with EU competition and state aid rules”, in particular avoiding market 
distortions.123  
 
In order to complement the general guidelines on State aids (explained in section C.1. above), the 
Commission has attempted to enunciate in detail the principles it will apply to broadband in a set 
of Guidelines first issued in 2009, and then subsequently updated in 2013,124 the latter reflecting 
the priorities of the DAE, particularly the need for increased public investment in NGA 
broadband.125   
 
The Guidelines recognise, on the one hand, that the DAE targets cannot be achieved without the 
support of public funds, while cautioning that State aid should only be complementary to, and 
not a substitute for, the investments of market players, limiting as far as possible the risk of 
“crowding out of private investments”.126 It notes the need to go beyond mere market failures; 
markets may produce outcomes which are efficient but are otherwise “unsatisfactory from a 
                                                          
121 The first of these – securing the availability of basic broadband to all European citizens – was achieved ahead of 
schedule in 2013. The focus now is how to provide fast and ultra-fast broadband by 2020 to all and half of the 
European households respectively. European Commission, “100% basic broadband coverage achieved across 
Europe – EU target achieved ahead of schedule. Next stop is fast broadband for all.” (2013), Press Release, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-968_en.htm accessed 3 August 2016. 
122 European Commission, supra n 120, 19.  
123 Ibid, 21. 
124 European Commission, “EU Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment 
of broadband networks” [2013] OJ C25/1. 
125 The cost of the provision of internet speeds of 30 Mbps are estimated to be nearly EUR 60 billion and to provide 
at least half of the European households with ultra-fast internet (100 Mbps) may be up to EUR 268 billion, European 
Commission, supra n 124, para 2. 
126 Ibid, para 4. 
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cohesion policy point of view” in addressing the digital divide.127 An element of market 
distortion is consistent with this policy, but these effects need to be outweighed by the positive 
effects of wider access and penetration.128  
 
In scrutinising state interventions, principally assessed under Article 107(3),129 the Commission 
applies a series of necessary conditions, including the need to demonstrate that – absent the aid – 
the infrastructure investment would not take place, that the aid is limited to the minimum level 
necessary to remedy either the market failure or to correct social or regional inequalities that 
would the market alone would produce.130 Overall, it is the incumbent upon the Member State to 
demonstrate a “step change” in broadband availability before any distortion of competition can 
be justified by the efficiency or social goals being pursued.  Even where aid can be justified, a 
series of measures to minimise market distortions are required, including consultation with 
market players who may be planning infrastructure investments in the areas concerned, and the 
imposition of wholesale access conditions commensurate with the need to avoid the creation of 
regional service monopolies at the retail level.131 Echoing the SGEI Framework, the Guidelines 
also require that, in selecting the beneficiaries of the aid, there is a competitive selection process 
in line with EU public procurement principles.132 The use of a competitive selection procedure 
appears to be vital to avoid the “tendency of public authorities to contract with the national 
telecommunications incumbent”.133 Failure to comply with the terms of the Guidelines may 
result in a (costly) requirement to re-run the tender process.134  
                                                          
127 Ibid, para 5. 
128 Ibid, para 6.  
129 In the case of broadband projects, the state aid measures may be compatible with the internal market, if the 
measure promotes the economic development of areas with an abnormally low standard of living or high 
unemployment rate (Article 107(3)(a) TFEU) or in which the aid enhances the development of certain economic 
activities or certain economic areas and does not have a negative effect on the European Union (Article 107(3)(c) 
TFEU). 
130 European Commission, supra n 124, paras 30-54.   
131 Ibid, supra n 124, paras 51, 78; See Kliemann and Stehmann, supra n 110, 512-13.  
132 European Commission, supra n 124, para 78(c); Member States are also required to respect the principle of 
technological neutrality with no a priori preference given to one type of technology over another, European 
Commission, supra n 124, para 78(e).  
133 Kliemann and Stehmann, supra n 110, 511. 
134 F Chirico and N Gaál, “State aid to broadband: primer and best practices” (2011) Competition Policy Newsletter, 
Number 1, 50, 55 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2011_1_10_en.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. 
Even where this requirement is not met, aid may be lawful under Article 106(2) (see Decision N196/2010  
Establishment of a Sustainable Infrastructure Permitting Estonia-wide Broadband Internet Connection (EstWin 
Project) [2010]. 
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There has been a considerable increase in the number of broadband State aid cases since the first 
one was notified in 2003.135 Between December 2003 and August 2009, the Commission 
processed only 47 cases, whereas between the adoption of the 2009 Guidelines and mid-February 
2014, it decided 85 broadband cases, clearing 82.136 In terms of the volume of State aid involved, 
this increased sharply from an annual average of €30-55 million in 2003-2005, to almost €2 
billion per year from 2010 and €6 billion in 2012.137  
 
The vast majority of cases appear to be notified and cleared under the State aid regime, but there 
remains a residual category for cases which may escape the State aid regime altogether because 
the Member State seeks to rely upon the Altmark criteria.138 Such cases are dealt with briefly in 
the Guidelines.139 The most significant case to date is Réseau à trės jait débit en Hauts-de-
Seine.140 Here, following a competitive tendering process, the French authorities awarded a 
subsidy of €59 million over 25 years to a consortium to build a high-speed broadband network in 
the Hauts-de-Seine department, an area bordering Paris. Following a voluntary notification by 
France, the Commission determined that the payment did not constitute State aid,141 a decision 
which was contested by a number of competitors before the General Court.142 The Court upheld 
the Commission’s decision that all four Altmark critera were met. The first of these, the existence 
of a SGEI, was present since there was evidence of a “market failure” in so far as, despite being 
a relatively densely populated area, there was evidence to suggest that the commercial operators 
would not have the incentives to serve all users in the area with high-speed broadband. The 
                                                          
135 Decision N282/2003 Cumbria Broadband-Project ACCESS [2003]. 
136 European Commission, “Commission decision on State aid to broadband” (2016) 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/telecommunications/broadband_decisions.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. For a 
detailed discussion of the cases, see Kliemann and Stehmann, supra n 110. 
137 Chirico and Gaál, supra n 109, 30. This amounts to 10 per cent of the total State aid granted (ibid, 31). This 
actual amount may be higher since the notification requirement does not apply, in theory at least, to investment 
which meets the Altmark criteria.  
138 According to Kliemann and Stehmann, supra n 110, 504 only three cases have been considered by the 
Commission under Article 106(2), all concerning France. Of course, there are other categories of cases where public 
investment does not amount to State aid (e.g. where the market investor principle can be demonstrated with respect 
to the aid, European Commission, supra n 124, paras 16 and 17. 
139 European Commission, supra n 124, paras 18-27.  
140 Decision N 331/2008 Réseau à trės jait débit en Hauts-de-Seine [2009] C(2009) 7426 final. 
141 Strictly speaking, there is no requirement to notify, but it appears that France opted to do so for legal certainty 
reasons, Kliemann and Stehmann, supra n 110, 504. 
142 Case T-79/10 Colt Télécommunications France v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2013:463; Case T-258/10 Orange v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2013:471; Case T-325/10 Iliad and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2013:472. 
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General Court confirmed that the presence of a market failure, which was an “objective 
concept”,143 was a necessary condition for finding a service to fall within the SGEI definition.144 
It also held that the presence of universal service with respect to basic broadband, did not 
demonstrate the lack of a market failure on the high-speed broadband market.145 The Court also 
rejected the arguments of the commercial operators that over-compensation would occur, 
contrary to the third Altmark criterion, merely because the scheme is designed to use cross-
subsidies from profitable consumers to reduce the costs of serving those who are unprofitable.146  
 
1.2. Conclusions  
 
The approach of the European Commission and the majority of the Member States raises the 
question of why they prefer using State aid procedures instead of including broadband in the 
scope of universal service under the USD and then, if necessary, compensate the universal 
service provider.  
 
All Member States have developed national broadband plans for fulfilling the goals of the DAE, 
some going even further. Some countries focus on improving broadband access in rural areas, 
while others that have sufficient coverage in all parts of their country may focus on the  
availability of NGA broadband.147 This differentiated approach certainly tells against the 
adoption of a USO at the EU level with prescribed minimum broadband speeds. On the other 
hand, the requirement as it now stands in the USD does leave Member States with a considerable 
amount of discretion when it comes to defining a universal level of broadband access suitable to 
the relevant markets and demand conditions. Furthermore, for national governments, invoking 
the provisions of the USD with respect to both prescribing and, where necessary, compensating 
                                                          
143 Colt, supra n 142, para 158. 
144 Ibid, para 153. As has been pointed out elsewhere, this is an important development since it limited the discretion 
member states have to determine whether there is the necessity for a SGEI, E Szyszczak, “Services of General 
Economic Interest and State Measures Affecting Competition” (2014) 5 Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice, 508, 514. 
145 Colt, supra n 142, para 161. 
146 Ibid, paras 185-6. The Court of Justice ruled inadmissible the competitors challenge to the General Court’s 
judgment Case C-621/13P Orange v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2015:114; Case C-624/13P Iliad and Others v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2015:112. 
147 For detailed information on national broadband plans and their realisation, see European Commission, supra n 
120; BEREC, supra n 79. 
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for universal levels of broadband access does have the advantage of avoiding the Commission’s 
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 108(3).148 However, the use of the USD procedures are 
complex and may give rise to a level of legal uncertainty which itself may result in sub-optimal 
levels of investment. A USO provider must first be designated, and it will only be compensated 
where the NRA determines that it bears an unfair burden. As was discussed in section C.2., this 
does not simply mean net costs; in each case an individual assessment is required and what is an 
unfair burden for one undertaking may not be for another operator (this assessment depends on 
the firm’s size and market share, its equipment, economic and financial situation, and any 
intangible benefits of being the USP).149 As the rules under the USD derive from the Altmark 
criteria, the level of compensation is strictly limited to the provision of USO, i.e. the USP can 
only be compensated for infrastructure investment which could not be supported by the 
market.150 This methodology no doubt creates uncertainty for a potential USP, which is likely to 
impact disproportionately on new entrant firms who might otherwise be willing to invest in 
infrastructure, rather than merely relying upon access to the incumbent’s network. Indeed, one of 
the key benefits of relying on the State aid regime is the extent to which it opens avenues for 
infrastructure competition, especially in relation to the deployment of NGA broadband, which 
can no longer be supported only by the incumbent’s legacy networks.151 By way of contrast, a 
reliance on the incumbent provider is likely to create significant barriers to entry, and merely 
extend incumbency advantages into new broadband service markets.  
 
2. Postal services 
 
The concept of universal service in the postal sector has a long history. Historically, the norm 
throughout the EU was to have a monopoly postal provider charged with an obligation to fulfil 
universal service at a uniform price. From the early 1990s, however, this model of universal 
service delivery was gradually dismantled, with the abolition of exclusive rights for incumbents 
                                                          
148 Interestingly, Chirico and Gaál argue that the principles established in the Guidelines and the underlying case law 
are now so clear and consistently applied that a State aid exemption for broadband should now be put into place, 
Chirico and Gaál, supra n 109, 36.  
149 Commission v Belgium, supra n 101. 
150 European Commission, supra n 124, para 26; L Papadias, F Chirico and N Gaál, “The new State Aid Broadband 
Guidelines: not all black and white” (2009) Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 3, 17, 20 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2009_3_3.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. 
151 For a discussion see Kliemann and Stehmann, supra n 110, 498.  
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from 2012 onwards. Alongside this there has been significant changes in demand, especially a 
steep decline in the volume of letters, as customers and businesses increasingly use electronic 
forms of communication.152 While new entry in the postal services market may have played a 
significant role in securing greater efficiency, it has also posed a challenge to the sustainability of 
universal service. Competition has come from firms who have only entered the most profitable 
segments of the market, such as bulk mail, business to business communications, and the 
growing parcel delivery sector.153 This poses particular difficulties for incumbents, whose ability 
to cross-subsidise USOs has been eroded.  
 
2.1. Liberalisation of postal services and the protection of USOs: reconciling the two 
objectives 
 
The liberalisation of postal services began with the publication of a Green Paper in 1992 which 
proposed to protect and finance USOs by granting exclusive rights to the incumbents with 
respect to specific reserved services. 154 This was followed in 1994 by a Council resolution 
inviting the Commission to come forward with legislative proposals to include a definition of a 
minimum level of universal service and, in order to ensure “the economic and financial viability” 
of the provision of universal service, the definition of “a sector of appropriate dimensions which 
may be reserved for universal service providers”.155 The First Postal Directive156 in 1997 defined 
universal service as “the permanent provision of a postal service of specified quality at all points 
in their territory at affordable prices for all users”,157 prescribing the minimum levels of service 
                                                          
152 In the UK, the volume of letter mail has dropped by 28.2% since 2008. Despite the loss in volume, the prices for 
standard-sized letter mail are cheaper than in other European countries, Ofcom, “International Communications 
Market Report” (2014), 311 http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr14/icmr/ICMR_2014.pdf 
accessed 3 August 2016. The financial crisis and the recession has left its scars, Dieke et al., supra n 83, 168.  
153 The parcel market has grown over the last years (23.4% between 2008 and 2013), mainly because of an 
increasing popularity of e-commerce leading to a growth of the business to consumer segment of the parcel market. 
The revenues in the parcel market are also higher than in the letter market. In 2014, Royal Mail’s domestic parcel 
revenue market share was 31%, Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, “Competition in the postal services 
sector and the Universal Service Obligation” (Ninth Report of Session 2014-15), para 56, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmbis/769/769.pdf accessed 3 August 2016.  
154 Commission, “Green Paper on the Development of the Single Market for Postal Services” (Communication) 
COM(91) 476 final. 
155 Council Resolution of 7 February 1994 on the development of Community postal service [1994] OJ C 48/3. 
156 Directive 97/67/EC. 
157 Ibid, art 3(1). 
 33 
 
Member States should seek to protect.158 At the same time, it stipulated the limitations of 
reserved services, and set out a number of deadlines to be met in the gradual reduction of their 
scope, “taking into account the financial equilibrium of the universal service provider(s)”.159  
 
In 2002, the Commission reported on the effect of liberalisation of universal service, painting a 
very positive picture of the situation in all of the Member States.160 Not only were the minimum 
requirements of the Directive being met, in many countries they were being exceeded 
significantly. Furthermore, while the Directive only required universal service at “affordable 
prices”,161 the Commission reported that “the uniform tariff remains a cornerstone of universal 
service in all Member States (even if not a regulatory requirement in all of them)”.162 However, 
there was evidence that the financial stability of USPs was in question: in seven Member States, 
provisions for compensation mechanisms were in place, although at that time only Spain had 
plans to activate a fund.163 All in all, the Commission concluded that universal service was “not 
at risk”.164 This finding was hardly surprising given the report had been overtaken by the 
adoption of Second Postal Service Directive,165 which laid down deadlines for the significant 
reduction in the scope of reserved services in 2003 and 2006 while at the same time leaving the 
universal service requirements substantially the same.166  
 
Although the clear endpoint was the removal of reserved markets, there was evidence of some 
nervousness over the sustainability of USOs, the Directive requiring the Commission complete 
an assessment by the end of 2006 of the “impact on universal service of the full accomplishment 
of the postal internal market”.167 In fulfilling that requirement, the Commission announced a 
                                                          
158 Directive 97/67/EC, art 3(3). 
159 Ibid, art 7(3). 
160 Commission, “Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of the 
Postal Directive (97/67/EC Directive)” COM(2002) 632 final, 16-19. 
161 Directive 97/67/EC, art 3(1). 
162 Commission, supra n 160, 17.  
163 Ibid, 18. 
164 Ibid.  
165 Directive 2002/39/EC. 
166 Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2002/39/EC, art 7(1). The market was opened in four steps. The 
first reduction of the reserved areas took place in 1999 when the market was opened for items weighing 350 grams 
or more and costing less than five times the public tariff. The Second Postal Directive reduced the limit for reserved 
services further to items weighing less than 100 grams as from 1 January 2003 and for services weighing less than 
50 grams from 2006 on respectively.  
167 Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2002/39/EC, art 7(3).  
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detailed “prospective study” of the implications of full market opening on universal service.168 
Published in 2006, the study had one core message: that market opening should not be delayed 
beyond 2009.169 Those countries which had already introduced significant postal competition – 
Sweden, Finland and the UK – had not seen a decline in the attainment or quality of USOs, and 
there was evidence of increased efficiency and reliability of postal services in those countries.170 
Indeed, the Commission opined, one of the key problems in delaying full market opening would 
be the resulting lack of incentives operating on the incumbents to increase their efficiency and 
preparedness for fully fledged competition. Overall, the Commission’s premise was that 
competition would enhance service quality, with universal service benefiting from the “dynamic 
efficiencies” that would be created.171 Only once this was achieved would further interventions 
be required to protect USOs. These would be regulatory safeguards, in the form of service 
standards or price caps and, only in the last resort, specific subsidies for USPs.172  
 
The key recommendation of the Commission’s study was implemented with the adoption in 
2008 of the Third Postal Directive.173 All postal markets had to be fully opened to competition 
by the end of 2010, although eleven Member States took advantage of a two year transitional 
period.174  
 
Despite the removal of the reserved areas, the scope of universal postal service has been retained 
substantially at the levels originally laid down in the First Postal Services Directive.175 Member 
States do retain a degree of discretion and flexibility to meet national demands and 
circumstances.176 While the first two Directives clearly envisaged the incumbent as the de facto 
universal service provider, alongside the removal of the reserved areas, the Third Postal 
                                                          
168 Commission, “Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of the 
Postal Directive (97/67/EC Directive as amended by Directive 2002/39/EC)” COM(2005) 102 final, 7.  
169 Commission, “Prospective study on the impact on universal service of the full accomplishment of the postal 
internal market in 2009” (Report) COM(2006) 596 final.  
170 Commission, supra n 169, 4.  
171 Ibid, 7.  
172 Ibid.  
173 Directive 2008/6/EC. 
174 Ibid, art 2(1) and art 3(1); Those Member States were Czech Republic, Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. 
175 Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2002/39/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, art 3. 
176 Directive 2008/6/EC, Recital 23. 
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Directive gives the Member States more freedom to designate one or more universal service 
provider(s), or to rely on the market when intervention is not necessary.177 The need to move 
beyond relying only upon the incumbent as the universal service provider is reflected in the 
Third Postal Services Directive which now encourages the use of public procurement procedures 
in the funding of universal services.178  
 
2.2. How changes in demand / the abolition of the reserved market has led to increased 
tensions on postal services – the UK and Germany 
 
Despite the Commission’s position, sustained for over two decades, that liberalisation and 
universal service could both be pursued successfully in tandem, this view has come under stress 
in recent years. The logic underpinning the reserved areas approach was that the incumbent 
would retain an ability to cross-subsidise the non-profitable elements of its service from the 
profitable ones. While the potential to do so was progressively lowered with the reduction in the 
scope of reserved areas, full liberalisation has left incumbents facing ‘cherry-picking’ by new 
entrant firms across all of their activities. New entrants have chosen selective entry, mainly 
offering their services in urban areas with a focus on the business to business market. They can 
also freely choose the quantity and quality of their collections and deliveries, not being subject to 
the USO requirements. In many rural and less populated areas, the former incumbent is still the 
only service provider, with the “final mile” of delivery remaining a natural monopoly. 
Incumbents then are forced to lower prices where they face new entry, and raise prices where 
they do not, undermining the sustainability of universal service, at least in the long-term.  
 
One solution to this problem, of course, is to extend USOs to new entrants. However, doing so 
especially in the early days of liberalisation, may well have created significant barriers to entry 
and hinder competition. The same could be said, albeit to a lesser extent, of requiring new 
entrants to contribute to an incumbent’s net costs via a compensation mechanism. Another 
                                                          
177 Ibid.  
178 Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, art 7(2).  
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alternative is to reduce the scope of universal service (subject, of course, to the minimum 
requirements of the PSD). This has been done in a number of EU countries.179  
 
In order to explore some of these issues further, we focus on recent developments in two 
Member States, Germany and the UK. These two countries were in the vanguard of opening their 
postal service markets to competition, well ahead of the 2010 deadline.180 The issue of the 
sustainability of universal service has come to the fore in both, with pressure from incumbents to 
reduce the scope of universal service.181  
 
Currently in the UK, universal service obligations are only imposed on the incumbent, Royal 
Mail, and there is no compensation mechanism in place. In areas which an entrant does not wish 
to serve, it can choose instead downstream access, i.e., handing their postal items over to Royal 
Mail for final mile delivery. In Germany, Deutsche Post was designated as USP, but since the 
introduction of competition in 2008, its designation was removed, and no universal service 
provider is now designated. If universal service cannot be fulfilled by the market, then all 
licensed operators must provide the service jointly.182  
 
                                                          
179 The frequency of delivery has been reduced to five days a week in the Netherlands and Italy. European 
Regulators Group for Postal Services, “Discussion paper on the implementation of Universal Service in the postal 
sector and the effects of recent changes in some countries on the scope of the USO” ERGP(14)16, 8 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ergp/docs/documentation/2014/ergp-14-16-uso_en.pdf accessed 3 August 2016; 
PostNL, “General Conditions for the Universal Postal Service 2014”, Article 20(1), 
file://ueahome/eresssf4/zgr08szu/data/Documents/general-conditions-universal-postal-service_tcm19-76269.pdf 
accessed 3 August 2016. 
180 The UK and German postal services markets were fully liberalised in 2006 and 2008 respectively. S Hough and L 
Booth, “Postal Services: Royal Mail plc” (2014) House of Commons, Standard Note, SN/EP/06763; Section 51(1) 
of the Postgesetz of 22 December 1997, BGBl. I, 3294, as amended by Art. 4 Abs. 106 G v. 7.8.2013, BGBl. I, 
3154. 
181 Both countries impose obligations which go further than is required by the PSD. The Postal Services Directive 
only requires the collection and delivery of letters and parcels from Mondays to Fridays, whereas in the UK and 
Germany letters are collected and delivered six days a week (Mondays to Saturdays) and in Germany the six days a 
week collection and delivery applies also for parcels. For a summary of USOs at European level, in Germany and 
the UK, see Harker at al., supra  n 1, 35-38. 
182 If the German regulatory authority believes that the level of discharging universal service is not satisfactory, then 
all operators who have a licence, subject to a turnover threshold of 500,000 euros in the preceding calendar year, 
jointly provide universal postal service (section 12(1) of the Postgesetz of 22 December 1997, BGBl. I, 3294, as 
amended by Art. 4 Abs. 106 G v. 7.8.2013, BGBl. I, 3154). See C Feijoo and C Milne, “Re-thinking universal 
service policy for the digital era: setting the scene – an introduction to the special issue on universal service” (2008) 
10, info 4.  
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The levels of end-to-end competition (where the entrant collects, sorts and then distributes and 
delivers the mail) are low in the letter market as the vast majority of letters are still delivered by 
the former incumbent.183 In the UK, the most significant entrant was offering direct letter 
delivery in London, Liverpool and Manchester, but withdrew from the direct delivery market in 
2015.184 However, despite an overall decline of letter volumes, the demand for downstream 
access has increased.185 In Germany, while there are hundreds of licensed operators,186 Deutsche 
Post delivers nearly 90 per cent of all (licensed) letters.187 In rural areas, consumers often do not 
have a choice between different providers and instead have to rely on the former incumbent.188 
Downstream access also plays an important role in Germany.189  
 
In both countries, the sustainability of universal service has been questioned. In the UK, Royal 
Mail regards itself as being at a competitive disadvantage compared with the other providers and 
has asked for a number of regulatory reviews of the USO scheme. In 2008, the Hooper Report 
acknowledged that universal service was under threat, mainly because of the declining letter 
market, but it also suggested that the incumbent was in a position to reduce its costs still further 
before any intervention was required.190 Two years later, in an update to the report, Hooper came 
                                                          
183 In the UK, in 2013-14 only 0.6% of letters by volume were delivered by providers other than Royal Mail, Ofcom, 
“Annual monitoring update on the postal market: Financial year 2013-14” (2014), paras 6.26-6.27, 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/post/monitoring-reports/annual-monitoring-update-postal-2013-14.pdf 
accessed 3 August 2016 
184 BBC, “Royal Mail regulation to be reviewed by Ofcom” (16 June 2015), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
33145446 accessed 3 August 2016. 
185 Ofcom, supra n 183, paras 6.20-6.23. 
186 At the end of 2013, there were about 600 licenced enterprises, many of them small or even micro businesses, 
Bundesnetzagentur, “Herausforderungen des Post-Universaldienstes Vorbereitung einer Stellungnahme gemäß § 47 
Abs. 1 Satz 2 Postgesetz” (2014) Impulspapier, 2 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Sachgebiete/Post/Verbraucher/Universaldienst/Impul
spapier.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1 accessed 3 August 2016. 
187 Bundesnetzagentur, “Marktuntersucherung Bericht über den lizenzpflichtigen Briefbereich 2015” (2016), 7, 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Sachgebiete/Post/Unternehmen_Institutionen/Marktb
eobachtung/LizenzpflichtigePDL/Marktuntersuchung2015.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5 accessed 3 August 
2016. 
188 Monopolkommission, “Post 2013: Wettbewerbsschutz effectivieren” Sondergutachten 67, 27, 
http://www.monopolkommission.de/images/PDF/SG/s67_volltext.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. 
189 The majority of alternative postal provider carry out the entire service from collection to delivery of letters. 
Despite the fact that in 2012 more than 60% of all licensed letters carried out by the incumbents stemmed from 
downstream access, only a tenth of those products came from new entrants. Bundesnetzagentur, “Post 2012 /2013” 
(2013) Tätigkeitsbericht, 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Allgemeines/Bundesnetzagentur/Publikationen/Beric
hte/2013/131216_TaetigkeitsberichtPost2012.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3 3 August 2016. 
190 Richard Hooper, Deirdre Hutton and Smith Ian R, “Modernise or decline: Policies to maintain the universal 
postal service in the United Kingdom” (An independent review of the UK postal service sector, 2008), para 38, 
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to the conclusion that the situation had become more serious.191 However, repeating the findings 
of the previous report, the 2010 Report found that Royal Mail still had the potential to increase 
further its efficiency before any reduction of the scope of the USOs would be contemplated.192 
The postal regulator, Ofcom, has taken a very robust stance with Royal Mail. In a recent report 
on universal service in 2014, it dismissed Royal Mail’s claims that it was unable to fulfil its 
USOs, stating unequivocally that universal postal service in the UK is “not under threat”, and 
reiterated the need for Royal Mail to increase its efficiency.193  
 
In Germany, similar issues have come to the fore and in 2014 the postal regulator, 
Bundesnetzagentur, launched an inquiry into the universal postal service.194 Since Germany is 
relying on the market to secure universal service, there is the real prospect that a declining letter 
market and increasing competition in parcel market may threaten the sustainability of USOs, at 
least in the long-term. Anticipating a further decline, and higher costs for the service providers, 
the regulator has emphasised the need for operators to increase their efficiency and develop new 
services.195 However, unlike its UK counterpart, the Bundesnetzagentur has signalled that it may 
be necessary to change the national and even the European regulatory framework to guarantee an 
adequate universal postal service in the future. This could involve both increasing and reducing 
the scope of USOs; new services that have been developed because of increased competition 
                                                          
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228786/7529.pdf accessed 3 August 
2016. 
191 Richard Hooper, “Saving the Royal Mail’s universal postal service in the digital age: An Update of the 2008 
Independent Review of the Postal Services Sector” (September 2010) para 7 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31808/10-1143-saving-royal-mail-
universal-postal-service.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. 
192 Ibid. Unlike the 2008 Report, the updated version concluded that the creation of a compensation fund should not 
be excluded per se, ibid, 40. For a discussion see L Booth and D Hough, “TNT Post and Royal mail: end-to-end 
competition in postal services” (2014) House of Commons Briefing Paper, 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06935 accessed 3 August 2016. 
193 Ofcom, “Securing universal postal service” (2 December 2014), http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/post/securing-
universal-postal-service/ accessed 3 August 2016; The regulator also argued that selective entry does not create a 
‘cherry-picking’ situation, ibid. More recently the BIS Select Committee, in a report published in March 2015, 
reached the conclusion that alternative providers are able to ‘cherry-pick’ but the current level is too low to require 
any regulatory action, Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, supra n 153, para 39, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmbis/769/769.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. Ofcom 
has recently confirmed the position: Ofcom “Review of the Regulation of 
Royal Mail” (25 May 2016), http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/royal-mail-
review/summary/Review-of-Royal-Mail-Regulation.pdf accessed 3 August 2016.  
194 Bundesnetzagentur, supra n 186, 2. 
195 Ibid, 2-3.  
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could be brought within it (perhaps by combining universal service in telecoms), while the scope 
of traditional letter services may need to be reduced, especially in rural and less populated 
areas.196 Given that the incumbent is not subject to any formal requirement with respect to 
universal service, it is not surprising that the situation in Germany is seen as more urgent than it 
is in the UK.  
 
2.3. Compensation mechanisms for universal service in postal services 
 
In postal services, it appears that while the majority of Member States have legislated for the 
establishment of a compensation fund, as of 2013, only four have actually gone on to establish 
one.197 A further four compensate the USPs directly from public funds.198 For those countries 
which have actively considered the introduction of compensation mechanisms, there is a wide 
variety of views on the pros and cons of their implementation from a competition perspective. 
The Swedish NRA is of the view that designation is vital to protect competition since the 
designation procedure triggers the requirement of the PSD on cost-related pricing.199 On the 
other hand, the Spanish competition authority has been highly critical of the designation of the 
incumbent as the USP for a fifteen year period, which it considers to be contrary to both the 
spirit and the letter of the PSD.200 This approach, however, appears to represent the practice in 
other Member States; in all cases where a USP has been designated it has been the incumbent 
firm, despite the Third Postal Directive encouraging some level of contestability.201 It also 
appears that, subject to limited exceptions, the vast majority of users in Member States will have 
service levels which meet the minimum USO requirements of the Directive without the need for 
intervention.202  
 
                                                          
196 Ibid, 5-6. 
197 Dieke et al., supra n 83, 154.  
198 Ibid. As of 2013, 22 have legislated for a compensation fund, while six have deemed that the USO represents an 
unfair burden on the USP. Ibid.  
199 Ibid, 133. 
200 Comision Nacional de la Competencia, The new regulatory framework for the traditional postal sector in Spain 
(March 2011), cited in Dieke et al., supra n 83, 133.  
201 Dieke et al., supra n 83, 16. 
202 This is the result of a survey of Member States which concludes that “the risk of persons lacking basic universal 
service appears to be confined to relatively small populations living in thinly populated rural areas”, ibid, 136. 
 40 
 
State aid fulfils a different role in postal services compared to broadband. In broadband, state aid 
is used to increase access to a service, whereas in postal services it is used to maintain the current 
level of services and secure a level-playing field between undertakings that provide USOs and 
alternative operators with no such obligation. State aid cases are relatively few. There have only 
been 27 State aid decisions concerning compensation for discharging SGEI in the postal sector 
between 2003 and 2014.203 All of the cases concerned compensation payments to the former 
incumbent and the majority of cases involved aid granted for the provision of services that go 
beyond the minimum objectives and conditions set out by the PSD. 204  
 
There are only a handful of State aid cases that concern only the funding of USOs as defined in 
the PSD. 205 In both decisions, the subsidy granted by the Italian government to the incumbent, 
Poste Italiane, was held to be State aid as the fourth Altmark criterion had not been satisfied. 
There are a number of other cases where Member States have been found to be subsidising 
services which include but go beyond the definition of USO in the PSD.206 Although these may 
be capable of being disaggregated for the purposes of a State aid assessment, Member States are 
unlikely to set-up a separate compensation scheme under the PSD, with all of the administrative 
and bureaucratic architecture that implies, if there are other subsidies which have to be notified 
to the Commission. Of course, this has the effect in practice of excluding new entrants from 
fulfilling the USOs. Where compensation mechanisms are used, the Commission guards against 
market distortionary effects. For example, in a recent State aid decision concerning the Greek 
postal incumbent, ELTA, the Commission had to assess a compensation fund based on 
contributions by the incumbent’s competitors.207 The Commission concluded the compensation 
                                                          
203 The cases were collected from the European Commission with the help of the EC’s internal search engine 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm>. The search focussed on cases for the economic sector 
“H.53 – Postal and courier activities” between 25.07.2003 (after Altmark) and 31.12.2014. The search was further 
refined by limiting the cases to compensation payments for the provision of SGEI. State aid decisions that concern 
subsidies paid to cover pension costs were excluded. Other cases not listed as a result of the online search but we 
became aware of through a review of the relevant literature so that 25 cases are part of the case law assessment.  
204 Services of General Economic Interest in postal services are, for example, the distribution of periodicals, the 
provision of basic financial services, the distribution of electoral material, and in some Member States even the 
payment of pensions. See, Competition Policy Brief, “High quality and competitive postal services for citizens and 
businesses - State aid control in the postal sector” (May 2014), 2 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2014/006_en.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. 
205 Decision NN51/2006 [2006] Poste Italiane SpA and Decision NN24/2008 [2008] Poste Italiane SpA.  
206 N462/2008 [2008] Poland; N312/2010 [2010] Poland; SA. 33989 [2012] Italy; SA.17653 [2013] Germany. 
207 Decision SA.35608 [2014] Hellenic Post (ELTA). 
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scheme was incompatible as it appeared to place a disproportionate burden on new entrants, 
requiring them to make a contribution of up to 10 per cent of their turnover, thereby creating 
barriers to entry or even forcing them to exit the market.208  
 
2.4. Conclusions 
 
The findings of our case study suggest that the compensation mechanisms in the PSD have not 
been widely used. In many Member States, the incumbent provides services that go beyond the 
minimum requirement of universal postal service, but then struggles to finance those services, 
relying on state subsidies to maintain historic service levels. In those countries, such as the UK 
and Germany, where liberalisation has advanced significantly, incumbents have argued that 
universal service is unsustainable given the ability of new entrants to ‘cherry-pick’ the most 
profitable customers. Such arguments are likely to gain traction as demand for letter collection 
and delivery declines in the future.  
 
E. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have considered the protection of universal service in the network industries, 
with a focus on telecommunications and postal services.  
 
As has been observed in the literature, the protection of universal service was essentially a quid 
pro quo for liberalisation of the network industries. The EU sectoral legislation represented a 
compromise between these competing values; it sought to give formal legal protection to USOs 
and, in anticipation of full liberalisation and the eventual reduction of incumbents’ market 
shares, put in place detailed and elaborate mechanisms for compensating the costs of serving 
disadvantaged and unprofitable consumers. As we have demonstrated, to a surprising degree, 
these provisions have remained dormant. Where they have been tested, they have demonstrated 
themselves to be particularly complex and cumbersome. The substantive rules, as interpreted by 
the Court and the Commission, have been framed primarily to promote contestability in the 
                                                          
208 Ibid, para 193-194. 
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provision of universal service and to avoid the danger of over-compensation to the USP (the 
incumbent in the vast majority of cases). It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the limited use 
of compensation mechanisms is due in no small part to the complexity of the underlying sectoral 
rules.  
 
Another surprising finding in this paper is the degree to which the State aid regime has been used 
as an alternative mechanism for funding USOs.209 Indeed, with respect to the public funding of 
investment in broadband infrastructure, this appears to be the result of a deliberate policy 
decision on the part of the Member States, albeit with a strong steer from the Commission.  
There is nothing new or novel in the use of the general competition rules as an alternative to 
sectoral regulatory tools.210 The more pertinent and interesting question from our point of view is 
why Member States would prefer to channel compensation schemes for approval under the State 
aid regime, rather than relying upon the detailed procedural and substantive rules contained in 
the Directives. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the State aid regime is preferred because 
of its flexibility, and the legal certainty resulting from the Commission’s ex ante role in 
scrutinising the Member States’ interventions in these markets. 
 
State aid rules are not unproblematic. As a judge of the CJEU, Thomas von Danwitz, has 
observed, the State aid rules are not necessarily an appropriate tool in this context: “we have to 
acknowledge that state aid control is not a generally usable, unconditioned instrument of 
regulatory policy for realising a level playing field in liberalised markets. State aid control is 
rather focused on the use and abuse of state resources in a competitive environment”.211  
 
Under the State aid rules, the Commission has substantial control over Member States’ autonomy 
when it comes to protecting and promoting universal service. Where an EU norm exists in 
                                                          
209 The Commission takes the rather surprising view that compensation payments for the provision of USOs through 
a compensation fund set up under the PSD is State aid and, therefore, assesses the compatibility under the State aid 
regime (Hellenic Post, supra n 207). We disagree with this approach.   
210 For a detailed discussion see M Harker, “EU Competition Law as a Tool for Dealing with Regulatory Failure: 
The Broadband Margin Squeeze Cases” (2013)  Journal of Business Law 817; N Dunne, “Margin 
Squeeze: From Broken Regulation to Legal Uncertainty” (2011) 70 Cambridge Law Journal 34; D Geradin and R 
O’Donoghue, “The Concurrent Application of Competition Law and Regulation: The Case of Margin Squeeze  
in the Telecommunications Sector” (2005) 1 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 355.  
211 von Danwitz, supra n 23, 12. 
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secondary legislation (as in the case of both the USD and PSD), Member States retain some 
measure of discretion to go beyond that norm, but a stricter test of proportionality obtains, 
requiring Member States demonstrate that the State aid measure is the least restrictive means of 
achieving the objective in question.212 Furthermore, the Commission has sought to limit the 
discretion that Member States enjoy in the design of compensation mechanisms, maximising the 
boundaries of its supervisory powers by its restrictive interpretation of the Altmark criteria and 
Article 106(2).  
 
Controlling Member States’ autonomy when intervening in markets is not the same task as 
regulating to ensure that the aims and objectives of regulation are being fulfilled. As we 
explained, the State aid rules, as they are now to be interpreted under the 2012 SGEI package, 
have been realigned to promote contestability in public service provision. Nevertheless, the 
public procurement requirement introduced by the SGEI Framework is by no means a panacea. 
While the intention is to encourage more contestability in the provision of SGEI, it may be that 
tendering does not result in the best outcomes.213 Asymmetries of information may have the 
effect that the winning bidder actually puts forward a bid which is too low to recover the costs of 
universal service. Furthermore, procurement procedures cannot prevent undertakings colluding 
in order to achieve higher compensation payments. And even though an incumbent may be able 
to offer to fulfil USOs at the lowest cost, it will have an incentive to bid-up its price as the costs 
of its competitors will in general be higher. There are also potential problems when it comes to 
specifying and securing service levels as there are incentives on bidders to compete purely on 
price rather than quality of service.214 While using a tendering process obviates the need for 
Member States to engage in the complex requirements under the Directives, reliance solely on 
the EU public procurement rules is not an effective substitute for regulation; they do not involve 
an effective ex post check on the accounts of the incumbent to avoid any over-compensation.215 
                                                          
212 Sauter, supra n 15, 180-81; see also Ross, supra n 67, 136-8; Fiedziuk, supra n 23; Klasse, supra n 35, 50-51. 
213 N Fiedziuk, “Putting services of general economic interest up for tender: reflections on applicable EU rules” 
(2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 87, 93.  
214 EAGCP, supra n 35, 6-7. 
215 Ibid, 6; Klasse, supra n 35, 46-47; Fiedziuk, supra n 213, 93-96. 
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Furthermore, the State aid rules may not be engaged at all where the compensation payments are 
not capable of being imputable to the state.216  
 
There will often be trade-offs between pursuing liberalisation policies while at the same time 
seeking to protect vulnerable and disadvantaged consumers from some of the adverse 
consequences of competition. The core issue is whether these trade-offs are better made within a 
framework which seeks to give formal protection to specified levels of universal service, while at 
the same time putting in place safeguards – procedural and substantive – aimed at minimising 
distortions of competition. There are a number of dangers, outlined above, in relying upon the 
State aid regime to control Member States’ compensation of USOs. However, in our view, the 
key problem is that the State aid regime gives insufficient protection to the importance of 
universal service. The State aid rules are permissive; they do not require Member States to put in 
place mechanisms for compensation where the fulfilment of USOs require it. The danger is that 
such a discretionary approach to securing universal service will result in a diminution of USOs, 
leading to less protection for vulnerable and disadvantaged consumers. The Commission has 
been more concerned with ensuring that interventions in support of universal service do not 
produce disproportionate market distortions, that the incumbent is not over-compensated, and 
that new entrant firms are not excluded from being the USP. Very little, if any, attention has been 
paid to whether the USOs are in fact being fulfilled and, of equal importance, are being 
appropriately updated in the light of changing demand, technological and market conditions. It is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that universal service, as a formal EU regulatory norm in the 
network industries, is in managed decline. 
                                                          
216 On the problem of imputability see von Danwitz, supra n 23, 7-8. The extent to which an industry compensation 
scheme constitutes State aid is by no means straightforward. It depends upon whether the scheme is deemed to meet 
the cumulative conditions of being “aid granted by the State” and “through State resources”. The latter condition 
may be particularly difficult to meet in cases where the contributions towards an industry compensation scheme are 
made only by private undertakings and are not redistributed via a public institution (see Case C-379/98 
PreussenElecktra AG [2001] ECR I-2099). See M Clayton and M Catalan, “The Notion of State Resources: So Near 
and yet so Far” (2015) (2) European State Aid Law Quarterly 260 for a discussion of recent case law. It would 
appear vital that the scheme is both administered by a state institution and that there is state control over how the 
resources collected are distributed. However, the 2012 SGEI Communication posits that “compensatory payments 
for the operation of SGEIs which are financed through parafiscal charges or compulsory contributions imposed by 
the State and managed and apportioned in accordance with the provisions of the legislation are compensatory 
payments made through State resources.” Commission, supra n 48, Recital 36.  
 1 
 
Universal service obligations and the liberalisation of network industries: taming the 
Chimera? 
 
Professor Michael Harker and Antje Kreutzmann-Gallasch 
 
 
Professor Michael Harker (corresponding author) 
Law School, University of East Anglia 
Norwich Research Park 
Norwich, NR4 7TJ 
01603 59 2406 
m.harker@uea.ac.uk 
 
 
Antje Kreutzmann-Gallasch 
Law School, University of East Anglia  
Norwich Research Park 
Norwich, NR4 7TJ 
a.kreutzmann@uea.ac.uk 
 
 
Word count: c.11500
Manuscript - with author details
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 2 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper considers the protection of universal service in the network industries, with a focus on 
the postal service and telecommunications sectors. We define the concept of universal service 
and explain how it was seen as a necessary quid pro quo for securing the liberalisation agenda in 
the EU. We go on to explain and analyse the two competing means of protecting and 
compensating universal service, either under the State aid regime or the relevant sectoral 
legislation. In order to gain a better understanding of how these competing mechanisms operate 
in practice, we look in detail at two areas where liberalisation and universal service are in 
particular tension: (i) high-speed broadband and (ii) letter collection and delivery. We conclude 
by discussing some of the problems of using State aid rules as a substitute for a sectoral 
framework and contemplate the future of universal service.  
 
 
Keywords: competition law, State aid, Service of General Economic Interest, Universal Service 
Obligation, telecommunications, postal services, compensation. 
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A. Introduction 
 
Over the last three decades, the EU has been pursuing a liberalisation agenda across all of the 
network industries – telecommunications, postal services, energy, water and railways. A concern 
to arise from this is that when traditionally monopolised markets are opened to competition, new 
entrants may be able to enter and target the most profitable consumers, leaving the incumbent 
with a disproportionate number of consumers who provide insufficient revenue to cover their 
costs. This is a particular problem where there have historically been extensive cross-subsidies in 
favour of groups of consumers who are viewed as vulnerable, deserving or politically sensitive 
(for example, those living in rural areas). As a consequence, it is often politically difficult or 
socially undesirable to achieve cost-reflective pricing through tariff rebalancing.  
 
The response in the EU has been to formalise the protection of certain classes of customers 
through the imposition of universal service obligations (USOs). In the early days of 
liberalisation, such obligations were normally imposed on the incumbent without it being 
compensated; its size and the advantages it had derived as the historic monopolist meant that it 
could afford to absorb these additional costs without being placed at a significant competitive 
disadvantage. The effectiveness of this approach to universal service begins to unravel where the 
market share of the incumbent is significantly eroded by new entry, or where new investment is 
needed in network infrastructure. In the long-run, a sustainable approach to funding universal 
service has to be found.  
 
In this paper, we consider the legal responses to the protection of the universal service in the EU. 
In section B, we define what is meant by USOs, and explain some of the potential market 
distortions that can occur in pursuing them, including how entrants and incumbents may be 
placed at a competitive (dis)advantage. While there are inherent tensions in attempting to secure 
universal service alongside liberalisation, a number of EU Member States would never have 
accepted the latter goal without some formal protection for the former. However, in more recent 
years, the policy emphasis has shifted towards the introduction of contestability into the 
provision of universal service with an attempt to reverse the de facto presumption of the 
incumbent’s continuation of the role. In section C, we explain and compare the legal frameworks 
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for universal service provision. In the network industries, the relevant EU secondary legislation 
often prescribes both the requirements of USOs and the means by which compensation may be 
made to those entrusted with its provision. Alternatively, as a subset of Services of General 
Interest (SGEIs), Member States may instead choose to make compensation payments to 
universal service providers (USPs) under the State aid regime, as reformed by the 2012 SGEI 
package. As we explain, in recent years, under both the sectoral and State aid regimes, increased 
emphasis has been placed upon contestability in the provision of universal service. In section D, 
we have selected two contrasting areas to investigate further. The first relates to the provision of 
high-speed broadband, the expansion of which requires substantial investment in infrastructure, 
both public and private. What is particularly striking here is that Member States have eschewed 
the secondary legislation, and the sectoral rules on compensation which it contains, in favour of 
making use of the State aid regime. The second area is postal services, in particular the collection 
and delivery of letters. The provision of universal service has come under particular strain in 
recent years due to increased liberalisation and dramatic falls in demand. Nevertheless, we see 
here very little use of compensation mechanisms, either under the sectoral or State aid regimes, 
with a focus instead on incumbents achieving efficiency gains. In section E, we conclude, 
contemplating the future of universal service, its sustainability, and the extent to which it is 
subordinated to pro-competition goals.  
 
B. Universal service obligations and liberalisation 
 
In this section, we first define what is meant by universal service, before proceeding to explain 
some of the tensions that exist between its protection and the promotion of liberalisation and 
competition in the network industries. We discuss how the protection of universal service in the 
EU was essentially a political compromise by Member States in accepting the EU’s liberalisation 
agenda for the network industries. We then explain how universal service can be secured, 
particularly by utilising the various options that exist in the design of compensation mechanisms.  
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The nature and extent of USOs differ significantly between sectors and countries.1 In some 
sectors, such as telecommunication and postal services, USOs tend to be highly specified, 
whereas in others, EU law lays down requirements which are fairly open textured, leaving 
Member States with a broad degree of discretion. While there is no universal definition of what 
is meant by the term, it is normally taken to mean a requirement which maximises the ubiquity of 
a service in terms of coverage and accessibility.2 First, there may be an obligation to provide a 
prescribed level of geographical coverage for a particular type of service. To achieve 
geographical ubiquity, it may be necessary to use cross-subsidies (for example, from customers 
in urban areas to those in rural areas). Second, such obligations may require that services are 
offered at a price which is “affordable”. Again, this may involve cross-subsidies between 
different types of users (for example, between business and domestic customers). Uniform 
pricing may be used to achieve this goal or a more targeted approach may be used in the form of 
special tariffs in favour of particular types of disadvantaged consumers (“social tariffs”). What 
unifies all of these different requirements is the notion that the market would not otherwise serve 
these areas and/or consumers, or if it did, prices would be charged which would place services 
beyond the reach of a significant number of consumers.3  
 
The imposition of USOs may lead to a number of market distortions. Restrictions on pricing, in 
particular uniform pricing mechanisms, can create strategic links between market participants 
which have complex effects;4 for instance, the possibility of higher prices for all consumers, 
                                                          
1 For a comprehensive review of the literature see M Harker, A Kreutzmann and C Waddams, “Public service 
obligations and competition”, (2013) CERRE, Final Report, 23-46, 
http://www.cerre.eu/sites/cerre/files/130318_CERRE_PSOCompetition_Final_0.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. 
2 Colin R Blackman, “Universal service: obligation or opportunity?” (1995) 19 Telecommunications Policy 171, 
172. 
3 On social exclusion, see E Szyszczak, The regulation of the state in competitive markets in the EU (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2007) 243. 
4 F Mirabel, JC Poudou and M Roland, “Universal service obligations: The role of subsidization schemes” (2009) 21 
Information Economics and Policy 1, 7. 
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including the intended beneficiaries of the policy.5 The imposition of USOs may also reduce 
entry, especially if the obligations are imposed on entrants.6  
 
One particular problem with USOs is “cherry-picking”, i.e., where new entrants target the most 
profitable consumers, leaving the incumbent with those consumers who provide insufficient 
revenue to cover their costs.7 While this may be sustainable in the short term, as new entrants 
establish their position on the market, in the long run the incumbent’s costs will be forced 
upwards, meaning it will either be required to increase its prices, or some form of compensation 
mechanism will have to be employed (for example, an industry compensation scheme). Such 
mechanisms are not without their own problems and may lead to the over-compensation of the 
incumbent.8 It may also mean that certain classes of customers are left with the incumbent 
provider, who is perhaps offering an inferior level of service to that which would be available to 
them in a competitive environment.9 This tends to emphasise the importance of analysing the 
counterfactual, i.e., the market conditions which would prevail absent the USO. Indeed, it may 
even be the case that the imposition of USOs on the incumbent provider may actually place it at 
a competitive advantage vis-à-vis new entrants, especially where it is over-compensated for the 
cost of providing the USO.  
 
From a political perspective, it is often difficult to withdraw USOs, especially where doing so 
may lead to the erosion of cross-subsidies leading to adverse distributional consequences.10 
                                                          
5 Calzada demonstrates that uniform pricing will affect the development of competition enabling the entrant to enter 
in a limited way, increasing both the incumbent’s prices and the profitability of both players, J Calzada “Universal 
service obligations in the postal sector: The relationship between quality and coverage” (2009) 21 Information 
Economics and Policy 10, 18;  Hviid and Waddams Price show how non-discrimination clauses imposed in the UK 
energy markets result in higher prices for all consumers, M Hviid and C Waddams Price, “Non-Discrimination 
Clauses in the Retail Energy Sector” (2012) 122 The Economic Journal, F236.  
6 S Hoernig and TE Pinto, “Universal Service Obligations: Should they be imposed on entrants?” (2001) 
ftp://193.196.11.222/pub/zew-docs/div/IKT/hoernig.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. 
7 L Rapp, “Public service or universal service?” (1996) 20 Telecommunications Policy 391, 394; G Simmonds, 
“Consumer Representation in Europe Policy and Practice for Utilities and Network Industries, Universal and Public 
Service Obligations in Europe” (2003) CRI Research Report 15/2003, 8. 
http://www.bath.ac.uk/management/cri/pubpdf/Research_Reports/15_Simmonds.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. 
8 A Gautier and X Wauthy, “Competitively neutral universal service obligations” (2012) 24 Information Economics 
and Policy 254, 259-60. 
9 JC Panzar, “A methodology for measuring the costs of universal service obligations” (2000) 12 Information 
Economics and Policy 211. 
10 See OECD, “Rethinking Universal Service for a Next Generation Network Environment” (2006) OECD Digital 
Economy Papers 113, 22-23, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/231528858833 accessed 3 August 2016. 
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Tariff rebalancing may be perceived as inequitable where it leads to higher prices for lower 
income and rural consumers, and may even result in some consumers disconnecting from the 
network altogether.11 The political sensitivity of tariff rebalancing may be employed by 
incumbents to resist liberalisation, or to slow its pace, and there is certainly evidence from the 
past that incumbents have used its spectre as a means of resisting liberalisation.12  
 
While there are obvious tensions between liberalisation and USOs, it may be that there is a more 
nuanced relationship between the two. First, the formal recognition of USOs was seen as a quid 
pro quo for further liberalisation, especially for Member States like France that have a strong 
tradition of public service in utilities.13 In this context then, USOs may be characterised as a 
“means to protect the weakest citizens from market liberalization”.14 So without the 
strengthening of USOs in law, the achievement of liberalisation policies at the EU level would 
have been more difficult. Second, liberalisation and USOs may serve the same ends. Increased 
competition may lead to lower prices, greater efficiency and increased affordability. 
Furthermore, the formal legal status and specification given to USOs, while differing 
significantly between sectors, may lead to more meaningful (and enforceable) rights for 
consumers.15 The clearer specification of USOs also increases certainty for market players, 
including new entrants.  
 
                                                          
11 Ibid. 
12 The UK gas incumbent, British Gas, provided an early example of such lobbying in its evidence to the 1993 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission Inquiry into opening the market. They predicted huge increases in fixed 
charges, less than a decade before they themselves abolished them in the competitive market, see M Bennett, D 
Cooke and C Waddams Price, “Left out in the cold? New energy tariffs, low-income households and the fuel poor” 
(2005) 23 Fiscal Studies 167. 
13 T Prosser, The limits of competition law: Markets and public services (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005), 
106-13. For a comparative discussion, see KA Eliassen and J From, “Deregulation, privatisation and public service 
delivery: Universal service in telecommunications in Europe” (2009) 27 Policy and Society 239. 
14 M Finger and D Finon, “From “service public” to universal service: the case of the European Union” in M Finger 
and RW Künneke (eds), International handbook of network industries: The liberalization of infrastructure 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2011), 55.  
15 W Sauter, “Services of general economic interest and universal service in EU law” (2008) 33 European Law 
Review 167, 178. 
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There are potential downsides to greater specification of USOs.16 The concept of universal 
service is a dynamic one, which needs to adapt to changing societal and technological needs.17 
Issues of particular concern include affordability in the light of changing living standards, 
changing perceptions of what is an essential service (for example, access to the internet is 
increasingly perceived as a basic need), and the danger of locking in services which are no 
longer used extensively nor judged as essential. So where USOs remain static and highly 
specified, they may become outmoded or irrelevant.18  
 
While some form of compensation may be necessary in order to achieve USOs, there are a 
number of different models which can be chosen, and the incumbent firm is not necessarily the 
best candidate for discharging the USO. One option is to remove the subsidies from the 
competitive retail supply market and deliver them through other means, for example, via a 
monopoly distribution network (where one exists). This occurs in many distribution networks 
where rural consumers are subsidised by urban consumers by the charging of uniform 
distribution prices. A second option is to grant special or exclusive rights over certain markets to 
the universal service provider, preserving its ability to cross-subsidise between profitable and 
non-profitable customers. This was the model used until recently in postal services. A third 
option, which tends to be the default regulatory choice, is to allow the incumbent to carry the 
costs without compensation because it enjoys other advantages. In the long run, as liberalisation 
gathers pace, it is unlikely that failing to compensate the incumbent will be sustainable. This then 
raises the vexed question of how to calculate the net costs and benefits for the purpose of 
                                                          
16 The actual level of specification differs significantly between sectors. For post and telecommunications, there is 
more detailed specification of the universal service requirements in EU law than is the case for the other network 
industries, in particular, transport, water and electricity. This can, in part, be attributed to the structural 
characteristics of the different network industries (for example, the amount of cross-border trade); and in part to the 
historical traditions in the Member States with regard to the definition and implementation of universal and public 
service provisions in these sectors. See Simmonds, supra n 7, 61; Prosser supra n 13, 174-206; and for a full survey, 
see Harker et al., supra n 1, 65-73.  
17 J Alleman, P Rappoport and A Banerjee, “Universal service: A new definition?” (2010) 34 Telecommunications 
Policy 86, 90; J Davies and E Szyszczak, “Universal Service Obligations: Fulfilling New Generations of Services of 
Economic Interest”, in E Szyszczak (ed), Developments in Services of General Interest (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser 
Press, 2011) 162-71; A Kreutzmann-Gallasch et al, “Criteria to define essential telecoms services” (2013) A Report 
for Ofcom by the ESRC Centre for Competition Policy, 9-16.  
18 Kreutzmann-Gallasch et al, supra n 17; Harker et al, “Competition for UK postal sector and the universal service 
obligation” (2014) BIS Consultation response from the ESRC Centre for Competition Policy,  
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/8158338/8261737/CCP+Response+-+BIS+-
+Competition+for+UK+Postal+Sector.pdf/364e21b3-6296-4ee9-8e4d-945b696e8235 accessed 3 August 2016. 
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compensating the universal service provider.19 There are two possible sources of compensation. 
One is an industry compensation scheme whereby entrants compensate the incumbent for 
fulfilling the relevant USO. Another is compensation directly from public funds. In either case, 
there is the problem that the incumbent will be over-compensated because, as with regulation 
more generally, it enjoys an informational advantage over, and an incentive to exaggerate, its 
costs. In addition, the incumbent may enjoy certain other intangible benefits in being appointed 
as universal service provider, for example, brand ubiquity.  
 
There is no reason, however, why the incumbent should be the universal service provider. An 
auction could be held for supplying consumers who require enhanced services or who are loss-
making, inviting bids to supply them with a subsidy. This is similar to the franchising 
arrangements for loss making transport routes, and has the obvious advantage of potentially 
revealing the most efficient provider. Another option is to require all suppliers to either ‘pay or 
play’, so that either they supply a particular portion of the loss making consumers, or pay a 
contribution (in proportion to their market share) into a central fund which is then distributed to 
those who do.20 As we discuss in the remainder of this paper, substantial efforts have been made 
in recent years to expand the provision of universal service beyond the historic incumbents, 
albeit with varying degrees of success.  
 
C. The funding of universal service in a changing environment 
 
In this section we explain the legal frameworks which govern the compensation of universal 
service. First, since USOs are generally accommodated within the Treaty – as a subset of SGEI – 
                                                          
19 A paper by Rodriguez and Storer pays considerable attention to the calculation of USOs. Two main approaches 
are suggested: the net avoided cost and the entry pricing approach, but both have their difficulties. F Rodriguez and 
D Storer, “Alternative approaches to estimating the cost of the USO in posts” (2000) Information Economics and 
Policy 285. In a later report on telecoms, the OECD reports on the difficulties in estimating the net cost of providing 
universal service, including identification of the intangible benefits which might accrue to the universal service 
provider, and the adverse effect such uncertainty might have on investment in the sector: OECD, supra n 10, 18.  
20 For a discussion see P Choné, L Flochel and A Perrot, “Universal service obligations and competition” (2000) 12 
Information Economics and Policy 249. The OECD is of the view that such processes can “generate incentives to 
contain costs, innovate, and reveal the true cost of delivering universal service thus minimising the subsidy 
required” (OECD, supra n 10, 5). It points to some success in competitive tendering in Chile and Peru, although less 
success in Australia and Switzerland (where trials resulted in no competitive entry) (OECD, supra n 10, 18). 
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compensation for the costs generated by them may be justified, even if this requires a derogation 
from the EU competition rules, including the State aid rules.21 We therefore sketch briefly the 
main principles and requirements for compliance with the State aid rules. Second, the general 
rules on State aids and SGEIs have, to a certain extent, been displaced by the rules contained in 
the EU secondary legislation which both define universal service goals and lay down the 
procedural and substantive provisions for compensation. While these sectoral rules have been in 
place for a number of years, they have been left largely inactive by Member States due to the 
incumbents’ ability to maintain cross-subsidies without explicit compensation. Indeed, as we 
explain, the compensation provisions are only triggered if and when the USP can demonstrate 
that the USO imposes upon it an ‘unfair burden’, which is by no means straightforward. In recent 
years the Commission has used its enforcement powers in numerous instances, especially where 
compensation mechanisms appear to be over-compensating the incumbent, or are designed in 
such a way as to exclude entrants from being designated as a USP.  
 
1. State aid, universal service, and Services of General Economic Interest 
 
While no explicit mention is afforded to universal service in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU),22 the concept is generally considered to fall within the scope of SGEI, 
which are given specific protection under the TFEU, primarily under Article 106(2).23 
                                                          
21 Indeed, in theory, where compensation exists which does not exceed the net cost of providing the USOs, 
undertaking(s) charged with their fulfilment are not placed at a competitive advantage, and so the State aid rules are 
not engaged at all.  
22 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47. Unless 
indicated otherwise, all further references are made to the TFEU.  
23 SGEIs are also given protection under Article 14 TFEU, Protocol 26 to the TFEU and Article 36 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. On the effects of Article 14, Protocol 26, and Art 36 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: 
Sauter argues that these provisions add substantively little to Article 106(2), see W Sauter, supra  n 15, 174; W 
Sauter, Public services in EU law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015) 12. For a general discussion see 
N Fiedziuk, “Services of general economic interest and the Treaty of Lisbon: opening doors to a whole new 
approach or maintaining the “status quo”” (2011) 37 European Law Review 226. On the other hand, von Danwitz 
argues that their adoption is “the culmination point in the fight for a specific legal status for public services” (T von 
Danwitz, “The Concept of State Aid in Liberalised Sectors”, (2008) EUI Working Papers LAW 2008/28, 1 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/9588/LAW_2008_28.pdf?sequence=1 accessed 3 August 2016). 
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Notwithstanding the various attempts by the Commission to define SGEI24 (and USOs),25 
Member States have a measure of discretion in defining a service as a SGEI.26 This approach 
allows Member States to establish, extend and adjust the provision of particular services to 
specific national needs, subject to certain limiting principles developed by the EU courts. That 
said, in recent years the Court has held that services can only be categorised as a SGEI if it can 
be demonstrated that the service would not otherwise be provided through the market – the 
‘market failure’ requirement – which significantly limits the apparently broad discretion of 
Member States.27 For example, in a recent case concerning high-speed broadband, the General 
Court confirmed that the presence of market failure is a necessary condition for a SGEI.28  
 
Although external financing may be necessary to secure the provision of USOs, it can also distort 
competition. Article 106(2) contains a derogation from the application of the competition rules, 
including the general prohibition on State aids. However, where the payment made to a universal 
service provider goes no further than merely compensating the undertaking for the net costs of 
fulfilling the USO, there is in principle no market distortion, since it is not placed at a 
competitive advantage vis-à-vis its competitors.  
 
In the past there was no clear understanding of whether payments for the provision of SGEIs 
were to be regarded merely as compensation for discharging those services (the “compensation 
                                                          
24 The term ‘SGEI’ also lacks a clear definition. However, the European Commission has sought to clarify and 
define the concept of SGEI in several of its policy documents, for example, as “economic activities which deliver 
outcomes in the overall public good that would not be supplied (or would be supplied under different conditions in 
terms of quality, safety, affordability, equal treatment or universal access) by the market without public 
intervention”. European Commission, “A Quality Framework for Services of General Interest in Europe”, 
(Communication) COM (2011) 900 final, 5.  
25 In the 2011 Communication, the Commission referred to USOs as: “requirements designed to ensure that certain 
services are made available to all consumers and users in a Member State, regardless of their geographical location, 
at a specified quality and, taking account of specific national circumstances, at an affordable price”. Ibid, 4. This 
definition is in line with Article 3(1) of Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service Directive) [2002] OJ L108.   
26 The Treaty allows Member States and their local, regional and national public authorities broad discretion to 
define a service as being SGEI (and USO). Case T-17/02 Olsen v Commission [2005] ECR II-2031, para 216 
(confirmed by order of the Case C-320/05P Olsen v Commission [2007] I-131 ECR).  
27 Whether or not a service is provided through the market is then addressed by the test for “manifest error of 
assessment”, Olsen v Commission, supra n 26, para 166. For a defence of this position see Sauter, supra n 15, 178.  
28 In the Colt case, the existence of market failure was assumed when the Member State can demonstrate that the 
service will not be provided by the market within the near future, Case T-79/10 Colt Télécommunications France v 
European Commission ECLI:EU:T:2013:463, para 153. Earlier, the General Court ruled in BUPA that in order to 
pass this test, a SGEI must have a “universal and compulsory nature” and the Member State is obliged to explain 
why a particular service is to be regarded as SGEI, Case T-289/03 BUPA [2008] II-81 ECR, para 172. 
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approach”), or as State aid (the “State aid approach”). Under the State aid approach, each 
payment to an entrusted undertaking was considered as State aid within the meaning of Article 
107(1) and, therefore, incompatible with the internal market unless they satisfied one of the 
public interest exceptions contained in Article 107(2-3). However, even if the compensation in 
question did not satisfy the State aid exceptions, it could still be justified under Article 106(2). 
Even though the payment may ultimately be compatible with the internal market, the 
Commission must be notified of it in advance and the Member State is required to wait for the 
Commission’s approval before making the payment (the standstill obligation).29 In contrast, 
under the compensation approach, payment for the pure recovery of the undertaking’s net costs 
(including a reasonable profit) for the delivery of a SGEI is to be regarded as merely 
compensatory and not as State aid. Such a payment would be compatible with the internal market 
without recourse to the public interest exceptions nor the derogation under Article 106(2). 
Further, as it is not regarded as State aid, a prior assessment by the Commission is not 
necessary.30 In practice, therefore, the main difference between the two approaches is the 
notification requirement and standstill obligation under the State aid approach, which obviously 
gives the Commission more control over Member States’ autonomy.  
 
In terms of the jurisprudence, it is fair to say that, while the EU courts have not been entirely 
consistent, the compensation approach dominates.31 The issue was apparently settled in the 
Altmark case,32 where the Court confirmed that the compensation approach was the correct one 
to be followed, confirming as a point of principle that provided the undertaking does not receive 
over-compensation for the fulfilling its public service mission, such payments do not put it at a 
competitive advantage within the meaning of Article 107(1).33 The Court went further, however, 
                                                          
29 Art 108(3). 
30 L Hancher and P Larouche, “The Coming Age of EU Regulation of Network Industries and Services of General 
Economic Interest” in PP Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The evolution of EU law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2nd edn, 2011) 759; A Jones and B Sufrin, EU competition law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 5th edn, 2014),  
chapter State aid,  67-8; For a detailed discussion of the compensation approach and the state aid approach, see 
Szyszczak, supra n 3, 222–28.  
31 For examples of the compensation approach, see: Case C-240/83 Procureur de la République v ADBHU [1985] 
ECR 531, para 18; Case C-53/00 Ferring [2001] ECR I-9067, para 27. For examples of the State aid approach, see: 
Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de Espana SA v Ayuntamiento de Valencia [1994] ECR I-877, paras 20-22.; Case T-
106/95 FFSA and Others v Commission [1997] ECR II-229, para 172; Case T-46/97 SIC v Commission [2000] ECR 
II-2125, para 84. 
32 Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans [2003] ECR I-7747. 
33 Ibid, para 92. 
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by developing four cumulative criteria which have to be met for a payment to fall outside of the 
scope of Article 107(1) (“the Altmark criteria”).34 Despite the apparent clarity of the Court’s 
criteria, their application has not been unproblematic. The fourth criterion – requiring that the 
undertaking is either selected by a public procurement process or that compensation should 
reflect the costs of a “typical, well-run undertaking” (hereafter “the efficiency benchmark”) – has 
been very difficult to apply in practice.35 However, in BUPA, this requirement was relaxed by the 
General Court. Depending on the established compensation scheme in place, an efficiency 
benchmark may not be needed, even in cases in which the undertaking was not entrusted by an 
act of public procurement.36 Furthermore, in the Deutsche Post case,37 the General Court set 
aside the Commission’s State aid decision principally on the ground that it had failed to assess 
sufficiently whether the payments received by Deutsche Post amounted to over-compensation (as 
it was required to do in applying the third Altmark criteria).38 The decision of the General Court 
was upheld by the Court,39 and the case is seen as an important confirmation of the Altmark 
criteria and the “compensatory approach” which underpins it.40  
 
                                                          
34 The criteria can be summarised as follows: First, the recipient undertaking must actually have “public service 
obligations” to discharge, and the obligations must be clearly defined. Second, the method by which the 
compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner. Third, the 
compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to recover costs incurred. Fourth, the undertaking discharging the 
public service must either be chosen by a public procurement procedure or the level of compensation should reflect 
the cost of a “typical, well-run undertaking”, ibid, paras 88-94.  
35 Hancher and Larouche, supra n 30, 761 - 2; See also M Klasse, “The Impact of Altmark: The European 
Commission Case Law Responses” in E Szyszczak and JW van de Gronden (eds), Financing Services of General 
Economic Interest (The Hague, T. M. C. Asser Press, 2013) 36–7; EAGCP, “Services of General Economic 
Interest” (2006) Opinion prepared by the State aid Group of EAGCP, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/sgei.pdf  accessed 3 August 2016.  
36 BUPA, supra n 28, paras 245-8. However, the Commission is still required to examine whether the compensation 
does not result from any inefficiencies of the service provider (ibid, para 249.). See NA Matos, “The Role of the 
BUPA Judgement in the Legal Framework for Services of General Economic Interest” (2011) 16 Tilburg Law 
Review 83, 86–9. In the Chronopost judgment, three weeks prior to Altmark, the ECJ decided that in markets where 
there is no undertaking to compare the incumbent’s costs with, compensation cannot be based on market conditions 
but rather must “be assessed by reference to the objective and verifiable elements which are available” (Joined Cases 
C-83/01P, C-93/01P; C-94/01P Chronopost [2003] ECR I-6993, paras 38-40). 
37 Case T-266/02 European Commission v Deutsche Post AG and others ECLI:EU:T:2008:235. 
38 In particular, the Commission had failed to assess whether or not the total costs of delivering the door-to-door 
parcel service at a uniform tariff exceeded the level of subsidy it received.   
39 C-399/08 European Commission v Deutsche Post AG and others ECLI:EU:C:2010:481. See DC Bauer and G 
Muntean, “Case Note on European Commission v Deutsche Post AG et al.” (2011) 4 European State Aid Law 
Quarterly 655; A Bartosch, “Clarification or Confusion? How to Reconcile the ECJ”s Rulings in Altmark and 
Chronopost”, (2003) European State Aid Law Quarterly 375.  
40 Bauer and Muntean, ibid, 669.   
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In terms of the decisional practice of the Commission, the Altmark criteria has been applied 
strictly and in the majority of cases the fourth criterion is not met.41 The consequence, therefore, 
is that most payments are considered as State aid (within the scope of Article 107(1)), subject to 
the Commission’s control, the prior notification requirement and the standstill obligation.42 
However, even where compensation cannot be justified under Article 107(2) or (3), it may still 
be subject to the derogation under Article 106(2). According to the Court, Article 106(2) has 
three requirements: the SGEI must be clearly-defined; it must be provided by an “explicitly 
entrusted” undertaking; 43 and “the exemption… must not affect the development of trade to an 
extent that would be contrary to the interests of the Community”.44 In contrast with Altmark, 
neither a tendering procedure nor the application of an efficiency benchmark is required.45  
 
Following the Altmark judgment, in 2005 the Commission issued guidelines on granting State 
aids in the form of public service compensation.46 These were replaced by a new SGEI Package 
in 2012, consisting of revised Decision and Framework documents, in addition to a new 
Communication document.47 The objective of the 2012 package is to provide guidance and 
                                                          
41 See Matos, supra n 36. 
42 Klasse, supra n 35, 50. 
43 An entrusted undertaking is any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the 
way in which the entity is financed (see e.g. Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser v Macrotron [1991] ECR I-1979, para 
21 and Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavlov and Others [2000] ECR I-6451, para 74. Entrustment requires 
that the undertaking must discharge a public service assigned by an act of a public authority. See Case C-127/73 
BRT v SABAM [1974] ECR-313, para 20. 
44 Case T-442/03 SIC v Commission [2008] ECR II-1161, para 144; Joined Cases T-204/97 and T-270/97 EPAC v 
Commission [2000] ECR II-2267, paras 125-6; Case C-179/00 Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova [1991] ECR-
5889, para 26. 
45 SIC v Commission, supra n 44, para 145; Olsen v Commission, supra n 26, para 239. In the CBI case, the General 
Court confirmed that Article 106(2) TFEU does not require an efficiency test such as that which is laid down in the 
fourth Altmark criteria; Case T-137/10 CBI v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2012:584, paras 295-300. 
46 The 2005 SGEI Package – or so-called “Monti/Kroes Package” – consisted of a Decision and a Framework 
document. Both documents contained conditions under which compensation payments granted to entrusted 
undertakings with the provision of SGEI are compatible with the internal market “Community framework for State 
aid in the form of public service compensation” [2005] OJ C 297/4; “Commission Decision of 28 November 2005 
on the application of Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted 
to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of series of general economic interest” [2005] OJ L 312/67). 
47 Commission, “Communication from the Commission on the application of the European Union State aid rules to 
compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest” [2012] OJ C8/4; Commission 
Decision (2012/21/EU) of 20 December 2011 on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings 
entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest [2011] OJ L7/3; Commission, “European 
Union framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation (2011)” (2012/C 8/03) [2012] OJ C8/15 
(2012 SGEI Framework). 
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clarification to the Member States for the assessment of public financing of SGEI.48 The 
Decision is a de facto block exemption for State aids below certain thresholds. Where the 
requirements of the Decision are satisfied, the public service compensation constitutes State aid 
but is considered to be compatible with the internal market and therefore no notification is 
required.49 For cases that fall outside the scope of the SGEI Decision, the compatibility of the 
payment must be assessed under the SGEI Framework.50 Where its criteria are satisfied, the 
payment still constitutes State aid but it is justified under Article 106(2).51  
 
The requirements of the SGEI Framework only partially correspond with Article 106(2) 
jurisprudence. In line with recent case law, the Commission emphasises the market failure 
requirement in order to establish a genuine SGEI.52 The 2012 Framework also prescribes that the 
entrustment period is limited to the time necessary to recover the most significant assets,53 and 
prescribes methodologies for calculating the compensation payment.54 However, the Framework 
                                                          
48 European Commission, “State aid: Commission adopts new rules on services of general economic interest 
(SGEI)” (2011), Press Release, IP/11/1579. 
49 For SGEIs in postal services and telecommunications, the compensation threshold was lowered from EUR 30 
million to EUR 15 million per annum (Article 2(1)(a) of the Decision (2012/21/EU)). Undertakings providing SGEI 
have to be entrusted with the provision of the service by the Member State (Article 4). The scope of the Decision is 
then further limited by a 10 year entrustment period (under certain circumstances, where a longer period is required 
for the amortisation of the investment cost, this period can be extended) to reduce the negative impact on 
competition as the entrustment act can create a barrier to entry (Recital 12 and Article 2(2) of the Decision); see A 
Sinnaeve, “What’s New in SGEI in 2012? - An Overview of the Commission’s SGEI Package” (2012) 2 European 
State Aid Law Quarterly 347, 357. To avoid overcompensation of the entrusted service provider, the Decision limits 
the amount of compensation to the net costs, including a reasonable profit (Article 5(1)), in line with the third 
Altmark requirement.  
50 Note also the de minimis rules: Commission Regulation (EU) 360/2012 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services 
of general economic interest [2012] OJ L114/8.   
51 2012 SGEI Framework, Recital 7. The 2012 SGEI Framework does not apply to SGEI in the land transport or 
public service broadcasting sectors, nor to providers of SGEI in difficulty; 2012 SGEI Framework, Recital 8 and 9. 
52 With regard to the Member States’ discretion to actually judge whether the service is not provided through the 
market, the Commission’s control is limited to the manifest error of assessment, 2012 SGEI Framework, Recital 13.  
53 2012 SGEI Framework, Recital 17. This limitation is new compared to the 2005 SGEI Framework.  
54 The first and preferred method is the so-called “net cost avoided methodology”. The second possible method is 
the “cost allocation methodology”. Under the first methodology, the necessary net costs – or the net costs expected 
to be necessary – shall not exceed the difference between the net costs for discharging the services and the net cost 
or profits for the same provider without the obligation to provide such services (2012 SGEI Framework, Recital 25). 
For further guidance, the 2012 SGEI Framework refers in Recital 26 to the Annex IV of the Universal Service 
Directive (Directive 2002/22/EC) and to Annex I of the First Postal Directive (Directive 97/67/EC). The “cost 
allocation methodology” uses the difference between the costs and revenues for the calculation of the net costs 
necessary to provide the obligations (2012 SGEI Framework, Recital 28). For a discussion see D Geradin, “The 
New SGEI Package” (2012) 3 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 1. See generally Rodriguez and 
Storer, supra n 19. 
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further mandates compliance with the EU Public Procurement rules,55 and also requires Member 
States to “introduce incentives for the efficient provision of SGEI of a high standard, unless they 
can duly justify that it is not feasible or appropriate to do so”.56 These two new requirements 
potentially reduce the compatibility of State aid measures under Article 106(2).57 However, the 
threshold of these two requirements must be lower than the criteria enumerated by the Court in 
Altmark, otherwise Article 106(2) would be rendered largely redundant.58 Nonetheless, it should 
be noted that both the requirements of a public procurement procedure and the efficiency test is 
contrary to established case law on Article 106(2).59  
 
2.  The Directives and compensation principles: postal services and telecommunications  
 
In this section, we turn to the alternative route open to Member States in compensating for the 
provision of universal service, with a focus on postal services and telecommunications. In these 
two sectors, relative to the other network industries,60 a stronger emphasis was put on the formal 
protection of universal service in the EU secondary legislation, and the principles and procedures 
governing compensation are the most developed.61 For postal services and telecommunications 
                                                          
55 2012 SGEI Framework, Recital 18-19. 
56 2012 SGEI Framework, Recital 39. For example, Member States can incorporate productive efficiency targets in 
the entrustment act and the level of compensation then depends on the extent to which the targets have been met, 
2012 SGEI Framework, Recital 40 and 41.   
57 One should bear in mind that where an undertaking is entrusted with the provision of SGEI through a procurement 
procedure or where the level of compensation is based on the costs of a comparable efficient undertaking, the 
Altmark criteria will be satisfied and the payment will constitute a pure compensation payment and not State aid. In 
such a case, it would not be necessary to rely on the SGEI Framework. 
58 Rather than being based on a “typical and well-run undertaking” (as in the Altmark test), they must be based on 
objective and measurable criteria (2012 SGEI Framework, Recital 42). See Sinnaeve (n 49) 360. The General Court 
confirmed that Article 106(2) TFEU does not require an efficiency test such as laid down in the fourth Altmark 
criteria in CBI v Commission, supra n 45, paras 295-300. 
59 In comparison with Altmark, a tendering procedure is not required by established European case law SIC v 
Commission, supra n 44, para 145; Olsen v Commission, supra n 26, para 239. See also Geradin, supra n 54, 6–7; 
EM Mestmäcker and H Schweitzer, Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht (München, C.H. Beck, 3rd edn, 2014), 8.  
60 The different structure of the electricity sector in Member States as well as the different stages of liberalisation 
may have contributed to the fact that universal service is less defined in electricity, see Prosser, supra n 13, 186, 
197, 205. 
61 In contrast, the Directive for electricity (Directive 2009/72/EC) contains more limited provisions on both 
universal service obligations and on compensation mechanisms. With respect to the former, the Directive requires 
that Member States ensure that all household customers and – at the discretion of Member States – SMEs shall enjoy 
universal service, defined as the “right to be supplied with electricity of a specified quality within their territory at 
reasonable, easily and clearly comparable, transparent and non-discriminatory prices” (Article 3(3)). On financial 
compensation, the Directive merely states that “financial compensation, other forms of compensation and exclusive 
rights which a Member State grants for the fulfilment” of any obligations “shall be done in a non-discriminatory and 
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the relevant rules are contained in the Postal Services Directive (PSD)62 and Universal Service 
Directive (USD) respectively.63  
 
2.1. The scope of universal service in postal services and telecommunications 
 
As was discussed above, Member States enjoy a measure of discretion when defining SGEI 
(including USOs). This discretion can be reduced or displaced where USOs are specified by 
European secondary legislation.64 The degree to which discretion can be displaced depends on 
how precisely services are specified in secondary EU legislation. While Member States may 
impose USOs which go beyond those specified in the Directives,65 they may not use the 
compensation mechanisms contained within them to compensate service providers for these 
additional obligations.66 If Member States go further and expand the scope of USOs, they are 
subject to the State aid rules.67 
 
For telecommunications, the USD requires that Member States ensure that services included in 
the scope of universal service are made available to all end-users irrespective of their 
geographical location at an “affordable price”.68 In addition, with respect to ensuring the 
affordability of access, Member States may impose on operators to offer tariffs which depart 
                                                          
transparent way” (Article 3(6)). The 2003 Directive [Directive 2003/54/EC (repealed)] was identical. For a wider 
discussion see Harker, supra n 1, 52 – 64.  
62 Directive 97/67/EC of 15 December 1997 on common rules for the development of the internal market of 
Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service [1998] OJ L15/14, as amended by Directive 
2002/39/EC [2002] OJ L176/21, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC [2008] OJ/L52/3. 
63 Directive 2002/22/EC of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic 
communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive) [2002] OJ L108/51, as amended by Directive 
2009/136/EC [2009] OJ L337/11. 
64 Case C-206/98 Commission v Belgium [2000] ECR I-3509 para 45. 
65 The USOs are defined in the Postal Service Directive, Article 3 Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 
2002/39/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC and in the Universal Service Directive, Articles 3 – 9 Directive 
2002/22/EC, as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC.  
66 Directive 2002/22/EC, art 32; Directive 2008/6/EC, Recital 30. 
67 Directive 2008/6/EC, Recital 30. In doing so, Member States’ discretion under the State aid regime is subject to a 
stricter proportionality standard (Sauter, supra n 15, 186-88); see also M Ross, “A healthy approach to services of 
general economic interest? The BUPA judgment of the Court of First Instance” (2009) 34 European Law Review 
127, 136-8; Fiedziuk, supra n 23, 228; Klasse, supra n 35, 50-51.   
68 Directive 2002/22/EC, art 3(1). The relevant services are: access to a publicly available telephone network at a 
fixed location to a public communications network (Directive 2002/22/EC, as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC, 
art 4), a directory of users and a directory enquiry service (Directive 2002/22/EC, as amended by Directive 
2009/136/EC, art 5), the provision of public pay telephones (Directive 2002/22/EC, as amended by Directive 
2009/136/EC, art 6), and special measures for disabled end-users (Directive 2002/22/EC, as amended by Directive 
2009/136/EC, art 7).  
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from “normal commercial conditions”, such as “social tariffs” for those on low-incomes or with 
“special social needs”.69 They may also require operators to offer tariffs which include 
geographical averaging.70 In postal services, the universal service obligations include the 
provision of a sufficient density of post offices and post boxes, the daily delivery and collection 
of specified mail items, at prices affordable for all users.71  
 
2.2. Securing contestability in the provision of USOs 
 
In order for firms to be compensated for fulfilling universal service, they must first be designated 
by the Member State.72 While Member States have some discretion when it comes to 
designation, it is circumscribed by a number of principles, including least market distortion.73 
The USD and PSD make clear that Member States may designate different undertakings to 
deliver different elements of universal service and/or to cover different parts of the national 
territory.74 In so doing, Member States are, in both cases, required to abide by the principle of 
non-discrimination,75 and the USD further stipulates that the designation mechanism must not 
result in any undertaking being “a priori excluded from being designated”,76 ensuring that new 
entrant firms are not excluded in practical terms from providing USOs. A specific issue was 
identified in 2005, which appeared to limit designation to the French telecommunications 
                                                          
69 Directive 2002/22/EC, as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC, art 9(2).  
70 Directive 2002/22/EC, art 9(4).  
71 This includes letters up to 2 kilograms, packages up to 10 kilograms but may be increased up to 20 kilograms, and 
20 kilograms for inbound parcels from other Member States and services for registered and insured items at a 
minimum of five working days per week, Directive 1997/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, art 3. 
72 Directive 1997/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, art 4; Directive 2002/22/EC, as amended by Directive 
2009/136/EC, art 8. The historical position in postal services is different, as the postal incumbents in Member States 
retained exclusive rights over reserved services in order to facilitate the cross-subsidisation of universal service (this 
is explained in more detail in section D.2. below). However, the Third Postal Services Directive required the 
abolition of these exclusive rights, while at the same time putting in place new requirements for designation 
(modelled on those contained in the USD).  
73 For telecommunications, the Directive requires that Member States must “determine the most efficient and 
appropriate approach” which respects the principles of “objectivity, transparency, non-discrimination and 
proportionality”, and “seek to minimise market distortions… whilst safeguarding the public interest”, Directive 
2002/22/EC, art 3(2). The PSD similarly refers to the requirements of “transparency, non-discrimination, 
proportionality, transparency and least market distortion”, Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 
2008/136/EC, art 4(2). 
74 Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, art 4; Directive 2008/6/EC, Recital 23; Directive 
2002/22/EC, as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC, art 8; Directive 2002/22/EC, Recital 14.  
75 Directive 2002/22/EC, art 8(2); Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, art 4(2). 
76 Directive 2002/22/EC, art 8(2). 
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incumbent.77 This was because designation was limited to undertakings that were able to cover 
all of the national territory. An infringement procedure was launched, and the Court found that 
the provision in question, to the extent that it excluded operators who were unable to serve the 
whole of France, breached the principles contained in the USD.78 There are obvious tensions 
between the objective of cost effectiveness and the no a priori exclusion rule, especially in 
relation to economies of scale and scope.79 It is clear from the approach of the Commission and 
the Court, however, that the no a priori exclusion rule takes precedence.80  
 
Various problems have been identified concerning designation, especially in 
telecommunications. A number of countries have been slow to put in place legislation for the 
designation of USPs, much to the chagrin of the Commission.81 Despite the principles outlined 
above, and the increased formalisation by Member States of the designation process in domestic 
legislation, in practice the incumbents are appointed as USPs in the vast majority of cases in both 
                                                          
77 Commission, “European Electronic Communications Regulation and Markets 2005 (11th Report)”, (Staff 
Working Document) Volume I, SEC(2006) 193, 143. Infringement proceedings were also launched against Finland 
in 2005. In that case, the relevant legislation appeared to specify that the operator designated as USP would be the 
company either with significant market power or having the largest market share in the region. The case did not 
come before the Court (ibid, 269).  
78 Case C-220/07 Commission v France [2008] ECR I-95, paras 32 - 33.  
79 BEREC, “Report on Universal Service – reflections for the future” (2010), 17 
http://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/reports/187-berec-report-on-universal-service-
reflections-for-the-future accessed 3 August 2016. 
80 In another case, which resulted in infringement proceedings against Spain, one firm expressed an interest in 
providing a directory enquiries service. The Spanish rules excluded from consideration firms who were only 
interested in offering one unique element of the USOs, and hence the firm was not considered. Despite attempting to 
justify its approach on the ground of cost-effectiveness, the Commission held that the rules for designation were in 
breach of the principles of the USD. Letter of formal notice from the European Commission to Spain (27.06.2007), 
“Designation and financing of universal service”; European Commission, “New round of infringement proceedings 
under the EU telecom rules: What are the issues?”, (2007) MEMO/07/2005; The Commission closed the case after 
Spain had changed its national legislation, European Commission, “Telecoms: Commission requests information 
from Spain on new charge on operators; closes infringement case on universal service”, Press Release, IP/10/322, 
18 March 2010.  
81 Commission, “Progress Report on the Single European Electronic Communications Market (15th Report)”, (Staff 
Working Document) Volume I, SEC(2010) 630 final, 57-58.  
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 20 
 
telecommunications82 and postal services.83 This may be the result of a lack of incentives for new 
entrants to apply for designation, even if the process is open to them, a point made by BEREC: 
 
“…[I]t appears that the number of competitors having the technical and financial standing 
required for an USP designation is very limited, which adds to what can be described as 
an inherent reluctance of market players to compete for being designated as bearers of 
obligations… under the regulatory framework”.84  
 
For postal services, a recent survey of the USP designation points to a failure of most Member 
States to consider introducing some element of contestability in universal service provision, 
using instead “universal service designation to continue some remnant of the former legal 
privileges of the public postal operators”.85 
 
2.3. Deciding whether to compensate – “net costs” and “unfair burden” 
 
The relevant legislation on telecommunications and postal services contain broadly similar 
principles on the implementation and design of compensation mechanisms.86 Before such 
arrangements may be made, the relevant regulator must be satisfied that the provision of 
universal service represents an “unfair burden” on the designated undertaking(s) based on a “net 
                                                          
82 At that time, in 2005, it was only in Estonia that a tender process resulted in the designation of a new entrant as 
USP; in Belgium and the Czech Republic, elements of the service were provided by entrants alongside the 
incumbent, Commission, “European Electronic Communications Regulation and Markets 2006 (12th Report)”, 
COM(2007), 155 final, 17. According to a 2010 Report, published by the Body of European Regulators for 
Electronic Communications (BEREC), eight out of 27 BEREC countries used the tender process to designate the 
universal service provider, BEREC, supra n 79, 30-33. 
83 AK Dieke et al., “Main Developments in the Postal Sector (2010-2013)” (Study for the European Commission, 
Directorate General for Internal Market and Services) (2013), 137, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/post/doc/studies/20130821_wik_md2013-final-report_en.pdf accessed 3 August 
2016. 
84 BEREC, supra n 79, 31–32.  
85 Dieke et al., supra n 83, 137. Malta, Sweden and Germany are exceptions. The latter has not designated any 
operator at all since 2008, Harker et al., supra n 1, 37. In Estonia, Luxemburg, Poland, Romania and Sweden 
universal service is also provided without relying on a designated USP,  European Commission, “Implementation of 
the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications – 2014” (Commission Staff Working Document) 
SWD(2014) 249 final, 17.  
86 For postal services, alongside the abolition of the “reserved market”, new rules on the compensation mechanism 
were promulgated in 2008 (Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, art 7(1)), which largely reflect 
those already in existence for telecommunications that are contained in the Universal Service Directive (Directive 
2002/22/EC). 
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cost” calculation of the provision.87 The meaning of “unfair burden” is not elaborated upon in 
either the USD or PSD.  
 
The calculation of net cost, upon which an assessment of unfair burden depends, is by no means 
straightforward.88 When assessing net costs, account should be had to any “market benefit” or 
“intangible benefits” which accrue to the USP.89  The calculation of attributable costs includes 
identified services or users which can only be provided or served at a loss or under cost 
conditions falling outside normal commercial standards. A calculation of the net costs of each 
aspect of universal service is to made separately in order to avoid any “double counting” of any 
direct or indirect benefits and costs. Notwithstanding the principles above, both the USD and 
PSD do not define what is meant by “unfair”, and several alternative approaches have been 
suggested, including: whether the net costs of the USO exceed those costs which would be 
involved in setting-up a compensation mechanism, the inability of the USP to make a normal 
economic profit (the requirement for a “reasonable profit” is recognised in the PSD),90 or where 
the profitability of the USP differs significantly from its competitors.91  
 
Neither the USD nor the PSD specify or give examples of what is an intangible benefit. Recital 
20 of the USD merely states that such benefits should be an “estimate in monetary terms, of the 
indirect benefits that an undertaking derives by virtue of its position as [a] provider of universal 
service”. In a survey of BEREC members, a number of examples of intangible benefits were 
                                                          
87 Directive 2002/22/EC, art 12(1) in accordance with Annex IV, Part A; Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by 
Directive 2008/6/EC, art 7(3) in accordance with Annex I, Part B. 
88 Net costs are defined as the difference between the USP’s net costs operating with the universal service 
obligations and operating without them, Directive 2002/22/EC, Annex IV, Part A; Directive 97/67/EC, as amended 
by Directive 2008/6/EC, Annex I, Part B. 
89 Directive 2002/22/EC, art 12(1) in accordance with Annex IV, Part A; Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by 
Directive 2008/6/EC, art 7(3) in accordance with Annex I, Part B.See also Commission, “Assessment Criteria for 
National Schemes for the Costing and Financing of Universal Service in telecommunications and Guidelines for the 
member States on Operation of such Schemes”, COM(96) 608 final. For a discussion of different methodologies 
used in postal services to determine whether or not a financial burden is “unfair”, see Frontier Economics, “Study on 
the principles used to calculate the net costs of the postal USO: A Report prepared for the European Commission” 
(2013), 123-36 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/post/doc/studies/2012-net-costs-uso-postal_en.pdf accessed 3 
August 2016.  
90 Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, Annex I, Part B. For a discussion see F Boldron et al., 
“A Dynamic and Endogenous Approach to Financing the USO in a Liberalized Environment”, in MA Crew and PR 
Kleindorfer (eds), Progress in the competitive agenda in the postal and delivery sector (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 
2009).   
91 Frontier Economics, supra n 89, 123–36. 
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gathered from national regulatory authorities (NRAs). These included: the benefits of 
geographical ubiquity, which arises where a customer moves from an area served only by the 
USP to another area where there are new entrants; the “life-cycle effect” benefit, relating to a 
customer who it is currently unprofitable to serve who might become profitable in the future; and 
benefits resulting from brand enhancement and corporate reputation.92 As BEREC observes, 
estimating and quantifying the intangible benefits is likely to “prove extremely difficult” in 
practice.93  
 
Once the net costs have been calculated, and these are judged to be an “unfair burden”, the 
Member States must then decide, upon the request of the designated undertaking(s), how to 
compensate. This compensation can be drawn directly from public funding, or by sharing the net 
costs between market participants.94 Such a sharing mechanism must be administered by a body 
independent of the beneficiaries of the scheme,95 respecting the principles of transparency, non-
discrimination, and proportionality.96 For telecommunications, Member States must also respect 
the principle of “least market distortion”,97 and have the discretion to exempt new entrants 
“which have not yet achieved any significant market presence”.98  
 
The net cost calculation and establishment of an unfair burden appears to be a complicated and 
time-consuming process in telecommunications. Due to various administrative delays, court 
proceedings, delays in contributions, or updates of net cost calculation methodologies, 
compensation schemes have not been widely employed by Member States.99  
 
                                                          
92 BEREC, supra n 79, 35–36. For a similar study in respect of postal services, see Frontier Economics, supra n 89, 
109–22. 
93 For some examples of methodologies used by the national regulatory authorities, see BEREC, supra n 79, 36–38. 
94 Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, art 7(3); Directive 2002/22/EC, art 13(1).  
95 Directive 2002/22/EC, art 13(2), which goes on to specify this should be either the NRA or a body supervised by 
it; Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, art 7(4). The PSD also refers to the requirement of 
supervision by the NRA in the calculation of net costs, Directive 2008/6/EC, Recital 29.  
96 Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, art 7(5); Directive 2002/22/EC, art 13(3).  
97 Directive 2002/22/EC, Recital 23. 
98 Directive 2002/22/EC, Recital 21. 
99 In 2009, compensation mechanisms were only in place and activated in France, Czech Republic, Italy, Spain, 
Romania, Latvia and in Belgium for social tariffs only, Commission, supra n 81, 58. As is discussed below, the 
Belgian compensation mechanism for social tariffs was later challenged by the European Commission.  
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The most important case on the principles which must be followed by Member States in 
compensating USPs is Commission v Belgium.100 The USO in question related to “social tariffs”, 
i.e., discounts which were available to consumers on low incomes and with special needs. All 
operators, the incumbent and entrants alike, were required to offer these tariffs to such 
customers. A compensation scheme was set up whereby payments were made to any operator 
which carried a disproportionate number of social tariff consumers relative to its market share. 
Compensation was calculated at a flat-rate for all operators and was automatic – there was no 
additional need to demonstrate that the number of social tariffs carried by an individual operator 
imposed an “unfair burden”, and the net cost of serving a social tariff customer was assumed to 
be the same for all operators.  
 
The Court found that the automatic nature of the scheme breached the Directive’s requirement 
that an undertaking had to be found to bear an unfair burden before compensation mechanisms 
could be put in place.101 The Court held that a net cost is not per se an unfair burden: 
 
“…[T]he unfair burden which must be found to exist by the national regulatory authority 
before any compensation is paid is a burden which, for each undertaking concerned, is 
excessive in view of the undertaking’s ability to bear it, account being taken of all the 
undertaking’s own characteristics, in particular the quality of its equipment, its economic 
and financial situation and its market share”.102 
 
For the purposes of this assessment, the NRA had to lay down “general and objective criteria” 
taking into account the undertaking’s characteristics, and must carry out “an individual 
assessment of the situation of each undertaking concerned”.103 The Court also held that the 
assessment of the net cost for the undertaking must also include intangible benefits, in line with 
                                                          
100 Case C-222/08 Commission v Belgium [2010] ECR I-9017. See also Case C-389/08 Base and Others [2010] ECR 
I-9073, a preliminary reference procedure covering the same ground. See also Case C-384/99 Commission v 
Belgium [2000] ECR I-633. 
101 Commission v Belgium, ibid, para 58. In Commission v France, a compensation scheme set up to compensate the 
incumbent was unnecessary given that the incumbent held a near monopoly over the market (Case C-146/00 
Commission v France [2001] ECR I-9767, paras 25-30).  
102 Commission v Belgium, ibid, para 49. Emphasis added. 
103 Ibid, para 50.  
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the requirements of the Directive.104 It rejected the Belgium Government’s argument that where 
USOs applied to all operators, the benefits would be the same for all of them.105  
 
3. Conclusions 
 
As we have demonstrated, the provisions which exist for compensating undertakings for the 
costs of universal service are complex and cumbersome. This would appear to explain their 
limited take-up by Member States. This may further explain why, in telecommunications, the ex 
ante system of compensation has been usurped by the State aid regime, especially in relation to 
the provision of universal service in broadband services. However, the State aid regime has been 
significantly reconfigured in recent years to promote contestability in the assignment of public 
service obligations.   
 
D. Balancing universal access and liberalisation: case studies in broadband and postal 
services  
 
In this section, we analyse recent developments in securing universal service in broadband and 
the letter collection and delivery markets. It is in these two sectors where we see the most 
pronounced tensions between the achievement of USOs and liberalisation, albeit for different 
reasons. In telecommunications we witness the most technological change, and liberalisation is 
the most advanced. However, for broadband, the regime for securing universal access under the 
USD has largely been usurped by the use of State aid, with important consequences in terms of 
the Commission’s supervisory powers and the formal protection of USOs. Furthermore, while 
state support for the rolling-out of significant broadband infrastructure investment may be seen 
as necessary to secure universal access to vital communications services, this objective is subject 
to a number of limiting principles which give precedence to securing and maintaining effective 
competition. For postal services, the model of achieving universal service, as originally 
envisaged under the EU legislation, was one where the incumbent could sustain cross-subsidies 
                                                          
104 Ibid, para 84.  
105 Ibid, para 69.  
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because it had exclusive rights over certain market sectors. These rights were gradually 
withdrawn, with full competition being introduced across the EU between 2010 and 2012. 
Alongside this, the rules on compensation were also reformed to the extent that Member States 
were encouraged to ensure that there was a level of contestability in universal service provision. 
In the collection and delivery of letters, our focus here, demand has been declining for a number 
of years, while at the same time incumbents have seen a gradual reduction in their ability to 
subsidise USOs. In this sector, there is little use of compensation mechanisms, despite the claims 
that universal service is being placed in jeopardy by new entrants and their so-called ‘cherry-
picking’ of the most profitable consumers. The emphasis thus far has been on the incumbents 
achieving efficiency gains.106 
 
1. Broadband and its inclusion within the USOs 
 
There is no doubt that, in a sector such as communications where technological progress and 
demand conditions evolve rapidly, services which might have been seen as essential until only 
recently can become obsolete. There is no better example than the provision of public payphones 
which are only used by a very small percentage of end-users, yet are very expensive to 
maintain.107 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that bringing new services within an EU-wide 
definition of universal service has be approached with considerable caution by both Member 
States and the Commission. In some cases, such as mobile services, the answer is 
straightforward; the market is the best route to maximising both ubiquity and affordability, 
without the need for any form of state intervention.108  
 
The position within broadband is quite different, where it is clear that neither national 
governments nor the Commission believe that universal broadband coverage will be achieved by 
                                                          
106 See, for example, Dieke, supra n 83, 220-22.  
107 Some Member States have already withdrawn the obligation to provide public payphones as part of the USO 
(Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, Latvia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania 
and Slovakia), European Commission, “Implementation of the EU regulatory framework for electronic 
communication – 2015” (Commission Staff Working Document) SWD(2015) 126 final, 22. 
108 European Commission, “Universal service in e-communications: report on the outcome of the public consultation 
and the third periodic review of the scope in accordance with Article 15 of Directive 2002/22/EC”, 
(Communication) COM(2011) 795 final, 8-9, 12. 
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the market alone.109 This is particularly the case when it comes super-fast broadband – so-called 
“next generation access” (NGA) – the rolling-out of which requires substantial upgrading and 
replacement of existing telecommunications infrastructure.110 An obvious solution to this 
problem would be to use the existing sectoral regime by including a minimum level of 
broadband services within the definition of USOs, triggering – where appropriate – the use of 
compensation mechanisms for the investment necessary to secure coverage in areas that would 
otherwise be unprofitable to serve.  
 
Since the original USD, Member States have been required to ensure that all users connected at a 
fixed location have access to data communications “at data rates that are sufficient to permit 
functional internet access, taking into account prevailing technologies used by the majority of 
subscribers and technological feasibility”.111 In contrast to the original Directive which specified, 
for the purposes of imposing a USO, functional internet access as a single narrowband 
connection at a maximum data rate,112 the 2009 amending Directive removed any reference to a 
defined data rate,113 making clear that Member States were to have flexibility in defining a 
minimum level of internet access, “taking due account of specific circumstances in national 
markets, for instance the prevailing bandwidth used by the majority of subscribers in that 
Member State, and technological feasibility, provided that these measures seek to minimise 
market distortion”.114 This was a significant change since Member States, while always being 
free to impose more onerous universal service obligations than those specified in the USD, were 
not permitted to include these within any compensation mechanism involving specific 
undertakings.115 The situation now allows Member States to include broadband access within the 
                                                          
109 F Chirico and N Gaál, “A Decade of State Aid Control in the Field of Broadband” (2014) 13 European State Aid 
Law Quarterly 28, 28–29. 
110 For an overview see A Kliemann and O Stehmann, “EU State Aid Control in the Broadband Sector - The 2013 
Broadband Guidelines and Recent Case Practice” (2013) 12 European State Aid Law Quarterly 493, 495-7.  
111 Directive 2002/22/EC, art 4(2).  
112 Ibid, Recital 8. A single narrowband network connection referred to a data rate of 56 kbit/s. Member States were 
allowed to deviate and lower the data rate where necessary. 
113 Directive 2009/136/EC. 
114 Ibid, Recital 5. 
115 Directive 2002/22/EC, art 32. The wording of this provision was unchanged by the 2009 amending Directive. 
However, Directive 2009/136/EC, Recital 5 makes clear that where an expansion of minimum internet access 
covered by USO within a Member State results “in an unfair burden on a designated undertaking, taking due account 
of the costs and revenues as well as the intangible benefits resulting from the provision of the services concerned, 
this may be included in any net cost calculation of universal obligations”.  
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scope of USO, with the potential to activate any of the compensation mechanisms specified 
therein, rather than notifying measures under the State aid framework.116 The interesting fact is 
that they so rarely do so.117  
 
1.1. Compensating investment for universal broadband coverage – USD v State aids 
regime 
 
Despite the permissive approach created by the 2009 amending Directive, in its review of 
universal service in 2011, the Commission encouraged Member States not to include broadband 
access within their USOs, fearing that doing so could lead to higher prices for consumers, and 
“could distort markets and put an unreasonable burden on the sector”.118 This message has been 
largely followed by Member States.119  
 
In parallel, however, the EU has developed a proactive policy in favour of encouraging public 
support and subsidies in favour of increasing both the coverage and quality of broadband access. 
A key plank of the Europe 2020 strategy, the “Digital Agenda for Europe” (DAE) adopted in 
2010, is aimed at accelerating the role-out of high-speed broadband across the EU.120  
 
                                                          
116 Directive 2009/136/EC, Recital 5 makes clear that alternative financing methods may also be enacted. The 
Commission confirmed that compensation for the infrastructure and wholesale provision of basic broadband in the 
form of State aid did not breach the original USD, Decision N381/2004 Haut débit en Pyrénées-Atlantiques [2004] 
Press Release IP/04/1371; Decision N382/2004 Haut débit en Limousin - DORSAL [2005] Press Release IP/05/530. 
117 Belgium, Spain, Finland, Croatia, Malta, Sweden and Latvia (only for disabled end-users) have included 
broadband at different broadband speeds within the scope of universal service. Latvia, Slovenia and the United 
Kingdom are discussing whether or not to extend the scope of USO by including broadband, European Commission, 
supra n 107, 22. However, there are reports the European Commission is now proposing to include broadband 
access in the scope of universal service, C Stupp, “Broadband internet access will become a legal right under new 
EU telecoms rules”, EurActiv.com, 29 July 2016, http://www.euractiv.com/section/innovation-
industry/news/broadband-internet-access-will-become-a-legal-right-under-new-eu-telecoms-rules/?nl_ref=17987440 
accessed 3 August 2016. 
118 European Commission, “Universal service in e-communications: report on the outcome of the public consultation 
and the third periodic review of the scope in accordance with Article 15 of Directive 2002/22/EC”, 
(Communication) COM(2011) 795 final, 12. 
119 Subject to some limited exceptions, it appears that the majority of Member States are pursuing increasing 
broadband access outside of the sectoral rules, see BEREC, supra n 79, 59. 
120 European Commission, “A Digital Agenda for Europe” (Communication) COM(2010) 245 final.  
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The DAE contains a number of ambitious broadband targets,121 the achievement of which will 
involve considerable investment in infrastructure, both private and public. The key danger of 
leaving infrastructure investment merely to private firms is that high-speed broadband access 
will be “concentrated in a few high-density zones with significant entry costs and high prices”.122 
Furthermore, relying only upon the private sector will result in under-investment since the 
positive externalities resulting from network expansion will not be captured, particularly the 
economic growth which it can facilitate. Such “market failures” can be corrected somewhat by 
public sector investment and, for this reason, the DAE seeks to impose on Member States an 
obligation to draw-up national broadband plans which should include the use of “public 
financing in line with EU competition and state aid rules”, in particular avoiding market 
distortions.123  
 
In order to complement the general guidelines on State aids (explained in section C.1. above), the 
Commission has attempted to enunciate in detail the principles it will apply to broadband in a set 
of Guidelines first issued in 2009, and then subsequently updated in 2013,124 the latter reflecting 
the priorities of the DAE, particularly the need for increased public investment in NGA 
broadband.125   
 
The Guidelines recognise, on the one hand, that the DAE targets cannot be achieved without the 
support of public funds, while cautioning that State aid should only be complementary to, and 
not a substitute for, the investments of market players, limiting as far as possible the risk of 
“crowding out of private investments”.126 It notes the need to go beyond mere market failures; 
markets may produce outcomes which are efficient but are otherwise “unsatisfactory from a 
                                                          
121 The first of these – securing the availability of basic broadband to all European citizens – was achieved ahead of 
schedule in 2013. The focus now is how to provide fast and ultra-fast broadband by 2020 to all and half of the 
European households respectively. European Commission, “100% basic broadband coverage achieved across 
Europe – EU target achieved ahead of schedule. Next stop is fast broadband for all.” (2013), Press Release, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-968_en.htm accessed 3 August 2016. 
122 European Commission, supra n 120, 19.  
123 Ibid, 21. 
124 European Commission, “EU Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment 
of broadband networks” [2013] OJ C25/1. 
125 The cost of the provision of internet speeds of 30 Mbps are estimated to be nearly EUR 60 billion and to provide 
at least half of the European households with ultra-fast internet (100 Mbps) may be up to EUR 268 billion, European 
Commission, supra n 124, para 2. 
126 Ibid, para 4. 
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cohesion policy point of view” in addressing the digital divide.127 An element of market 
distortion is consistent with this policy, but these effects need to be outweighed by the positive 
effects of wider access and penetration.128  
 
In scrutinising state interventions, principally assessed under Article 107(3),129 the Commission 
applies a series of necessary conditions, including the need to demonstrate that – absent the aid – 
the infrastructure investment would not take place, that the aid is limited to the minimum level 
necessary to remedy either the market failure or to correct social or regional inequalities that 
would the market alone would produce.130 Overall, it is the incumbent upon the Member State to 
demonstrate a “step change” in broadband availability before any distortion of competition can 
be justified by the efficiency or social goals being pursued.  Even where aid can be justified, a 
series of measures to minimise market distortions are required, including consultation with 
market players who may be planning infrastructure investments in the areas concerned, and the 
imposition of wholesale access conditions commensurate with the need to avoid the creation of 
regional service monopolies at the retail level.131 Echoing the SGEI Framework, the Guidelines 
also require that, in selecting the beneficiaries of the aid, there is a competitive selection process 
in line with EU public procurement principles.132 The use of a competitive selection procedure 
appears to be vital to avoid the “tendency of public authorities to contract with the national 
telecommunications incumbent”.133 Failure to comply with the terms of the Guidelines may 
result in a (costly) requirement to re-run the tender process.134  
                                                          
127 Ibid, para 5. 
128 Ibid, para 6.  
129 In the case of broadband projects, the state aid measures may be compatible with the internal market, if the 
measure promotes the economic development of areas with an abnormally low standard of living or high 
unemployment rate (Article 107(3)(a) TFEU) or in which the aid enhances the development of certain economic 
activities or certain economic areas and does not have a negative effect on the European Union (Article 107(3)(c) 
TFEU). 
130 European Commission, supra n 124, paras 30-54.   
131 Ibid, supra n 124, paras 51, 78; See Kliemann and Stehmann, supra n 110, 512-13.  
132 European Commission, supra n 124, para 78(c); Member States are also required to respect the principle of 
technological neutrality with no a priori preference given to one type of technology over another, European 
Commission, supra n 124, para 78(e).  
133 Kliemann and Stehmann, supra n 110, 511. 
134 F Chirico and N Gaál, “State aid to broadband: primer and best practices” (2011) Competition Policy Newsletter, 
Number 1, 50, 55 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2011_1_10_en.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. 
Even where this requirement is not met, aid may be lawful under Article 106(2) (see Decision N196/2010  
Establishment of a Sustainable Infrastructure Permitting Estonia-wide Broadband Internet Connection (EstWin 
Project) [2010]. 
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There has been a considerable increase in the number of broadband State aid cases since the first 
one was notified in 2003.135 Between December 2003 and August 2009, the Commission 
processed only 47 cases, whereas between the adoption of the 2009 Guidelines and mid-February 
2014, it decided 85 broadband cases, clearing 82.136 In terms of the volume of State aid involved, 
this increased sharply from an annual average of €30-55 million in 2003-2005, to almost €2 
billion per year from 2010 and €6 billion in 2012.137  
 
The vast majority of cases appear to be notified and cleared under the State aid regime, but there 
remains a residual category for cases which may escape the State aid regime altogether because 
the Member State seeks to rely upon the Altmark criteria.138 Such cases are dealt with briefly in 
the Guidelines.139 The most significant case to date is Réseau à trės jait débit en Hauts-de-
Seine.140 Here, following a competitive tendering process, the French authorities awarded a 
subsidy of €59 million over 25 years to a consortium to build a high-speed broadband network in 
the Hauts-de-Seine department, an area bordering Paris. Following a voluntary notification by 
France, the Commission determined that the payment did not constitute State aid,141 a decision 
which was contested by a number of competitors before the General Court.142 The Court upheld 
the Commission’s decision that all four Altmark critera were met. The first of these, the existence 
of a SGEI, was present since there was evidence of a “market failure” in so far as, despite being 
a relatively densely populated area, there was evidence to suggest that the commercial operators 
would not have the incentives to serve all users in the area with high-speed broadband. The 
                                                          
135 Decision N282/2003 Cumbria Broadband-Project ACCESS [2003]. 
136 European Commission, “Commission decision on State aid to broadband” (2016) 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/telecommunications/broadband_decisions.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. For a 
detailed discussion of the cases, see Kliemann and Stehmann, supra n 110. 
137 Chirico and Gaál, supra n 109, 30. This amounts to 10 per cent of the total State aid granted (ibid, 31). This 
actual amount may be higher since the notification requirement does not apply, in theory at least, to investment 
which meets the Altmark criteria.  
138 According to Kliemann and Stehmann, supra n 110, 504 only three cases have been considered by the 
Commission under Article 106(2), all concerning France. Of course, there are other categories of cases where public 
investment does not amount to State aid (e.g. where the market investor principle can be demonstrated with respect 
to the aid, European Commission, supra n 124, paras 16 and 17. 
139 European Commission, supra n 124, paras 18-27.  
140 Decision N 331/2008 Réseau à trės jait débit en Hauts-de-Seine [2009] C(2009) 7426 final. 
141 Strictly speaking, there is no requirement to notify, but it appears that France opted to do so for legal certainty 
reasons, Kliemann and Stehmann, supra n 110, 504. 
142 Case T-79/10 Colt Télécommunications France v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2013:463; Case T-258/10 Orange v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2013:471; Case T-325/10 Iliad and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2013:472. 
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General Court confirmed that the presence of a market failure, which was an “objective 
concept”,143 was a necessary condition for finding a service to fall within the SGEI definition.144 
It also held that the presence of universal service with respect to basic broadband, did not 
demonstrate the lack of a market failure on the high-speed broadband market.145 The Court also 
rejected the arguments of the commercial operators that over-compensation would occur, 
contrary to the third Altmark criterion, merely because the scheme is designed to use cross-
subsidies from profitable consumers to reduce the costs of serving those who are unprofitable.146  
 
1.2. Conclusions  
 
The approach of the European Commission and the majority of the Member States raises the 
question of why they prefer using State aid procedures instead of including broadband in the 
scope of universal service under the USD and then, if necessary, compensate the universal 
service provider.  
 
All Member States have developed national broadband plans for fulfilling the goals of the DAE, 
some going even further. Some countries focus on improving broadband access in rural areas, 
while others that have sufficient coverage in all parts of their country may focus on the  
availability of NGA broadband.147 This differentiated approach certainly tells against the 
adoption of a USO at the EU level with prescribed minimum broadband speeds. On the other 
hand, the requirement as it now stands in the USD does leave Member States with a considerable 
amount of discretion when it comes to defining a universal level of broadband access suitable to 
the relevant markets and demand conditions. Furthermore, for national governments, invoking 
the provisions of the USD with respect to both prescribing and, where necessary, compensating 
                                                          
143 Colt, supra n 142, para 158. 
144 Ibid, para 153. As has been pointed out elsewhere, this is an important development since it limited the discretion 
member states have to determine whether there is the necessity for a SGEI, E Szyszczak, “Services of General 
Economic Interest and State Measures Affecting Competition” (2014) 5 Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice, 508, 514. 
145 Colt, supra n 142, para 161. 
146 Ibid, paras 185-6. The Court of Justice ruled inadmissible the competitors challenge to the General Court’s 
judgment Case C-621/13P Orange v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2015:114; Case C-624/13P Iliad and Others v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2015:112. 
147 For detailed information on national broadband plans and their realisation, see European Commission, supra n 
120; BEREC, supra n 79. 
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for universal levels of broadband access does have the advantage of avoiding the Commission’s 
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 108(3).148 However, the use of the USD procedures are 
complex and may give rise to a level of legal uncertainty which itself may result in sub-optimal 
levels of investment. A USO provider must first be designated, and it will only be compensated 
where the NRA determines that it bears an unfair burden. As was discussed in section C.2., this 
does not simply mean net costs; in each case an individual assessment is required and what is an 
unfair burden for one undertaking may not be for another operator (this assessment depends on 
the firm’s size and market share, its equipment, economic and financial situation, and any 
intangible benefits of being the USP).149 As the rules under the USD derive from the Altmark 
criteria, the level of compensation is strictly limited to the provision of USO, i.e. the USP can 
only be compensated for infrastructure investment which could not be supported by the 
market.150 This methodology no doubt creates uncertainty for a potential USP, which is likely to 
impact disproportionately on new entrant firms who might otherwise be willing to invest in 
infrastructure, rather than merely relying upon access to the incumbent’s network. Indeed, one of 
the key benefits of relying on the State aid regime is the extent to which it opens avenues for 
infrastructure competition, especially in relation to the deployment of NGA broadband, which 
can no longer be supported only by the incumbent’s legacy networks.151 By way of contrast, a 
reliance on the incumbent provider is likely to create significant barriers to entry, and merely 
extend incumbency advantages into new broadband service markets.  
 
2. Postal services 
 
The concept of universal service in the postal sector has a long history. Historically, the norm 
throughout the EU was to have a monopoly postal provider charged with an obligation to fulfil 
universal service at a uniform price. From the early 1990s, however, this model of universal 
service delivery was gradually dismantled, with the abolition of exclusive rights for incumbents 
                                                          
148 Interestingly, Chirico and Gaál argue that the principles established in the Guidelines and the underlying case law 
are now so clear and consistently applied that a State aid exemption for broadband should now be put into place, 
Chirico and Gaál, supra n 109, 36.  
149 Commission v Belgium, supra n 101. 
150 European Commission, supra n 124, para 26; L Papadias, F Chirico and N Gaál, “The new State Aid Broadband 
Guidelines: not all black and white” (2009) Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 3, 17, 20 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2009_3_3.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. 
151 For a discussion see Kliemann and Stehmann, supra n 110, 498.  
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from 2012 onwards. Alongside this there has been significant changes in demand, especially a 
steep decline in the volume of letters, as customers and businesses increasingly use electronic 
forms of communication.152 While new entry in the postal services market may have played a 
significant role in securing greater efficiency, it has also posed a challenge to the sustainability of 
universal service. Competition has come from firms who have only entered the most profitable 
segments of the market, such as bulk mail, business to business communications, and the 
growing parcel delivery sector.153 This poses particular difficulties for incumbents, whose ability 
to cross-subsidise USOs has been eroded.  
 
2.1. Liberalisation of postal services and the protection of USOs: reconciling the two 
objectives 
 
The liberalisation of postal services began with the publication of a Green Paper in 1992 which 
proposed to protect and finance USOs by granting exclusive rights to the incumbents with 
respect to specific reserved services. 154 This was followed in 1994 by a Council resolution 
inviting the Commission to come forward with legislative proposals to include a definition of a 
minimum level of universal service and, in order to ensure “the economic and financial viability” 
of the provision of universal service, the definition of “a sector of appropriate dimensions which 
may be reserved for universal service providers”.155 The First Postal Directive156 in 1997 defined 
universal service as “the permanent provision of a postal service of specified quality at all points 
in their territory at affordable prices for all users”,157 prescribing the minimum levels of service 
                                                          
152 In the UK, the volume of letter mail has dropped by 28.2% since 2008. Despite the loss in volume, the prices for 
standard-sized letter mail are cheaper than in other European countries, Ofcom, “International Communications 
Market Report” (2014), 311 http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr14/icmr/ICMR_2014.pdf 
accessed 3 August 2016. The financial crisis and the recession has left its scars, Dieke et al., supra n 83, 168.  
153 The parcel market has grown over the last years (23.4% between 2008 and 2013), mainly because of an 
increasing popularity of e-commerce leading to a growth of the business to consumer segment of the parcel market. 
The revenues in the parcel market are also higher than in the letter market. In 2014, Royal Mail’s domestic parcel 
revenue market share was 31%, Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, “Competition in the postal services 
sector and the Universal Service Obligation” (Ninth Report of Session 2014-15), para 56, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmbis/769/769.pdf accessed 3 August 2016.  
154 Commission, “Green Paper on the Development of the Single Market for Postal Services” (Communication) 
COM(91) 476 final. 
155 Council Resolution of 7 February 1994 on the development of Community postal service [1994] OJ C 48/3. 
156 Directive 97/67/EC. 
157 Ibid, art 3(1). 
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Member States should seek to protect.158 At the same time, it stipulated the limitations of 
reserved services, and set out a number of deadlines to be met in the gradual reduction of their 
scope, “taking into account the financial equilibrium of the universal service provider(s)”.159  
 
In 2002, the Commission reported on the effect of liberalisation of universal service, painting a 
very positive picture of the situation in all of the Member States.160 Not only were the minimum 
requirements of the Directive being met, in many countries they were being exceeded 
significantly. Furthermore, while the Directive only required universal service at “affordable 
prices”,161 the Commission reported that “the uniform tariff remains a cornerstone of universal 
service in all Member States (even if not a regulatory requirement in all of them)”.162 However, 
there was evidence that the financial stability of USPs was in question: in seven Member States, 
provisions for compensation mechanisms were in place, although at that time only Spain had 
plans to activate a fund.163 All in all, the Commission concluded that universal service was “not 
at risk”.164 This finding was hardly surprising given the report had been overtaken by the 
adoption of Second Postal Service Directive,165 which laid down deadlines for the significant 
reduction in the scope of reserved services in 2003 and 2006 while at the same time leaving the 
universal service requirements substantially the same.166  
 
Although the clear endpoint was the removal of reserved markets, there was evidence of some 
nervousness over the sustainability of USOs, the Directive requiring the Commission complete 
an assessment by the end of 2006 of the “impact on universal service of the full accomplishment 
of the postal internal market”.167 In fulfilling that requirement, the Commission announced a 
                                                          
158 Directive 97/67/EC, art 3(3). 
159 Ibid, art 7(3). 
160 Commission, “Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of the 
Postal Directive (97/67/EC Directive)” COM(2002) 632 final, 16-19. 
161 Directive 97/67/EC, art 3(1). 
162 Commission, supra n 160, 17.  
163 Ibid, 18. 
164 Ibid.  
165 Directive 2002/39/EC. 
166 Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2002/39/EC, art 7(1). The market was opened in four steps. The 
first reduction of the reserved areas took place in 1999 when the market was opened for items weighing 350 grams 
or more and costing less than five times the public tariff. The Second Postal Directive reduced the limit for reserved 
services further to items weighing less than 100 grams as from 1 January 2003 and for services weighing less than 
50 grams from 2006 on respectively.  
167 Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2002/39/EC, art 7(3).  
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detailed “prospective study” of the implications of full market opening on universal service.168 
Published in 2006, the study had one core message: that market opening should not be delayed 
beyond 2009.169 Those countries which had already introduced significant postal competition – 
Sweden, Finland and the UK – had not seen a decline in the attainment or quality of USOs, and 
there was evidence of increased efficiency and reliability of postal services in those countries.170 
Indeed, the Commission opined, one of the key problems in delaying full market opening would 
be the resulting lack of incentives operating on the incumbents to increase their efficiency and 
preparedness for fully fledged competition. Overall, the Commission’s premise was that 
competition would enhance service quality, with universal service benefiting from the “dynamic 
efficiencies” that would be created.171 Only once this was achieved would further interventions 
be required to protect USOs. These would be regulatory safeguards, in the form of service 
standards or price caps and, only in the last resort, specific subsidies for USPs.172  
 
The key recommendation of the Commission’s study was implemented with the adoption in 
2008 of the Third Postal Directive.173 All postal markets had to be fully opened to competition 
by the end of 2010, although eleven Member States took advantage of a two year transitional 
period.174  
 
Despite the removal of the reserved areas, the scope of universal postal service has been retained 
substantially at the levels originally laid down in the First Postal Services Directive.175 Member 
States do retain a degree of discretion and flexibility to meet national demands and 
circumstances.176 While the first two Directives clearly envisaged the incumbent as the de facto 
universal service provider, alongside the removal of the reserved areas, the Third Postal 
                                                          
168 Commission, “Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of the 
Postal Directive (97/67/EC Directive as amended by Directive 2002/39/EC)” COM(2005) 102 final, 7.  
169 Commission, “Prospective study on the impact on universal service of the full accomplishment of the postal 
internal market in 2009” (Report) COM(2006) 596 final.  
170 Commission, supra n 169, 4.  
171 Ibid, 7.  
172 Ibid.  
173 Directive 2008/6/EC. 
174 Ibid, art 2(1) and art 3(1); Those Member States were Czech Republic, Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. 
175 Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2002/39/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, art 3. 
176 Directive 2008/6/EC, Recital 23. 
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Directive gives the Member States more freedom to designate one or more universal service 
provider(s), or to rely on the market when intervention is not necessary.177 The need to move 
beyond relying only upon the incumbent as the universal service provider is reflected in the 
Third Postal Services Directive which now encourages the use of public procurement procedures 
in the funding of universal services.178  
 
2.2. How changes in demand / the abolition of the reserved market has led to increased 
tensions on postal services – the UK and Germany 
 
Despite the Commission’s position, sustained for over two decades, that liberalisation and 
universal service could both be pursued successfully in tandem, this view has come under stress 
in recent years. The logic underpinning the reserved areas approach was that the incumbent 
would retain an ability to cross-subsidise the non-profitable elements of its service from the 
profitable ones. While the potential to do so was progressively lowered with the reduction in the 
scope of reserved areas, full liberalisation has left incumbents facing ‘cherry-picking’ by new 
entrant firms across all of their activities. New entrants have chosen selective entry, mainly 
offering their services in urban areas with a focus on the business to business market. They can 
also freely choose the quantity and quality of their collections and deliveries, not being subject to 
the USO requirements. In many rural and less populated areas, the former incumbent is still the 
only service provider, with the “final mile” of delivery remaining a natural monopoly. 
Incumbents then are forced to lower prices where they face new entry, and raise prices where 
they do not, undermining the sustainability of universal service, at least in the long-term.  
 
One solution to this problem, of course, is to extend USOs to new entrants. However, doing so 
especially in the early days of liberalisation, may well have created significant barriers to entry 
and hinder competition. The same could be said, albeit to a lesser extent, of requiring new 
entrants to contribute to an incumbent’s net costs via a compensation mechanism. Another 
                                                          
177 Ibid.  
178 Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC, art 7(2).  
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alternative is to reduce the scope of universal service (subject, of course, to the minimum 
requirements of the PSD). This has been done in a number of EU countries.179  
 
In order to explore some of these issues further, we focus on recent developments in two 
Member States, Germany and the UK. These two countries were in the vanguard of opening their 
postal service markets to competition, well ahead of the 2010 deadline.180 The issue of the 
sustainability of universal service has come to the fore in both, with pressure from incumbents to 
reduce the scope of universal service.181  
 
Currently in the UK, universal service obligations are only imposed on the incumbent, Royal 
Mail, and there is no compensation mechanism in place. In areas which an entrant does not wish 
to serve, it can choose instead downstream access, i.e., handing their postal items over to Royal 
Mail for final mile delivery. In Germany, Deutsche Post was designated as USP, but since the 
introduction of competition in 2008, its designation was removed, and no universal service 
provider is now designated. If universal service cannot be fulfilled by the market, then all 
licensed operators must provide the service jointly.182  
 
                                                          
179 The frequency of delivery has been reduced to five days a week in the Netherlands and Italy. European 
Regulators Group for Postal Services, “Discussion paper on the implementation of Universal Service in the postal 
sector and the effects of recent changes in some countries on the scope of the USO” ERGP(14)16, 8 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ergp/docs/documentation/2014/ergp-14-16-uso_en.pdf accessed 3 August 2016; 
PostNL, “General Conditions for the Universal Postal Service 2014”, Article 20(1), 
file://ueahome/eresssf4/zgr08szu/data/Documents/general-conditions-universal-postal-service_tcm19-76269.pdf 
accessed 3 August 2016. 
180 The UK and German postal services markets were fully liberalised in 2006 and 2008 respectively. S Hough and L 
Booth, “Postal Services: Royal Mail plc” (2014) House of Commons, Standard Note, SN/EP/06763; Section 51(1) 
of the Postgesetz of 22 December 1997, BGBl. I, 3294, as amended by Art. 4 Abs. 106 G v. 7.8.2013, BGBl. I, 
3154. 
181 Both countries impose obligations which go further than is required by the PSD. The Postal Services Directive 
only requires the collection and delivery of letters and parcels from Mondays to Fridays, whereas in the UK and 
Germany letters are collected and delivered six days a week (Mondays to Saturdays) and in Germany the six days a 
week collection and delivery applies also for parcels. For a summary of USOs at European level, in Germany and 
the UK, see Harker at al., supra  n 1, 35-38. 
182 If the German regulatory authority believes that the level of discharging universal service is not satisfactory, then 
all operators who have a licence, subject to a turnover threshold of 500,000 euros in the preceding calendar year, 
jointly provide universal postal service (section 12(1) of the Postgesetz of 22 December 1997, BGBl. I, 3294, as 
amended by Art. 4 Abs. 106 G v. 7.8.2013, BGBl. I, 3154). See C Feijoo and C Milne, “Re-thinking universal 
service policy for the digital era: setting the scene – an introduction to the special issue on universal service” (2008) 
10, info 4.  
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The levels of end-to-end competition (where the entrant collects, sorts and then distributes and 
delivers the mail) are low in the letter market as the vast majority of letters are still delivered by 
the former incumbent.183 In the UK, the most significant entrant was offering direct letter 
delivery in London, Liverpool and Manchester, but withdrew from the direct delivery market in 
2015.184 However, despite an overall decline of letter volumes, the demand for downstream 
access has increased.185 In Germany, while there are hundreds of licensed operators,186 Deutsche 
Post delivers nearly 90 per cent of all (licensed) letters.187 In rural areas, consumers often do not 
have a choice between different providers and instead have to rely on the former incumbent.188 
Downstream access also plays an important role in Germany.189  
 
In both countries, the sustainability of universal service has been questioned. In the UK, Royal 
Mail regards itself as being at a competitive disadvantage compared with the other providers and 
has asked for a number of regulatory reviews of the USO scheme. In 2008, the Hooper Report 
acknowledged that universal service was under threat, mainly because of the declining letter 
market, but it also suggested that the incumbent was in a position to reduce its costs still further 
before any intervention was required.190 Two years later, in an update to the report, Hooper came 
                                                          
183 In the UK, in 2013-14 only 0.6% of letters by volume were delivered by providers other than Royal Mail, Ofcom, 
“Annual monitoring update on the postal market: Financial year 2013-14” (2014), paras 6.26-6.27, 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/post/monitoring-reports/annual-monitoring-update-postal-2013-14.pdf 
accessed 3 August 2016 
184 BBC, “Royal Mail regulation to be reviewed by Ofcom” (16 June 2015), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
33145446 accessed 3 August 2016. 
185 Ofcom, supra n 183, paras 6.20-6.23. 
186 At the end of 2013, there were about 600 licenced enterprises, many of them small or even micro businesses, 
Bundesnetzagentur, “Herausforderungen des Post-Universaldienstes Vorbereitung einer Stellungnahme gemäß § 47 
Abs. 1 Satz 2 Postgesetz” (2014) Impulspapier, 2 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Sachgebiete/Post/Verbraucher/Universaldienst/Impul
spapier.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1 accessed 3 August 2016. 
187 Bundesnetzagentur, “Marktuntersucherung Bericht über den lizenzpflichtigen Briefbereich 2015” (2016), 7, 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Sachgebiete/Post/Unternehmen_Institutionen/Marktb
eobachtung/LizenzpflichtigePDL/Marktuntersuchung2015.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5 accessed 3 August 
2016. 
188 Monopolkommission, “Post 2013: Wettbewerbsschutz effectivieren” Sondergutachten 67, 27, 
http://www.monopolkommission.de/images/PDF/SG/s67_volltext.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. 
189 The majority of alternative postal provider carry out the entire service from collection to delivery of letters. 
Despite the fact that in 2012 more than 60% of all licensed letters carried out by the incumbents stemmed from 
downstream access, only a tenth of those products came from new entrants. Bundesnetzagentur, “Post 2012 /2013” 
(2013) Tätigkeitsbericht, 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Allgemeines/Bundesnetzagentur/Publikationen/Beric
hte/2013/131216_TaetigkeitsberichtPost2012.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3 3 August 2016. 
190 Richard Hooper, Deirdre Hutton and Smith Ian R, “Modernise or decline: Policies to maintain the universal 
postal service in the United Kingdom” (An independent review of the UK postal service sector, 2008), para 38, 
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to the conclusion that the situation had become more serious.191 However, repeating the findings 
of the previous report, the 2010 Report found that Royal Mail still had the potential to increase 
further its efficiency before any reduction of the scope of the USOs would be contemplated.192 
The postal regulator, Ofcom, has taken a very robust stance with Royal Mail. In a recent report 
on universal service in 2014, it dismissed Royal Mail’s claims that it was unable to fulfil its 
USOs, stating unequivocally that universal postal service in the UK is “not under threat”, and 
reiterated the need for Royal Mail to increase its efficiency.193  
 
In Germany, similar issues have come to the fore and in 2014 the postal regulator, 
Bundesnetzagentur, launched an inquiry into the universal postal service.194 Since Germany is 
relying on the market to secure universal service, there is the real prospect that a declining letter 
market and increasing competition in parcel market may threaten the sustainability of USOs, at 
least in the long-term. Anticipating a further decline, and higher costs for the service providers, 
the regulator has emphasised the need for operators to increase their efficiency and develop new 
services.195 However, unlike its UK counterpart, the Bundesnetzagentur has signalled that it may 
be necessary to change the national and even the European regulatory framework to guarantee an 
adequate universal postal service in the future. This could involve both increasing and reducing 
the scope of USOs; new services that have been developed because of increased competition 
                                                          
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228786/7529.pdf accessed 3 August 
2016. 
191 Richard Hooper, “Saving the Royal Mail’s universal postal service in the digital age: An Update of the 2008 
Independent Review of the Postal Services Sector” (September 2010) para 7 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31808/10-1143-saving-royal-mail-
universal-postal-service.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. 
192 Ibid. Unlike the 2008 Report, the updated version concluded that the creation of a compensation fund should not 
be excluded per se, ibid, 40. For a discussion see L Booth and D Hough, “TNT Post and Royal mail: end-to-end 
competition in postal services” (2014) House of Commons Briefing Paper, 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06935 accessed 3 August 2016. 
193 Ofcom, “Securing universal postal service” (2 December 2014), http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/post/securing-
universal-postal-service/ accessed 3 August 2016; The regulator also argued that selective entry does not create a 
‘cherry-picking’ situation, ibid. More recently the BIS Select Committee, in a report published in March 2015, 
reached the conclusion that alternative providers are able to ‘cherry-pick’ but the current level is too low to require 
any regulatory action, Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, supra n 153, para 39, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmbis/769/769.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. Ofcom 
has recently confirmed the position: Ofcom “Review of the Regulation of 
Royal Mail” (25 May 2016), http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/royal-mail-
review/summary/Review-of-Royal-Mail-Regulation.pdf accessed 3 August 2016.  
194 Bundesnetzagentur, supra n 186, 2. 
195 Ibid, 2-3.  
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could be brought within it (perhaps by combining universal service in telecoms), while the scope 
of traditional letter services may need to be reduced, especially in rural and less populated 
areas.196 Given that the incumbent is not subject to any formal requirement with respect to 
universal service, it is not surprising that the situation in Germany is seen as more urgent than it 
is in the UK.  
 
2.3. Compensation mechanisms for universal service in postal services 
 
In postal services, it appears that while the majority of Member States have legislated for the 
establishment of a compensation fund, as of 2013, only four have actually gone on to establish 
one.197 A further four compensate the USPs directly from public funds.198 For those countries 
which have actively considered the introduction of compensation mechanisms, there is a wide 
variety of views on the pros and cons of their implementation from a competition perspective. 
The Swedish NRA is of the view that designation is vital to protect competition since the 
designation procedure triggers the requirement of the PSD on cost-related pricing.199 On the 
other hand, the Spanish competition authority has been highly critical of the designation of the 
incumbent as the USP for a fifteen year period, which it considers to be contrary to both the 
spirit and the letter of the PSD.200 This approach, however, appears to represent the practice in 
other Member States; in all cases where a USP has been designated it has been the incumbent 
firm, despite the Third Postal Directive encouraging some level of contestability.201 It also 
appears that, subject to limited exceptions, the vast majority of users in Member States will have 
service levels which meet the minimum USO requirements of the Directive without the need for 
intervention.202  
 
                                                          
196 Ibid, 5-6. 
197 Dieke et al., supra n 83, 154.  
198 Ibid. As of 2013, 22 have legislated for a compensation fund, while six have deemed that the USO represents an 
unfair burden on the USP. Ibid.  
199 Ibid, 133. 
200 Comision Nacional de la Competencia, The new regulatory framework for the traditional postal sector in Spain 
(March 2011), cited in Dieke et al., supra n 83, 133.  
201 Dieke et al., supra n 83, 16. 
202 This is the result of a survey of Member States which concludes that “the risk of persons lacking basic universal 
service appears to be confined to relatively small populations living in thinly populated rural areas”, ibid, 136. 
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State aid fulfils a different role in postal services compared to broadband. In broadband, state aid 
is used to increase access to a service, whereas in postal services it is used to maintain the current 
level of services and secure a level-playing field between undertakings that provide USOs and 
alternative operators with no such obligation. State aid cases are relatively few. There have only 
been 27 State aid decisions concerning compensation for discharging SGEI in the postal sector 
between 2003 and 2014.203 All of the cases concerned compensation payments to the former 
incumbent and the majority of cases involved aid granted for the provision of services that go 
beyond the minimum objectives and conditions set out by the PSD. 204  
 
There are only a handful of State aid cases that concern only the funding of USOs as defined in 
the PSD. 205 In both decisions, the subsidy granted by the Italian government to the incumbent, 
Poste Italiane, was held to be State aid as the fourth Altmark criterion had not been satisfied. 
There are a number of other cases where Member States have been found to be subsidising 
services which include but go beyond the definition of USO in the PSD.206 Although these may 
be capable of being disaggregated for the purposes of a State aid assessment, Member States are 
unlikely to set-up a separate compensation scheme under the PSD, with all of the administrative 
and bureaucratic architecture that implies, if there are other subsidies which have to be notified 
to the Commission. Of course, this has the effect in practice of excluding new entrants from 
fulfilling the USOs. Where compensation mechanisms are used, the Commission guards against 
market distortionary effects. For example, in a recent State aid decision concerning the Greek 
postal incumbent, ELTA, the Commission had to assess a compensation fund based on 
contributions by the incumbent’s competitors.207 The Commission concluded the compensation 
                                                          
203 The cases were collected from the European Commission with the help of the EC’s internal search engine 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm>. The search focussed on cases for the economic sector 
“H.53 – Postal and courier activities” between 25.07.2003 (after Altmark) and 31.12.2014. The search was further 
refined by limiting the cases to compensation payments for the provision of SGEI. State aid decisions that concern 
subsidies paid to cover pension costs were excluded. Other cases not listed as a result of the online search but we 
became aware of through a review of the relevant literature so that 25 cases are part of the case law assessment.  
204 Services of General Economic Interest in postal services are, for example, the distribution of periodicals, the 
provision of basic financial services, the distribution of electoral material, and in some Member States even the 
payment of pensions. See, Competition Policy Brief, “High quality and competitive postal services for citizens and 
businesses - State aid control in the postal sector” (May 2014), 2 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2014/006_en.pdf accessed 3 August 2016. 
205 Decision NN51/2006 [2006] Poste Italiane SpA and Decision NN24/2008 [2008] Poste Italiane SpA.  
206 N462/2008 [2008] Poland; N312/2010 [2010] Poland; SA. 33989 [2012] Italy; SA.17653 [2013] Germany. 
207 Decision SA.35608 [2014] Hellenic Post (ELTA). 
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scheme was incompatible as it appeared to place a disproportionate burden on new entrants, 
requiring them to make a contribution of up to 10 per cent of their turnover, thereby creating 
barriers to entry or even forcing them to exit the market.208  
 
2.4. Conclusions 
 
The findings of our case study suggest that the compensation mechanisms in the PSD have not 
been widely used. In many Member States, the incumbent provides services that go beyond the 
minimum requirement of universal postal service, but then struggles to finance those services, 
relying on state subsidies to maintain historic service levels. In those countries, such as the UK 
and Germany, where liberalisation has advanced significantly, incumbents have argued that 
universal service is unsustainable given the ability of new entrants to ‘cherry-pick’ the most 
profitable customers. Such arguments are likely to gain traction as demand for letter collection 
and delivery declines in the future.  
 
E. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have considered the protection of universal service in the network industries, 
with a focus on telecommunications and postal services.  
 
As has been observed in the literature, the protection of universal service was essentially a quid 
pro quo for liberalisation of the network industries. The EU sectoral legislation represented a 
compromise between these competing values; it sought to give formal legal protection to USOs 
and, in anticipation of full liberalisation and the eventual reduction of incumbents’ market 
shares, put in place detailed and elaborate mechanisms for compensating the costs of serving 
disadvantaged and unprofitable consumers. As we have demonstrated, to a surprising degree, 
these provisions have remained dormant. Where they have been tested, they have demonstrated 
themselves to be particularly complex and cumbersome. The substantive rules, as interpreted by 
the Court and the Commission, have been framed primarily to promote contestability in the 
                                                          
208 Ibid, para 193-194. 
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provision of universal service and to avoid the danger of over-compensation to the USP (the 
incumbent in the vast majority of cases). It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the limited use 
of compensation mechanisms is due in no small part to the complexity of the underlying sectoral 
rules.  
 
Another surprising finding in this paper is the degree to which the State aid regime has been used 
as an alternative mechanism for funding USOs.209 Indeed, with respect to the public funding of 
investment in broadband infrastructure, this appears to be the result of a deliberate policy 
decision on the part of the Member States, albeit with a strong steer from the Commission.  
There is nothing new or novel in the use of the general competition rules as an alternative to 
sectoral regulatory tools.210 The more pertinent and interesting question from our point of view is 
why Member States would prefer to channel compensation schemes for approval under the State 
aid regime, rather than relying upon the detailed procedural and substantive rules contained in 
the Directives. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the State aid regime is preferred because 
of its flexibility, and the legal certainty resulting from the Commission’s ex ante role in 
scrutinising the Member States’ interventions in these markets. 
 
State aid rules are not unproblematic. As a judge of the CJEU, Thomas von Danwitz, has 
observed, the State aid rules are not necessarily an appropriate tool in this context: “we have to 
acknowledge that state aid control is not a generally usable, unconditioned instrument of 
regulatory policy for realising a level playing field in liberalised markets. State aid control is 
rather focused on the use and abuse of state resources in a competitive environment”.211  
 
Under the State aid rules, the Commission has substantial control over Member States’ autonomy 
when it comes to protecting and promoting universal service. Where an EU norm exists in 
                                                          
209 The Commission takes the rather surprising view that compensation payments for the provision of USOs through 
a compensation fund set up under the PSD is State aid and, therefore, assesses the compatibility under the State aid 
regime (Hellenic Post, supra n 207). We disagree with this approach.   
210 For a detailed discussion see M Harker, “EU Competition Law as a Tool for Dealing with Regulatory Failure: 
The Broadband Margin Squeeze Cases” (2013)  Journal of Business Law 817; N Dunne, “Margin 
Squeeze: From Broken Regulation to Legal Uncertainty” (2011) 70 Cambridge Law Journal 34; D Geradin and R 
O’Donoghue, “The Concurrent Application of Competition Law and Regulation: The Case of Margin Squeeze  
in the Telecommunications Sector” (2005) 1 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 355.  
211 von Danwitz, supra n 23, 12. 
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secondary legislation (as in the case of both the USD and PSD), Member States retain some 
measure of discretion to go beyond that norm, but a stricter test of proportionality obtains, 
requiring Member States demonstrate that the State aid measure is the least restrictive means of 
achieving the objective in question.212 Furthermore, the Commission has sought to limit the 
discretion that Member States enjoy in the design of compensation mechanisms, maximising the 
boundaries of its supervisory powers by its restrictive interpretation of the Altmark criteria and 
Article 106(2).  
 
Controlling Member States’ autonomy when intervening in markets is not the same task as 
regulating to ensure that the aims and objectives of regulation are being fulfilled. As we 
explained, the State aid rules, as they are now to be interpreted under the 2012 SGEI package, 
have been realigned to promote contestability in public service provision. Nevertheless, the 
public procurement requirement introduced by the SGEI Framework is by no means a panacea. 
While the intention is to encourage more contestability in the provision of SGEI, it may be that 
tendering does not result in the best outcomes.213 Asymmetries of information may have the 
effect that the winning bidder actually puts forward a bid which is too low to recover the costs of 
universal service. Furthermore, procurement procedures cannot prevent undertakings colluding 
in order to achieve higher compensation payments. And even though an incumbent may be able 
to offer to fulfil USOs at the lowest cost, it will have an incentive to bid-up its price as the costs 
of its competitors will in general be higher. There are also potential problems when it comes to 
specifying and securing service levels as there are incentives on bidders to compete purely on 
price rather than quality of service.214 While using a tendering process obviates the need for 
Member States to engage in the complex requirements under the Directives, reliance solely on 
the EU public procurement rules is not an effective substitute for regulation; they do not involve 
an effective ex post check on the accounts of the incumbent to avoid any over-compensation.215 
                                                          
212 Sauter, supra n 15, 180-81; see also Ross, supra n 67, 136-8; Fiedziuk, supra n 23; Klasse, supra n 35, 50-51. 
213 N Fiedziuk, “Putting services of general economic interest up for tender: reflections on applicable EU rules” 
(2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 87, 93.  
214 EAGCP, supra n 35, 6-7. 
215 Ibid, 6; Klasse, supra n 35, 46-47; Fiedziuk, supra n 213, 93-96. 
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Furthermore, the State aid rules may not be engaged at all where the compensation payments are 
not capable of being imputable to the state.216  
 
There will often be trade-offs between pursuing liberalisation policies while at the same time 
seeking to protect vulnerable and disadvantaged consumers from some of the adverse 
consequences of competition. The core issue is whether these trade-offs are better made within a 
framework which seeks to give formal protection to specified levels of universal service, while at 
the same time putting in place safeguards – procedural and substantive – aimed at minimising 
distortions of competition. There are a number of dangers, outlined above, in relying upon the 
State aid regime to control Member States’ compensation of USOs. However, in our view, the 
key problem is that the State aid regime gives insufficient protection to the importance of 
universal service. The State aid rules are permissive; they do not require Member States to put in 
place mechanisms for compensation where the fulfilment of USOs require it. The danger is that 
such a discretionary approach to securing universal service will result in a diminution of USOs, 
leading to less protection for vulnerable and disadvantaged consumers. The Commission has 
been more concerned with ensuring that interventions in support of universal service do not 
produce disproportionate market distortions, that the incumbent is not over-compensated, and 
that new entrant firms are not excluded from being the USP. Very little, if any, attention has been 
paid to whether the USOs are in fact being fulfilled and, of equal importance, are being 
appropriately updated in the light of changing demand, technological and market conditions. It is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that universal service, as a formal EU regulatory norm in the 
network industries, is in managed decline. 
                                                          
216 On the problem of imputability see von Danwitz, supra n 23, 7-8. The extent to which an industry compensation 
scheme constitutes State aid is by no means straightforward. It depends upon whether the scheme is deemed to meet 
the cumulative conditions of being “aid granted by the State” and “through State resources”. The latter condition 
may be particularly difficult to meet in cases where the contributions towards an industry compensation scheme are 
made only by private undertakings and are not redistributed via a public institution (see Case C-379/98 
PreussenElecktra AG [2001] ECR I-2099). See M Clayton and M Catalan, “The Notion of State Resources: So Near 
and yet so Far” (2015) (2) European State Aid Law Quarterly 260 for a discussion of recent case law. It would 
appear vital that the scheme is both administered by a state institution and that there is state control over how the 
resources collected are distributed. However, the 2012 SGEI Communication posits that “compensatory payments 
for the operation of SGEIs which are financed through parafiscal charges or compulsory contributions imposed by 
the State and managed and apportioned in accordance with the provisions of the legislation are compensatory 
payments made through State resources.” Commission, supra n 48, Recital 36.  
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